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CERONOLOGICAL TABLE 
The follmving table of dates has been taken fram Maurice De Wulff s 
Histoire ~~ medievale philosophie. Pag~8~cited with the names of the 
Franciscans concerned refer to the pages on which the historical treatment 
will be found in Mr. De Wulff s work. 
1. Alexander of Hales. (pp. 104-111) 1170/80.1245. 
2. Roger Baoon. (pp. 269-281) 1210/15-1292. 
3. St. Bonaventure (pp. 112-125) 1221-1274. 
4. Roger Marston (pp. 240-3) a 1f epoque de ses etudes a Paris. 1269 and 
1272; died 1303. 
5. John Peokham (ppo 222-225). oiroa 1240-1292. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Franciscan philosophers take their pla?e in the history of philosophy 
as adherents to the tradition established in Christian philosophy by st. 
Augustine. 1 Their philosophy, Platonic and Neo-Platonio in inspiration, 
draws its prinoiples from an Augustinian phiJ;osophy whioh. because of the 
theology whioh guided the development of this philosophy and beoause of 
the metaphysioal prinoiples whioh served as ancillary premisses to 
theologioal-philosophical conolusions. Franoisoan philosophy differs from 
the Aristotelian philosophy introduoed into the sohools of the West by 
the Jews and the Arabs. 
When Aristotelian philosophy was brought to the schools of the West 
and was made to harmonize with Christian thought, a struggle between 
Christian traditionalists and Christian 'innovators' ensued. The Franois" 
oans knew that if tradition were to survive, it must cope successfully with 
'innovative philosophy.' Now, maintaining 'the old' and refuting 'the new' 
demanded of these men a familiarity with and a knowledge of the terms used 
in both philosophies. As a result. there is in Franoisoan thought. as 
lCf Maurioe De Vfulf, Histoire de la Philosophie M~dieval{, (J. Vrin, 'Paris, 
1936), pp. 19-22. For an analysTS and description of Franoisoan doctrines 
see chapitre troiseme6 # 7, p. 383 sq. 
i 
evidenced in the writings of Duns Scotus,2 a fusion of Augustinian 
tradition with new opinions. 
In the Arabian and Jewish interpretations of Aristotle, the schoolmen 
. 
found matter for unending disoussions.3 
1- .. ., 
Some problems, as presented in 
Arabian and Jewish commentaries under the oloaking of Aristotelian terms, 
such as the eternity of the world, were not c,nsonant with Catholic teach-
ing. Likewise there was a tendency to credit many new doctrines to the 
poorly translated texts of Aristotle, and to make the texts susceptible of 
many differing interpretations.4 
This making susceptible of differing interpretations may be accomplished 
in regard to the disputed texts of Aristotle's De Anima_ In this work, it 
2Ibidem, p. 60: La philosophie de Scot, qui apparait dans les derni~res 
annees du XIIIe si~cle, est issue dtun alliage de la tradition 
francis caine avec un ensemble de vues nouvelles_ Elle clot cette brillante 
'" , serie de systames. ~ 
3 Ibidem, p. 52: Dans l'interpr;tation de mainte theorie d'Aristote, les 
philosophies arabes et juifs, principalement Avicenne et Averro~s, ont 
servi des guides, et leurs cammentaires ont fourni mati~re a dtinterminables 
discussions. 
4Ibidem, p. 53: Diverses causes ont motive ces sevefities de la censure 
eccl~siastique. Dtabord les thtologiens st{meurent de oertaines doctrines 
aristoteliciennes qui contredisent le dogme (p.ex. It'ternit~du monde), 
des oammentaires arabes qui acoentuent ces theories sous le couvert d' 
Aristote, de la tendanoe a rattacher toutes sortes de doctrines nouvelles 
a des textes mal traduits et susceptibles d'interpr{tations divergentes. 
11 
·' 
is a question whether the agent intelleot is a faoulty of the human soul 
or a being separated from the human soul essentially and substantially -
secundum~ et substantiam -. It cannot be conclusively gathered from the 
, . 
• 47 
texts what Aristotle specifically means by the terms intellectus agens !! 
possibilis. The texts leave some latitude so that a commentator is in a 
position to offer various interpretations. Bit surely, such a procedure is 
not so muoh the exaot statement of the Philosopher's meaning as it is the 
interpretative meaning given to the srume words, (or at least to words 
similarly spelled), by the commentator. For this reason, it is no surprise 
to find philosopher reading Aristotle so as to conclude with the Psalmist: 
Signatum ~ lumen vultus ~ super ~,Domine. It is likewise no surprise 
to find them, in the guiding light of their own metaphysios, drawing varying 
meanings from terms and propositions of Aristotle. 
And so it is that the bringing of terms from one system of thought 
to another, and the use of these terms in another metaphysics, in the effort 
to adapt and conform, and, perhaps, thereby to save, and to harmonize these 
with the writings of the saints--especially with the writings of St. 
Augustine - has developed in the Franciscan school itself differing opinions. 
The several meanings given to the Aristotelian term intellectus agens by the 
Franoiscans account for the problem set forth in this paper, namely, is there 
a common appro~ch or a cammon treatment of the problem of the agent intellect 
among the Franciscans? 
iii 
·' 
CHAPl'ER I 
ALEXANDER OF HALES 
. 
;;, .... 
Alexander of Hales. the first Franciscan to occupy the chair of 
philosophy at Paris. and the principal figure of a long line of theologian-
philosophers. l is credited with a workwhich.well could be called Summa 
1finorum. or Franoisoan Summa. 2 In this Summa. Hales has made use of nearly 
all the philosophical works of Aristotle, but this does not prevent him 
fram abandoning Aristotle on same important questions. Alexander reserves 
a preponderant place for a number of Platonioand Augustinian theories.3 
Alexander relies strongly upon st. Augustine for his metaphysical 
theories and the philosophy developing fram them. This relianoe is 
mentioned by 
<,Jt. 
IMaurioe de Wu1f. Histoire ~~ philosophie medi$vale. p. 20: Les premiers 
maitres daminioains furent Roland de Cemone et Jean de S. Gilles; Ie prem-
ier franoisoaine fut Alexandre de Hales. 
Ibidem, p. 104: Alexandre de Ha1~s est Ie chef de file d'une longue serie 
de theolgiens-philosophes qui enseignerent a l'universite(, en qualite de 
titulaires d'une ohaire franoisoaine. 
2Ibidem. p. 105: ••• et 1a oompilation insorite sous Ie nom d'A1exandre 
put s'appeler la Summa Minorum, ou la Samme des franoisoains. 
3Ibidem. p. 106: II utilise presque toute l'oeuvre philosophique d'Aris-
tote, dont Ie or~dit, vers 1231, oammenoait ~ monter. et i1 n'a pas peu 
contribuea son suooes deoisif. oe qui ne llemp$ohe pas de oritiquer Aris-
tote. et de l'abandonner sur des questions importantes ••• En m~e temps. 
il re'serve une plaoe preponderante '8. nambre de theories platonioiennes et 
augustiniennes provenant de la soolastique du XlIe sieole. • • 
.' 
his editors in the Prolegomena to his Summa,4 and is stressed by Alexander 
himself when he says that it is better to believe Augustine"and Anselm than 
Aristotle. 5 
The Irrefragible Doctor attempts to fotl~w faithfully the teaohing of 
St. Augustine regarding man's knowledge ~ via, 6 maintaining that cognition 
of God is so impressed on the rational mind an~ its evidence shines forth so 
strongly, that the existence of the First Being, even without the influence 
of grace, cannot remain unknown. 7 Likewise, maintaining the stress laid by 
St. Augustine on the dignity of the human soul,8 Halensis rejects the Neo-
Platonic and Arabian position that between the human soul and its God, there 
are several beings interposed, or that there are intermediary intelligences 
needed. 9 Besides these dootrines, there is also a treatment of knowledge 
in the eternal reasons, as well as an attempt to reooncile Augustinian and 
4Alexander of Hales, Summa Theologica, t.l, p.xxviii: (Quarrachi, newed.), 
Alexander Halensis in oonscribenda Summa Theologioa dootrinas philosophi-~ 
cas ettheologicas a S. Augustino, S. Anselmo at sohola Saneti Victoris 
praecipue exoogitatas et i~ in aoademiis Medii Aevi usu reoeptas, fidel-
issime ampleotitur. 
5 Ibide.m, pp. xxxix-xl: Dieo quod plus oredendum est Augustino et Anselmo 
quam Aristoteli. 
6Cf~ St~ .ugustine, De Videndo Deo, Epist. 147. c. 3,n.8(PL 33,600); 
Ibidem, 00. 2,16,nn:-7,38 (PL 33,599,613). 
Vide, Alex. of Hales, Summa Theol., tome 1,n.14, p.33. 
7Alexander of Hales, Summa Theol. Prole p. xxxi: Alexander Halensis docet 
quod cognitio Dei in mente rationali ita impressa est ao tanta evidentia 
fulget ut existentia Entis Primi, eti~ gratia non influente, ignorari non 
potest ••• 
8Cf. St. Augustine, De Vera Re1ig. c. 55, n. 113 (PL 34,172); De Gen. ad 
Lit., n. 60 (PL 34,,243j"j'"83 Quaestionum, q. 51, nne 2 et 4 (PL40,33). 
Cf. Alex., Summa Theol., Ii:'" 20, ad 3, p. 31. 
I 
Aristotelian philosophy.IO 
Taking as the three principal methods of dividing the intellectus 
humanuS, the methods of St. Augustine, Aristotle and Blessed John Damascene, 
. 
. ~ 
Hales oonsiders that that of St. Augustine is superior to the other two. 
Augustine has given a division into ratio, intel}eotus, and intelligentia.11 
This division of the mind acceptable to Hales\s the one to which at least 
the terms, if not the meanings of the terms, of the Aristotelian division 
will be subordinated and applied. 
The Philosopher's division is that of material, possible and agent in-
tellect. The material intellect knows the speoies in the phantasms, and the 
separable possible intelleot knows the speoies abstracted by the agent in-
telleot.12 Blessed John Damasoene's division divides the soul into intelleo~ 
mind, and opinion, besides sense and imagination.13 Damasoene explains that 
from sense there arises the passion or feeling, whioh is oalled imagination~ 
From imagination, there arises opinion. Then the mind making a deoision re-
garding opinion, judges truth, whenoe the faculty of judging, because it de-
lODe WUlf, 100. oit.,p. 108: En psychologie, Alexandre tente de fusionner 
les dootrInes d'Aristote et Augustin. 
llAlex. Summa Theol. tome 2, num. 370, p. 449: De prima divisione Augustini: 
Ratio, Intelleotus, Intelligentia. 
12Ibide.m, p. 446: Philosophus vero dividit in intellectum material em, qui 
cognosoit speoies in phantasmatibus, et intellectum possibilem separabil-
em, quioognosoit species abstraotas, et intelleotum agentem. 
Cf. De Anima, III, 5. 
l3Alex.-Summa Theol. loc. oit., p. 446: Seoundum Ioannem Damasoenum divid-
itur in intelleotum, mentem, et opinionem: has enim enumerat oognitivas 
praeter sensum et imaginatione.m. 
I 
4 • 
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cides, knows and judges, is called mind.14 
These three divisions are not identioal to one another~ Each differs, 
beoause the point of view from whioh eaoh is determined is different. Augus-
1- 4, 
tine's division is made according to differences of intelligible forms, 
whether those forms be of the oomposite or the complex, that is whether 
those forms be of the spirit separated or thelpirit separable from the or-
ganio body. Damascene's division ooncerns the differenoes of these same be-
ings as they are oomprehended under the condition of oomposition or complex-
ity. Therefore, neither of these divisions is reduoible to the other.15 
Further, the intelleotus of the Augustinian division is not understood 
in the same way as the intellectus of Damascene's. The intellect described 
by St. Augustine is a cognitive power of separated created forms, even with-
out complexity, (that is, without corporeal matter); whereas the intellect 
described by Damasoene is understood as being the cognitive power by whioh 
"... 
determined truth is known by means of a pre-judgment of the mind belonging 
to oreatures composed of oorporeal matter and form. 16 Hence, we are to con-
14Ibidem: Unde dioit quod "per sensum animae constituitur passio quae dici-
tur imaginatio, ex imaginatione vero fit opinio, diende mens diudicans 
Op1n20nem, sive vera sit sive falsa, iudicat veritatem: unde mens a meti-
endo et ex cogitando et iudicando dicitur; quod autem diudioatum et de-
terminatum est, recte dicitur intelleotus. . 
15Ibidem, num. 368, p. 447, Sed Contra, bl Praeterea, divisio Augus~ini 
videtur esse seoundum diffe~tias formarum intel1igibi1ium sine oomposi-
tione vel oomp1exione, divisio vero Ioannis Damasceni seoundum differenti-
as earum in quantum cum composi tione vel complexione acoipiuntur; ergo 
neutra est as alteram reduoibilis. 
16Ibidem, p. 448, ad 1: Ad primum, quod intellectus in divisione Augustini 
non est secundum eumdem modum aooeptus seoundum ~em in divisione Ioannis 
Damasoeni. Ham inte1leotus, seoundum Augustinum, est vis oognosoitiva for-
Marum creatarum separatarum ut sine oomplexione; intellectus autem, se-
eundem Ioannem Damasoenum in uantum 00 noscitur veritas determinata in 
I 
5. 
elude that intelleot as defined by Augustine is broader in applioation, for, 
whereas Damascene defines the faoulty of a being whioh knows the spiritual 
and the spiritual conjoined to matter, Augustine defines the faculty of not 
. 
. ~ 
only suoh a being, but also of being whioh is by its nature wholly separable 
from body and the conditions of body. 
In these srume divisions, mind (mens) doel not have the srume meaning. 
Aooording to st. Augustine, mind is the supreme faoulty of the soul; but ao-
oording to Damascene it is merely a power for disoerning truth from 
falsity.l7 Nor does the term 'intelligence' oonnote the same thing for 
these two philosophers. Augustine teaohes that intelligenoe is the highest 
power of the soul extending itself to the oontemplation of God.18 For 
Damasoene, it is the power whioh understands truth with the oertitude of 
truth. 19 Lastly, the Augustinian ter.m ratio is not to be equated with 
Damasoene opinio, for ratio is the power whioh through oognition attains ~ 
to the forms abstraoted fram bodies and the aooidents of bodies. 20 
oomplexionibus ex iudioio mentis praeambulo. 
17Ibidem; Similiter neo mens utrobique similiter aooipitur. Nam non est mens 
seoundum Ioannem Damasoenum idem quod mens secundum Augustinum, supremum 
in anima, sed est vis diudioans ad disoernendum veritatam a falsi tate. 
18Ibidem; Unde non est idem quod intelligentia, quae est, seoundum Augustin-
um, vis suprema extendens se ad Dei oontemplationem. 
19Ibidem; p. 448, Solutio: Est enim aooipere verum cum quadrum admi~ione 
falsitatis, et sio dioitur opinio, vel oum disoretione veritatis a falsi-
tate, et sio est mentis, vel oum oertitudine veritatis, et sio dicitur 
intelleotus. 
20Ibidem, ad I. Neo opinio est idem quod ratio; nihilominus tamen seoundum 
quod ratio attingit oomplexiones, sio dioitur opinio esse in ratione ••• 
ratio vero secundum primam divisionem Augustini, est vis quae attingit per 
oognitionem formas abstraotas a oorporibus et oorporum aooidentibus. 
6 • 
. ' 
Thus st. Augustine's division is not reduoible to Damasoene's, nor is 
Damasoene's reduoible to Augustine's. Damasoene's explains the progress of 
reason from the habit of prinoiples or prinoiples to the habit of oonolu-
, . 
sions. 2l Augustine's explains knowledge of th~ external world by means of 
ratio, knowledge of the divine by inte1ligentia, and knowledge of the un-
created and the created, as well as knowledge .~ the created world of spir-
its, by the intellectus. 22 Now Damascene's is not contrary to Augustine's; 
yet it is not the same as Augustine's. Rather, his treating of truth ob-
tained of intelligible forms by beings of mixed or complex natures, that is 
by corporeal beings endowed with reason23 is oontained in St. Augustine's, 
whioh treats of the cognitive faculty of spiritual beings in general. 
Naw, let us oonsider the relation between Augustine and Aristotle. It 
2lIbidem, num. 380, ad 3, p. 459: Alias vero differentiae, quas ponit Dam-
asoenus, attenduntur seoundum progressum inte1lectus sive rationis ab 
habitu prinoipii vel principorum ad habitum oonolusionis. 
22Ibidem, num. 368, p.447: Sed oontra hoc est: a.quod Augustinus ita ponit 
differentias: rationis, lGrbellectus:-:rn~ligentia, ut ratio comprehendat 
corpor~ naturas, inte1lectus spiritum oreatum, intelligentia spiritum in-
oreatum; quare actus intellectus est post aotum rationis et ante aotum in-
telligentiae. 
Ibidem, p. 448, ad 1-1. In ad primum: ratio vero, secundum primam divis-
ionam Augustini, est vis quae attingit per cognitionem formas abstractas 
a corporibus et corporum accidentibus. 
Ibidem: Nam inte1leotus, secundum Augustinum, est vis cognitiva formarum 
creatarum separatarum ut sine oomplexione ••• intelligentia, quae est, vis 
suprema extendens as Dei oontemplationem. 
Ibidem; num. 370, p. 450, III, Solution: Intelleotus vero ponit oognosoit-
ivum angelorum, daamonum, animarum et omnis spiritus oreati; ex quo patet 
quod loquitur de intelligibilibus quae sunt iuxta animam rationalem. 
Ibidem, num. 377, Solutio ad finem: ratio vero est oiroa formas intelligi-
biles invent as in rebus sensibilibus; •• intelleotus autem formarum intelli-
gibilium oreatarum separatarum a sensibilibus; intelligentia vero divinorum. 
23Ibidem,: Aliae vero divisiones respiciunt veritatem formarum intel1igibil-
ium in complexione entium. 
I 
~-.. ----------------------------~ 
7 • 
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oannot be maintained that the threefold division offered by Aristotle oor-
responds to the three differences of powers maintained by Augustine. Aug-
ustine's division is distinguished acoordin~ to different intelligibles in 
..... , 
grades of greater or less nobility or spirituality. What this means is 
understood when we oonsider that the unoreated intelligible is nobler than 
the created; and that among oreated intelligiiles, that which is separated 
fram corporeal forms is nobler than that conjoined to suoh forms. It is 
upon differences of intelligibility or nobility that Augustine divides. But 
Aristotle's division has to do with differences arising fram the functions 
of one power of abstracting. Henoe the power described by Aristotle is 
oonstituted for abstraction, and it is thus an abstracting power and a 
power comprehending the abstraoted forms. From this it is olear that the 
differences of intelligibility assigned in the Philosopher's division are 
regarded from a comparison to abstraotible forms, whereas Augustine's, in,... 
treating of the intelligibles qua abstractibles and of intelligibles qua 
intelligibles, takes into account those of the Philosopher and more. 25 
24vide nota 16, 17, 18. Cf. Ibidem, nums. 278-9-80, pp. 457-9. 
25Alex. of Hales, Summa Theol., p. 447, II-2: Sic vero diceret quod intellec 
tus sub iis tribus differentiis respondet tribus differentiis virium quae 
ponuntur ab Augustino, hoc non est verum. Nrun illae tres differentiae, 
quas ponit Augustinus, distinguuntur secundum intelligibilia diffe~entia 
in nobilitate maiori vel minori: nobilius enim est intelligibile increat 
quam creatum, intelligibile vero oreatum separatum a formis oorporalibus 
qurun illud quod est in corporibus. Differentiae vero positae a Philosopho 
attenduntur secundum differentias omnium ad abstractionam pertinentium: 
est enim vis habens ea a quibus fit abstraotio et est vis abstrahens et est 
vis formas abstractas camprehendens, et ita differentiae intelligibilium, 
assignatorum a Philosopho, attenduntur secundum oamparationem ad formas ab 
stractibiles, differentia vero Augustini ad formas has et alias; non ergo 
secundum unum modum accipiuntur. 
8. 
In order that we may have a clearer notion of the differences between 
the Augustinian and the Aristotelian divisions, let us oonsider the relation 
between the intellectus and abstraction. Abstraotion is oonoerned with ab-
, . 
. ~ 
straotible intelligibles. Henoe, there cannot be abstraotion of suoh as the 
form of the angelic intelligenoe, of the forms of the scienoes, or of the 
fo~s of the virtues whioh are in the soul. Tie limitation of abstraotion 
to abstractible intelligibles marks the limitation of the Aristotelian in-
tellect; the Augustinian intellect (intellectus), on the other hand, is not 
hemmed in by the boundaries of abstractible intelligibles, but is free to 
oonsider the whole range of intelligibles as well as abstractible intellig-
ibles. 26 
There is still another differenoe between these divisions. Augustine 
has posited ratio (reason), by whioh man judges of those things external to 
him. Ratio includes both the material intellect and the possible intelle~ 
which Aristotle has assigned to the rational oreature. Thus ratio for St. 
Augustine, or the material and the possible intellect for Aristotle, knows 
intelligible fo~s as they were aocepted into the phantasms or as they are 
26Ibidem, ad II, 1-2: Ad illud quod obicitur de divisione Philosophi re-
speotu divisionis primae quam ponit Augustinus, dioendum quod non simili-
ter acoipitur in utraque divisione. Nam abstraotio ourrit seoundumjor-
mas secundum se abstractas, siout est forma intelligentiae angelioae, vel 
formas soientiarum aut virtutum quae sunt in anima, sed circa formas in-
telligibiles abstraotibiles. Et propter hoo, cum intelleotus in divisione 
Augustini accipatur oirca formas secundum se abstractas, in divisione vero 
Philosophi formas abstraotibiles, patet quod non similiter accipitur in-
tellectus utrobique. 
I 
.' 9. 
accepted from the phantasms.27 Thus. beoause the rational ereature. ao-
cording to the Philosopher's division. must accept the species abstracted 
by the agent intellect from the phantasm. 28 ,and beoause separated intellig-
ible forms are be no means abstractible. the possible intelleot can never 
receive knowledge of such separated intelligible forms fram the agent in-
29 tellect. In this oase. too. the limitatio~ imposed on the rational soul 
by Aristotle's theory of abstraction are evident. In the division proffered 
by Augustine there is no suoh limitation. beoause Augustine olearly main-
tains that the mind. even when considering itself, considers a spiritual 
being, nobler than the body which it inhabits; that the mind goes above it-
self, to that beyond itself, and that is God.30 
Having determined that the traditional division of St. Augustine is 
27Ibidem: In divisione ergo Augustini ratio continebat intellectum material-
em et possibilem prout cognosount formas intelligibiles vel in phantasma~ 
2Sibus vel a phantasmatibus aooeptas. 
Ibidem: Intelleotus autem duplioem habet aotum: Habet enim unum. actum. res-
peotu formarum. abstrahendarum., et ille est abstrahere ••• 
29Ibidem: intellectus vero possibilis nihilominus recipiet oognitionem ab 
agente a parte altera, soilioet formarum intelligibilium separatarume 
30Ibidem, ad I, 1: Unde non est idem quod intelligentia, quae est, secundum 
Augustinum, vis suprema extendens se ad Dei oontemplationem. 
Ibidem, num.. 370, p. 450. III, Solutio: Cum. autem dicitur quod "intelli-
gentia immediate supponitur Deo." loquitur de eo quod est supra animam 
rati onal em. Ea vero quae sunt intra, siout aunt scientiae et virtutes et 
quod ipsa anima se ipsam cognoscit, quia non est neoesse similitudines 
alias ab intelligibilibus pervenire ad intellectum, ideo non computantur 
in vi separata, sed cognoscuntur a vi in qua nata sunt esse, cum enim ani-
ma ipsam scientiam vel artem habeat apud se, quae neoessitas est habere 
similitudinem separatam ab intelligibili? Sed in aliis rebus intelligibil-
ibus oportet habere similitudinem, qua intellectus iuvetur ad hoc quod in-
telligibile fiat actu intellectum. 
I 
10. 
4<' 
superior to that ,of both Damascene end Aristotle, knowing that it is differ-
ent from the innovative division of Aristotle but that at the same time 
that the Aristotelian division is one not to be treated lightly, Halensis 
. 
.. 4'" pays olose attention to the Augustinian and the Aristotelian systems and 
their relations to eaoh other as they describe the powers of the rational 
soul. Our Franoisoan realized that the intell.gent creature endowed with 
sense powers needed abstraction. It was, therefore, necessary to aooept 
the Aristotelian division into material, possible, end agent intelleot.31 
At the seme time Christian philosophy and Christian dogma. taught that there 
are beings for the knowledge of whioh abstraction was not needed, indeed, 
would not su:ffioe.32 This truth demanded a theory of knowledge which would 
explain knowledge of these separated beings. Suoh a theory had been for.mu-
lated by St. Augustine and had been acoepted by Christians baok through the 
centuries up to Alexander's time. That was the divine illumination theory ... 
Now, in order to achieve a synthesis between two systems arising from 
differing cultures, and in order to explain adequately the knowledge had by 
the ratioml creature, a definite problem. of the agent intelleot is present. I 
What is the part played by the intellect in abstraction, and what is the 
role assigned to it by a theory holding to illumination abstraction? To 
, . 
solve this problem in the ter.ms of Alexander, let us study the Aristotelian 
divisions as the.y are handled by Alexander. 
The first of the Aristotelian divisions to be considered by Halensis is 
that of the material intelleot.33 This intelleot possesses the sensible 
31Vide nota 12. 
11-
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species in the phantasm,34 where preparation for further spiritualization 
of the species takes place. The intelligible species, therefore, is not 
immediately taken up by the agent intellect, when the object of intellection 
. 
.. ... ; 
exterior to the knowing soul is first presented. The first I degree of 
abstraction' must take place in the senses,36 after which the 'higher degr~ 
occur. Hales oonoludes that, therefore, it is. neoessary to admit a material 
intellect.36 
This intelleot alone is not sufficient for the perfection of man, as 
it is for the perfection of the brute. The brute has the material intelleot, 
not as a 'lower possibility' to a nobler perfection, but as a perfection 
itself. As regards the rational soul, however, we must hold that the 
material intellect is a 'lower possibility', which, when realized, leads to 
a nobler perfection.37 
Summa Theol., p. 448, ad II, 1-2: sed quia istae (i.e. quae aunt sine 
materia) non indigent abstractione ad hoc ut intelligantur, aliae vero 
indigent. 
32ut supra. 
330f. Summa Theol., num. 371, pp. 460-1 (tame 2). 
34Ibidam, p. 461, sub Solutio. intellectus vero materialis habet species in I 
phantasmatibus quas possible est abstrahi per intellectum agentam, ut 
uniantur cum possibili. 
36Ibidem, num. 372, p. 462, ad 2: Vires enim sensibiles praeparant formam 
intelligibilan ut sit oonvenies abstractioni, intelleotus vero agens actu 
abstrahit eam. 
36Ibidem,nwm. 371, p. 460. Solutiol Sic ergo necesse fuit ponere intelleotum 
materie.lam. 
37Ibideml Ad quod dicendum quod ille intellectus materialis, de quo 
loquitur Commentator, qui habet speoies in phantasmatibus, in hoc differt 
a phantasia quod phantasia habet phantasmate., non ut possibilia ulterius 
ad aotum alicuius potentiae intellectivaeJ sic enim est in brutisJ bruta 
enim habent hanc vim tamquam perfectionem, non ut possibile.m ulterius ad 
nobiliorsaperfectionem. Unde, sicut sensus brutalis non dieitur 
universalis neque per se neque per accidens sed solum singularis, sensus 
,..,,-
--------------------------------------------------------------------------, 
The aooeptanoe. so far. of divisions of the intelleot. and the accept-
anoe of a material intellect itself not suffioient to perfeot man. is ex-
pressive of a plurality of powers of the SOUt. The material intellect. 
sinoe it is so closely allied to that of the brute, seems to be concerned 
with things of a material and a perishable order. It oan be felt, although 
it has not yet been expressed, that this inteileot is not the only intellect 
possesses by man. for in a teleologioally governed universe every oreature 
must reach its end, that is what is perfeotive of the oreature. Now what 
is the oreature's perfeotion is. evidently knowledge, and the material in-
telleot being but a 'lower possibility' the soul must have more than one 
power. Thus, it is olear why the material intelleot is but. as it were, a 
stepping stone to further perfection. 
Before delving into the explanations conoerning a possible intelleot, 
Alexander first shows us its place in the hierarohy of intellects in the .~ 
rational soul. 15 That possible intellect has present to it the form which 
is essential to the soul itself. and in this it differs from prime matter.38 
vero humanus est utriusque, scilioet universalis et sin@llaris, ita con-
tingit in vi interiori ut sit phantastica habens phantasmata secundum 
quod huiusmodi, non ut possibilia ad species abstrahendas ad intellectuJ 
intelleotus vero materialis habet species in phantasmatibus. quas possi-
bile est abstrahi per intellectum agentem. ut uniantur oum possibil~. Sic 
ergo necesse tuit ponere intellectum materialem. 
38Ibidem. n. 373. p. 453: Utrum sit intelleotus possibilis? Solutio: Ad 
quod dioendum quod anima rationalis habet intelleotum possibilen tamquam 
unam sui differentiam in oognosoendo. 
Ibidem. ad 2: Ad seoundum vero dioendum quod non est simile de materia 
prima omnino et de anima rationali quoad hoo habet rationalis intelleotum 
possibilam. In hoo autem est simile quod, siout materia prima est possi-
bilis respeotu formarum in esse. ita intelleotus possibilis possibilitatem 
habet respeotu formarum sive specierum in eognitione. In hoc sutem est 
I 
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It is not to be supposed, however, that this is an intellective part of the 
soul similar to the intellective faculty of the angel. The 'angel has a 
possible intellect only in the sense that it ,is receptive of illumination 
... ; 
tr01I1 on high. That intellective part of the soul which is joined to the 
sensible part of man is called possible inasmuoh as it may be actuated 
through the medium of the sense operations.39 .It holds, then, a position 
between the material intelleot and the possible intelleot. 
The operation proper to the possible intellect is that of taking up 
the intelligible for.ms abstracted from the sensible speoies in the 
phantasms, or as Hales oalls it, the material intelleot.40 The possible 
intelleot, so-oalled beoause it is in potenoy to knowing,4l does not!!!! 
dissimilitudo quod materia prima nullam habet formam de se praeter ips am 
ipsam capacitatem; intellectus autem possibilis habet ali quam, quia 
ipsam formam essentialem ipsius animae, quae est aliquid in se t unde 
materia prtma non reflectitur super see ~ 
39Ibidem. num. 372, p. 452, ad 2: dicendum quod non est simile de parte 
intelleotiva animae et parte intellectiva ange1i. 'Haec enim quae est in 
angelo, separata est a parte sensibili I unde non habet possibilem nisi 
dioatur possibilis, id est receptibilis il1uminationum a Summo, sed habet 
partem sibi suffioientem ad oognosoendum ea quae nondum sunt cognita ab 
ea. Pars ergo inte11eotiva in anima quae ooniunota est parti sensibili, I 
ex illa parte est possibilis et suffioientiam habet ex agente et viribus 
praeambulis sensibilibus, ut eduoatur de potentia ad aotum. Vires enim 
sensibiles praeparant for.man intelligibilam ut sit oonveniens abstrao-
tioni, intelleotus vero agens aotu abstrahit eam etunit cum possibili. 
Sic ergo oampletur intelleotus possibilis in reoeptione speoierum 
intelligibilium a phantasmate abstraotarum. 
40Ibidem. num. 371, po 461, sub Solutio: intelleotus vero materialis habet 
speoies in phantasmatibus quas possibi1e est abstrahi per intel1eotum 
agent em, ut uniantur oum possibili. 
Ibidem. num. 368, ad 2, p. 448a sed cum intelleotus possibilis, de quo 
loquitur Philosophus, aooipit for.mas simplioes abstraotas a phantasmatibus. 
4lIbidem. num. 372, p. 462, Solutio: a1tera vero, soilioet possibilis, est 
ex parte suae materiae, qua est potentia ens respectu oognosoibilium quae 
fiunt in ea. 
~'------------------------------------------------~ 
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take up the species from the phantamn. This is clear from what Aristotle 
haS taught# for he says that nothing is educed from a material potenoy to 
act unless by that which is already in aot. Now. the possible intellect 
. 
. ~ 
in its own genus is regarded as a material potency. Therefore# it must be 
reduced to act by that Which is already in act. Thus# in the rational soul# 
the possible intellect is reduced from its p~ntiality by the active pow-
er of the soul# the agent intellect.42 It is as regards the possible in-
tellect's being brought from its potency to the intelleotive act of union 
~ 
with the intelligible species that there is a need for the acting intellect. 
In this way the intelleotive part of the soul# oonjoined to the sensible 
powers which prepare the intelligible forms for abstraction, is joined to 
these preparatory virtues and suffices to make possible intellect pass from 
the potency of knowing to the aotuality of knowing.44 And so, the possible 
intellect and the agent intellect are two different powers of the soul# ana. 
are its oonstitutive principles.44 
42Ibidam.# no. 372# p. 451. sect. 1.1: Quae autem sit necessitas ponere has 
duas differentias, habetur a Philosopho. 1. Dicit enim quod nihil eduoitur I 
de potentia materiali in actum# nisi per id quod est in aotu; sed intellec 
us possiQilis dioitur possibilis in suo genere potentia materiali; non er-
go educitur in actum nisi per id quod est in actu; illud autem est potentia 
agens, erunt ergo duae differentiae. 
43Vide notae 38. 39, 40. 
44Ibidem., no. 372, p. 452: Solutio: Ad quod potest dici quod intellectus 
agens et intellectus possibilis aunt duae differentiae in anima rational~ 
quarum una scilicet. intellectus agens, est ex parte formaeipsius animae, 
secundum quod est spiritus, altera vero. soilioet possibilis# est ex parte 
suae materiae. qua est potentia ens respeotu oognosoibilium quae fiunt in 
ea ••• 
Vide nota 39, lines 7-16. 
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In virtue of their being oonstitutive prinoiples, it is said that the 
agent intelleot issues from the form of the soul, and by reason of its 
form the soul is understood to be spirit; the possible intelleot issues 
. 
. ~ from the matter of the soul, and by reason of this the soul is understood 
to be in potenoy to knowables. 45 The soul, then, despite its spiritual 
nature, is not exempt from the universal law blnding the oreature to the 
creator, for it is, as is every artiole of oreation, a oomposite of matter 
In the treatment of the intelleot by Alexander the oommingling of Augus-
tinian and Aristotelian terms is obvious. The agent intelleot, whioh for 
both Alexander and Aristotle is more remote from matter than the material 
or possible intelleots, is not simply more abstraot, but it is that by whioh 
the rational soul is 'spiritus'. The possible intelleot, oloser than the 
agent to material oonditions, is not potential by reason of this proximity~ 
It is 'possible' beoause it is in potenoy to the intelligible object. Those 
who would say that it is a possible intelleot only in virtue of its being 
conjoined to the body are in error, for the rational soul in the next life I 
has an intelleotus agens ~ possibilis, just as has the rational soul in 
this life, and verily, in patria there is separation from and not oonjunotion 
with a body. Possibility means simply a potenoy to know.46 
45ut supra. 
46vide notae 38, lines 5-16:39, lines 4-16. Alexander of Hales, Summa Theol. 
no. 372, p. 452, Respondeo: Ex ilIa vero parte qua habet hano perfeotionem 
oognosoibilium ad quamdam similitudinem Primi, ex ilIa est intelleotus ag-
ens; quae pars, oum obviaverit formae intel1igibili in phantasmate exist-
enti, abstrahit earn ut sit aotu intelleota, et ex ilIa parte quan nondum 
16. 
The work performed by the agent intelleot i8 that of abstraoting the 
sensible speoies from the phantamn. The nature of its work'is determined 
by the nature oonferred upon it. Now, the nature of the agent intelleot is 
, . 
such that it has within itself a oertain natufral light, in virtue of whioh 
it is in aot with regard to intelligibles. This it has from the very be-
ginning, sinoe it is an immaterial substanoe slparated essentially from the 
body.47 Thus although the agent intelleot is oonjoined to the body, it is 
separated from it, and i8 above the body's aotivities; whereas the possible 
intelleot is simply separable, but not separated, from the body. In this 
manner of speaking, the rational soul knows the speoies abstraoted from 
the phantasm, whioh manner of knowing is a medium between knowing in the 
phantasm and knowing speoies in every way separated from the phAntasm.48 
habet anima illas formas intelligibiles, dioitur intelleotus possibilis. 
47Summa Theol., no. 372, p. 452, ad 2: intelleotus vero agens aotu abstra:. 
hit eam et unit cum possibili •• 
Vide notae 40 et 37. 
Ibidem., Solutio: Nee oportet ponere intellectum a gent em separatum in 
substantia ab ipsa anima, siout lux in sensu separata est in substantia 
ab ipso sensitivo. Est enim spiritus in se habens lumen quoddam naturale, 
ratione ouius habet aotum intelligibilium, a principio soilioet oreation-
is, ex parte soilioet ilIa qua est substantia tmmaterialis seoundum se 
separata, lioet ex alia parte oorpori sit coniungibilis. 
48Ibidem., no. 374, p. 454, ad 1: Et ad pr~ primo. Lioet enim non sit in-
tellectus possibilis ut forma separata a materia, est tamen separabilis; 
differentiae autem illae 'separatum' et 'coniunctum' sunt formarum ~ esse, 
sed secundum rationem sunt hae differentiae 'separata', coniuncta, separ-
abilis et ooniungibilis', et hoc modo se habet intellectus possibilis ani-
mae ut separabilis et coniungibilis, et ideo intelligere proportionale 
medium est inter intelligere speciem in phantasmate et speoiem omnino sep-
aratum, et hoc est intelligere speciem abstraotam a phantasmate. 
I 
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Beoause it has within itself this oertain natural light, the agent in-
telleot is oalled a spirit. But spirit is that whioh is above the intelleot, 
~upra intellectum~9 Now, sinoe some intellig~bles are supermental, might not 
.~ 
knowledge be had beoause of a super-mental agent? Alexander says that the 
agent is said to be in aot, not beoause it knows all forms from the begin-
ning, but beoause it is illuminated by the Firlt Agent. This illumination 
is given, not as regards all forms, but only as regards oertain forms, and 
when it (the oreated agent intelleot) is illuminated, it perfeots the pos-
sible intelleot in that way, that is as regards these given for.ms. There-
ro fore, it is not neoessary that the agent intelleot be a power above the soul. 
What does Alexander mean when he says that the agent intelleot is illum-
inated as regards oertain forms? Eviaently, he means that the agent intell-
ect, being the power of a limited intelligenoe is itself limited. Now, why 
is the agent intelleot limited in respeot to some forms, or why is it not ~ 
illuminated in respeot to all forms? Are we to oonolude that the angel 
could influenoe or move the human soul in its cognitive aots? It seems 
not, for the interposition of any oreature between God and the rational I 
soul is not to be admitted. In fact, suoh a possibility is expressly denied 
49Ibidem., no. 381. p. 460: Respondeo: Respondeo quod sensus spiritualis 
fundatur in natura spirituali, quia spiritus est super mentem, soilioet 
seoundum quod anima seoundum intelleotum dioitur spiritus, non in natura 
spirituali per gratiam vel per gloriam ••• 
50Ibidem., no. 372, p. 452, ad 1: Ad id vero quod obioitur quod aliqua in-
telligibilia aunt supra intellectum et ita oportet quod oognitio fiat per 
agentem qui est supra intelleotum: dioendum est quod agens non dicitur 
esse aotu. quia omnes formas a prinoipio intelligit, sed ab agente primo 
illuminatur, et iam non respeotu omnium, sed respeotu quarumdam formarum, 
et oum illuminatus perficit etiam possibilem illo modo. 
"'. 
-------------------------------------------------------------, 
51 by Halensis. 
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If the human agent intellect is illuminated as regards some form, and no 
intermediary nature is allowed to illuminate it as regards other forms, 
. . 
1- .. , 
should it then be said that it, or that God is the agent intelleot as re-
gards these other formst It is not easy to answer this question. The agent 
intelleot, as part of the rational soul. is l~ted to the oonferring of 
some forms only upon the possib~e intelleot; but we must bear in mind that 
Alexander has averred that it is not necessary to posit a power supra-mental 
in nature nor an agent intelleot separated from the soul substantially.52 
Then, it might be said that the Irrefragible Doctor holds that there are 
agent intellects. (and in the light of this. the question asking what is 
left to human agent intelleot is answered). and one uncreated agent intell-
eot, God, (and then the question has not been answered). 
If divine intervention is to be granted in the Halensian system. we are~ 
able to gather some notion of the nature of this intervention from Hales' 
use of the classic analogy of light and the sense of sight. He tells us 
that light is the effeotive cause of vision, but remains unknown to us in I 
its own nature as such. Analoguously. the eternal light or the uncreated 
agent intellect is the effective cause of our intelleotual vision, but it 
in itself remains unknown to the rational creature and is known only in its 
51Ibidem., tome 1, no. 20, ad 3, p. 31: Dicit Augustinus quod nulla est 
interposita natura inter mentem et Deum, ut soilicet sit aliqua substantia 
intelleotualis velut angelus, per quam formetur et perfioiatur ipsa mens, 
quemadmodum philosophi mentiti sunt, dieentes intelligentiam ruunanam eduoi 
2in aetum et perfiei per intelligentiam anglieam. 
5 Vide notae 50 et 51, et 47, lines 4 sqq. 
19. 
reflections in the intelligible objects of creation. 53. This is all we can 
conclude from the texts of Alexander~ and it is all we may conclude without 
perverting or changing the doctrine of Alexander. The question whether God 
. . 
.~ 
is the immediate First Agent Intellect in our knowing~ or whether He is 
immediate in the sense that every agent intellect must be first enlightened 
as regards only certain forms is an open one •• 
For a reason other than that intelligibles are supermental some have 
held that the agent intellect is separated secundum~~ substantiam 
fram the possible intelleot. They argue that just as in sense knowledge 
the sense is not perfeotive of itself, beoause the sense needs lignt~ both 
interior and exterior; so in intelleotual knowledge the rational soul need 
light whioh is interior and exterior to it, so that the potentially in-
telligible beoomes the aotually intelligible.54 This is the position 
brought into philosophy by the Arabs. ~ 
Without mentioning any names, Alexander rejeots this position. This 
analogy~ that as in sensation the illuminative light is outside the sense of 
53Summa Theol.~ tome l~ no. 20~ ad 1, p. 31: Videtur lux se ipsa effeotive, 
non tamen seipsa materialiter~ hoo est in seipsa~ id est in sua spiritual-
itate et absolutione naturae suae, sed in alia, ut in aere, vel oolore. 
Eodem modo lux aeterna in praesenti videtur seipsa, non tamen in se ipsa, 
sed in creatura~ quae est quasi medium materiale deferens ipsam luoe~ ad 
54intellectum. 
Ibidem., tome 2~ no. 372, p. 451, seot. I: Praeterea~ sensus non se ipsum 
perfioit in sentiendo~ sed indiget luoe interiori et exteriori; ergo nec 
intelleotus similiter; erit ergo unum aliquid in anima quod est per modum 
luois~ ut siout lux potentia-oolores faoit aotu sentiri~ ita quid in anima 
quod potentia-intelligibilia perduoit ad hoo ut actu intelligantur ab in-
telleotu possibili. 
I 
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sight and separated from it# so in intelleotion the illuminative light is 
outside of and separated from the possible intelleot# does not oarry- It 
is not necessary that the agent be a separate~ substanoe# for the soul, as 
1- lit, 
has been Said# is a spirit having within itself a oertain natural light from 
the oreati~e principle.55 Further# Alexander says# God being the First 
Light and the soul being His similitude# it is,-easonable that the soul's 
light be a natural light, for the Creator would not fashion the rational 
soul to His own ~age but what He would give it some perfection as regards 
knowing. 56 
Henoe, because the perfeotion proper to the intellective soul is intell-
ection, beoause the soul has in it from oreation an aotivity by whioh it 
aohieves its own perfeotion (Alexander seemingly implies here that seoondary 
oauses are effioient in their own order of secondary causality), and be-
oause the intellective soul is the image of God57 and a deflector of the ~ 
eternal light to the humsn intellaot58 , Alexander will not aocept the Jewish 
and Arabian interpretations of the Philosopher. 
Alexander has taken into his system the tradition of Augustine and fused I 
with Aristotelianism. Reason for retaining Aristotelian termB in Augustinian 
metaphysics is seen in Hales' meaning of the -word 'separatum'. Analysis of 
55Yide nota 47. 
56Ibidem., p. 452, Solutio: ••• non enim videtur quod ita condiderit animam ra-
tionalem ad imaginem suwn quin ei dederit perfectionem aliquam respectu 
cognoscibilium. 
57Ibidem., no. 337, p. 410, Respondeo 2-3: Abundat autem anima rationalis in 
hoc quod est imago Dei secundum hoo quod sicut Deus movet et gubernat uni-
versum, sio et anima movet et gubernat suum universum. 
58Yide nota 53. 
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this term reveals that separatum may pertain to that 'separated in act', 
and this means the soul; or 'that separated in intention', and this does 
not belong to the rational soul, for the rational soul has an intention to 
. 
.. 4; 
the body.59 This two-fold meaning of separatum suggests the two-fold 
activity of the Aristotelian intellect.60 The first activity of the in-
tellect is abstraction, which is made necessaiY by the soul's intention 
to the body. The other activity is that which the intellect exercises as 
regards knowledge of separated forms, which the soul has by reason of its 
being separated in act fram the body. 
Hales found it essential then, to retain the Aristotelian division as 
an explanation of knowledge had by way of sense experience. Aristotle qua 
Aristotle, however, could not be incorporated into his system of thought, 
for he found the Philosopher's division incamplete. The Augustinian divis-
ion, being complete, offered a satisfactory explanation of intellective 
powers and knowledge. The Aristotelian division pertains only to those 
forms which enter into knowledge by way of abstraction fram the sense phan-
tasm, whereas Augustine's division pertains to those forms and also to 
59Ibidam_, tome 2, no. 112, ad 4, p. 151: Ad quartum dicendum quod, licet 
anima esset separata, nihilominus hac differentia essentialiter distinguer-
etur, quia 'separatum' dicitur dupliciter: quod actu est separaturrw et hoc 
modo non differuntJ vel quod est separatum per intentionem: hoc modo non 
est anima separata, quia intentionem qu~dam habet ad corpus, siout dicit 
Augustinus ••• 
60Ibidam., no 368, p. 448, ad II, 1-2: Intellectus autam agens duplicam 
habet actum: habet enim unum actum in respectu formarum abstrahendarum. 
et ille est abstrahere; habet alium actum respectu formarum secundum se 
sive separatum. 
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thOse forms \ntering into their knowledge by way of simple intelligible 
61 1 forms. AU~stine's division aooounts for knowledge had of beings not on y 
separable bu~ also separated from bodies and from the oonditions of bodies • 
. 
1- .; 
and is thus ~ satisfaotory explanation of knowledge. whether it be knowledge 
of the oorpo~eal world, of oreated spirits, or of God and the eternal reas-
ons; but th~ Philosopher's division aooounts fir knowledge had of that part 
of nature OO~joined to bodies and to the oonditions of bodies. 
With a g~and sweep Alexander oleared away the problem of the separated 
intelligenoe. but with more labor and diffioulty he oombined the novel doo-
trines pf Artstotle with the traditional ones of Augustine. By combining 
these he was able to say that Augustine had given an aooount of Divine 
Light and or~ated images (or oreated lights) and that Aristotle had given 
an aooount ot a First Agent Intelleot and oreated agent intelleots. Hales 
seems to hav~ taken the position that the agent intelleot. pars animae. is.,.. 
of the soul itself. is oreated from nothing. and is, therefore, not from 
or of the substanoe of God. 62 Reluotant to abandon Augustine and tradition. 
Hales foists upon the illumination theory Aristotelian abstraotion, so that 
that power whioh in Aristotelian terms is an abstraotive power and in Augus-
tinian is an illuminative one. in Halensian terms is an illuminative-abstrao-
tive power. • The souroe of this power whioh the oreated agent intelleot man-
ifests is the Light whose image it is, the Light after whioh it is fashioned. 
-
61 62Ut supra. 
Ibidem., no. 322. p. 390. Solutio: Ad quod dioendum quod anima non est de 
Deo. sed est oreata de nihilo. siout habetur ab Augustino et aliis Sanotis 
in pluribus loois Saorae Soripturae. 
I 
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the Light whioh fashioned it in oreation. Nevertheless. beoause the soul is 
thus fashioned and is an image of the Divine Light. it is not to be oonolud-
ed that the oreated agent knows immediately the First Agent Intelleot. What 
, . 
;;. .. ., 63 
must be said is that the soul ~.!.!!:. oannot know God save through a medium. 
Finding both a distinotion and a harmony between tradition and innova-
tion, this Franoisoan Master attempted and aoh~ved to his own satisfaotion. 
a synthesis of Augustinian metaphysios and Aristotelian termonology. Alex-
ander's own doctrine is an account of a multiplicity of illuminations fram 
one Light, of a multiplioity of agent intelleots from one Agent Intelleot, 
of agent intelleots illuminated by the First. and of agent intelleots il-
luminative of possible intelleots beoause of their illumination by the First. 
63vide nota 53. 
Ibidem., tome 1, no. 20, p. 31. Respondeo: In praesenti non est oognos-
oere Deum sine medio. Utrum autem in futuro possit oognosoi sine medio 
aliquo, alias inquiretur. ~ 
I 
CHAPTER II 
Roger Bacon 
, . 
. ~ 
Because philosophy is not alien to, but contained in, Divine Wisdom,l 
Roger Bacon attempts to harmonize the teachings of the saints with those of 
the philosophers. Difficulties in this endeavir arise as well from poor 
knowledge of Latin and Gree~ as from faulty and untrustworthy translations 
of Aristotle.3 Besides, the available texts of the Philosopher are few in 
comparison with the number he actually wrote,4 and there is a neglect of 
lRoger Bacon, Opus Majus, 2,3, vol. 1, p_ 35: Quod autem philosophia non 
sit aliena a sapientia, sed in ipsa conclusa, manifestandum est. 
Opus Tertium, 23, p. 73: Deinde agressus sum partem secundum, in qua os-
tendo quod una sola est sapientia perfecta, ab uno Deo data uni generi 
humano propter unum finem, scilioet vitam aeternam quae in saoris litteris 
tota continentur, per ius tamen canonioum et philosophicam explecanda-
Ham quioquid est oontrarium sapientiae Dei vel alienum, est erroreum et 
inane; neo potest humano genere valere. ~ 
2Cf_ ~.~., c. 23. 
3~. 1!!- c. 23, p- 75: Sed quia non solvi ibi illud, unde iste errore 
venerit, ideo, ne suspendam an~ vestrae clementiae, dico, quod accidit 
haec falsitas ex mal translatione textus Aristotelis. 
Comp. ~. (Brewer edit.) 8, p. 471: Sed longe major error acoidit in 
philosophia translata. Quia si sancti erraverunt in suis translationibus, I 
multo magis alii qui parum aut nihil de sanotitate ouraverunt. Unde cum 
per Gerardum Cremonensem, et Miohaelem Sootum, et Aluredum Anglicam, at 
Heremannum Alemannum, et Willielmwn Flemin~, data sit nobis oopia trans-
lationum de omni soientia, accidit tanta falsitas in eorum operibus, quod 
nullus sufficit admirari. 
4Ibidem., p. 473: Pauoa quidem utilia habemus de philosophia in Latino-
Ham Aristoteles feoit mille volumina, ut legimus in vita sua, et non habe-
mus nisi tria quantitatis notabilia; scilioet Logioalia, Naturalia, Meta-
physioalia; ita quod amnes aliae soientiae, quas feoit, desunt Latinis, 
nisi quod aliquos traotatus et parvos libellos habemus de allis scientiis; 
pauoi valde ••• 
u. 
·' 
suoh masters as Alexander Hale. 5 The disorepant translation of Aristotle h 
has caused present-day philosophers (those of the thirteenth century, for 
Bacon) to err seriously on the question or philosophical and theological 
. 
.. .. ; 6 
importance - the nature of the agent intellect. 
Since Baoon wants to establish a harmony between the teaohings of the 
Saints and those of the philosophers, and sincl St. Augustine has given to 
the philosophers of his tradition a theory of knowledge having as its ini-
tial and oonoluding terms Divine Illumination, St. Augustine is important 
in Bacon's synthesis, - as Bacon's own words give testimony. It being 
~possible to give here anything resembling an even nearly adequate exposi-
tion of Augustine's theory, a brief summary of those points which concern 
the problEm at hand will have "1;0 satisfy. 
st. Augustine has given stress to the dignity and the nobility of the 
humJLD. soul by holding that between the soul and God, not even an angelic A 
interposition is necessary. While it i8 true that the rational soul is 
not God, it is equally true that there is no creature closer to God: 
"Quemadmodum fatendum est animam hnmanem non esse quod Deus est: ita 
praesumendum nihil inter omnia quae creavit, Deo esse propinquius.n7 When 
the soul knows truth, it knows it because God enlightens the soul, just as 
the sun does our eyes. This does not mean that St. Augustine denies angelic 
5 Ope Minus. pp. 326-327. 
6 Ope Ter., 23, p. 75. 
7 St. Augustine, De Quantitate An:lma.e 34, 77 (PL 32,1077) 
I 

Guided by this Augustinian tradition. Roger Bacon tried to solve the 
problem of the agent intellect. First he considers that the mistakes into 
which several teachers and philosophers of his own day have fallen serve as 
. . 
.... ; 
we..rning that the nature of the agent intelleot is one about which grevioul 
errors may center. The philosophers. Bacon says. speak of active and pos-
sible intellects. The possible intellect cann~t of its unaided self 
acquire knowledge.12 Its knowledge. then. must be reoeived through the 
agency of another. 
It is in regard to what is know.n as the agent or acting intellect that 
many philosophers have made their mistakes. The agent intellect is that 
which reduces the possible intellect to an intellect in act. The possible 
intellect. as an intelleot in aot. is not the active intelleot to whioh these 
philosophers have referenoe. for it is not to be supposed that the possible 
intellect in aot is the acting intelleot. The differenc e between the two ,.... 
intelleots is well-.marked. Baoon holds that the aoting intelleot is indeed 
that intelleot 1Ib.ioh influences the possible intelleot. by oonferring upon 
it the light which it laoks of itself. the light whereby it aotually attains I 
to knowledge.13 
12~ Maj •• 2. 5: anima vero humana dioitur ab eis possibilis. quia ~e se 
est impotens ad soientias. 
13 Ibidem. • Causae autem.. quare sanoti arfirmant quod quaerimus et figuratum 
tuisse deolarant. possum assigna.riJ prima propter hoo quod ubicumque 
invenitur. Christi iudioatur seoundum sententias at auotoritates superiua 
allegatas. Idcirco quamvis aliquomodo veritas philosophiae dioatur esse 
eorum; ad hanc tamen habende.m primo lux di vina influxi t in animos eorum et 
eosdam. superillustravitJ "IllWDinat enim omnam. hominem. venientem. in huno 
mundum,' siout dioit Soriptural cui sententiae philosophi ipsi concordant. 
Nem ponunt intellectum agentem et possibilemJ anima vero humena dicitur ab 
~----------------------------------I 
28. 
Theologians, as well as philosophers, have made serious errors regard-
ing the nature of the agent intelleot by averring tblt the agent (aoting) 
and the patient (possible) intelleots are one in 8ubstance. This position 
. 
.. 04'7 
holds that the agent intellect is part of the human soul; whereas Alpharabi, 
Avicenna and Aristotle all hold that the agent intellect is a substanoe, 
intellectual in nature, separated • secundum eS1e et substantiam t from the 
possible. Indeed, all the greater philosophers have held this opinion.14 
The errors made by others in this respeot have been due, no doubt, to the 
faulty translations of the philosopher. However, a good and holy interpreter 
could manage to grasp the truth ot the texts, because the text is not 80 
faulty but that it could be correotly interpreted. l5 Hence, the Christian 
interpreter is in a positi on to reotify and refute the false dootrines read 
into the texts of Aristotle. 
Aristotle had begun with the postulate that in every operation there ,.. 
is something whioh exeroises causality in the order of effioient cause, 
and something which reoeives that aotion_ In every intellectual operation, 
eis possibilis, quia de se est impctens ad scientias at virtutes, et eas 
recipit aliunde. Intelleotus agens dioitur, qui intluit in animas nostras 
illuminans ad soientiam et v1rtutem; quia licet intelleotus possibilis 
possit dioi agens ab aotu intelligendi, tamen sumendo intelleotum agen-
tam ut ipsi summunt, vooatur influens et illuminans possibilem ad oo~iti­
onem veritatis. 
l4.2R,_ !!!:., c. 23, pp. 76-77: Et hoc per Avicennam at Alpharabium, et multas 
rationes probo, quibus responderi non potest. Et ideo, lioet translatio 
ibi non sit ita plana siout necesse esset tamen patet per exempla eius, et 
ea quae sequuntur, et per expositores SUOB famosos et majores patet, quod 
intentio eiuB est, quod intellectus agens in animas nostras est Deus 
principaliter, et secundario angeli. 
15.2R,. ~. c_ 23, p. 75: Neo est ita mala quin possit a bono et pio 
interprete satis de plano exponi, et probari per textum suum ibidem et 
alibi. 
I 
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therefore, we must concede that there is something which is the efficient 
oa.use and something which is the recipient of the activity conferred by 
the efficient cause. When, then, the SOl1l is enlightened, it must be granted 
, . 
that an agent outside the soul has exln£erre!~" spiritual light on it.16 
Bacon conoedes that it is true tba t Aristotle did not in so many 
words s~ that t since there is in every nature .som.ething whioh acts, and 
something which SIlffers, so it 1Id.ll be with the soul,17 1:ut Bacon does not 
allow that one Dl8¥ foroe the text to mean tm t both agent and patient 
principles will be in the soul- l8 This is certainly not what the 
l6Ibidam., pp. 75-61 Volens igitur Aristoteles ostendere quod ad effectum 
scientiae et intellectus duo requirantur, agens scilioet, quod est 
illuminans, et materia patiens sau reoipiens illuminationem, probat hoc 
per simile in omnibus. Nsm in amni effectu at operatione duo requiruntur, 
efficiens et materia recipiens actionem efficientis; at non solum in 
naturalibus, sed in artiticialibus, ut arlificialibus, ut artifex ad 
materiam. in quam. operatur, et lux ad visum et oolores videndos pro examplo 
naturali. Et; awn in omnibus sic sit, erit ita a parte animae at in ".. 
operatione intelligendi. Unde oportet quod anima humana sit nata recipere 
illuminationes ab agente, et quod aliquod agens in animam conoedatur, qui 
illuminet eam per quoddsm lumen spirituale, siout lux solis visum • 
.2E. Kaj. 2, 5, pp. 40-1, Intellectus agens dicitur, qui influit in 
animas nostras illuminans ad scientiam. et virtutem; quia licat intellectus 
possibilis possit dici agens ab actu intelligendi, tamen sumendo I 
intellectum. agent am ut ipsi ~t, vocatur influens et illuminans 
possibilam ad oognitionem veritatis. 
l7.2E_ !!!:. 23, p. 761 Haec est intentio Aristotelis in prima parte et in 
principio oapituli. Sed ibi translatum est sic a 'Quonism autem. in omni 
natura est aliquid quod agat, et aliquid quod patiatur, ita erit in ~ima.' 
(De An. III, 5) 
l8Ibidem, Et hoo concludunt quod agens at patiens erunt in anima., et quod 
sint duae partes animae; quod est impossibile et contra Aristotelem 
ibidem. 
Cf. Appendix A, 
~'------------------------------------------------------------, 
Philosopher meant. as his words and his examples show. All Aristotle 
intends to show is that in every operation. whether in natural or artifioial 
things. aoting and passive prinoiples are needed. and when he says 'aio 
, . 
;;, ... ; 
est in anima' he really means 'sic est in operatione animae.' That this is 
what he means is evidEillt from. the examples he uses to illustrate his mean-
ing. The same relation applies to the sCAll as .tpplies to the artist and 
his material. or as to light and oolors. Clearly the carpenter is distinot 
by reason of his essenoe from. the materials on whioh he works. and surely 
the sun is not the color which it illuminates-19 
Understanding the text of Aristotle as it should be. and supported in 
this interpretation by Avicenna. 20 whom. he holds in hi~ regard. 2l Baoon 
states that the active intellect is separated substantially from the 
possible.22 This is not all that Bacon tells us of the nature of the agent 
intellect. This separated intelleot is inoorruptible as regards its being .;Jt. 
and its 81bstanoe. In this it differs from the possible which is incorrupt-
19.2£. !!!:. c. 23. p. 76& Nam. exempla declarant quod non vult dicere nisi 
quod duo requiruntur ad operation .. animae. sicut ad omnem. operationem I 
naturae et artis. Unde quod dicit 'sio est in anima' intendit quod sic 
est in operatione animae. secundum quod exemplificat dicens. 'ut artifex 
ad materiam..' et 'lux ad colores.' Certe carpentator est extra materiam 
seoundum. suam essentiam. et non aunt artifex et materia partes eiusdem. 
rei. nec lux solis et oolor quem illuminate 
20Ibidem •• Vide. Note 14. 
21Ibidem. pe 78: Deo hic testimonia uni praeferuntur; et tamen Averroes non 
plane discernit oontrarium. et Avicenna fuit major eo. et praecipuus 
I imitator Aristotelis. et dux ac princeps philosophiae post eum.e 
22.2£. !!!.. o. 23. p. 76& Et praeterea versus finem oapituli docet quod 
intellectus agens est separatus a possibili seoundum. substantiam. et 
secundum. esse. 
31. 
ible as regards its substance, but not asregarda its being. since it must 
suffer separation from its body.23 Aristotle bas also said that the agent 
intelleot is always in aot, am this possible neither for the human soul nor 
, . 
;,). .,.; 
the angel, bat for God alone.24 The actmg intelleot is, therefore, God 
Himself. 25 
The proot trom. authority my be considered.by the advooate of scientific 
observation a weak one, but Bacon holds n high regard the aforementioned 
authority of Alpharabi and Avioenna and h& nmr oites that of William of 
Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste. Bishop of Lincoln. William, Bishop ot 
Paris, assembled the university of Paris to reprove them, to dispute with 
them. and to disprove their tenet that tb aoting and passive faotors were 
parts of the soul.26 Robert of Linooln ~d Friar Adam Marsh hold and 
23.2£. Maj. 2, 5, p. 39: Et Avioenna quimo de anima et deoimo metaphysioes 
idem docet, neonon ipse philosophus dicit, 'Quod intelleotus agens est .,... 
separatus a possibili et immixtus.' Item vult quod intelleotus agens sit 
inoorruptibilis seoundum esse et subst~tiam, quoniam dioit ipsum 
differre a possibili penes inoorruptioDMn, sed pORsibilis est 
inoorruptibilis seoundum substantiam, ~ oorruptibilis secundum esse, 
propter separationan ejus. Ergo agens secundum esse et substantiam erit 
inoorruptibilis; qua propter non erit pars animae, quoniam tune secundum I 
esse suum in oorpore oorrumpetur, quando separetur; et dioit quod se habet 
ad possibilem siout artifex ad materiam, et liliout lux solis ad oolores. 
24.2£ • .!!!:. o. 23, p. 76: Et praeterea versus finem oapituli dooet quod 
intelleotus agens est separatus a possibili secundum substantiam et 
secundum esse, et quod anima soit, et semper est in aotuJ et hoo non ~st 
oreatura. sed solus Deus. 
25Ibidan., o. 23, p. 74 ~ ostendo quod hie intelleetus agEllls est Deus 
prineipaliter. • • 
26Ibidan: Et omnes sapientes antiqui, et qui ad hue rananserunt usque ad 
remanserunt usque ad tampora nostra, dixerunb quod fUit Deus. 
26Ibidem., pp. 74-5: Sed falsum est quodagens sit pars animae. Nam hoc 
est penitus impossibile, siout ibi ostendo per auctoritates et rationes 
sufficientea. Et amnes sapientes antiqui, et qui adhuo remanserunt usque 
ad tempora nostra, dixerunt quod fUit Deus. Unde bis venerabilan 


34. 
given his choioe betweem two apples. we can see that the operation of this 
light leads to an easy and natural operation on the part of the possible 
intellect. The boy. he says. will take the nioer apple. because "sine 
. . 
..... 
difficultate et laboreR he reasons that the nicer is the better, and what 
is better is to be chosen. Therefore, the nicer being the better apple, it 
is to be chosen. Just that easily and by mean, of argumentation, naturally 
the boy makes his choice.37 
We can see, then, Baoon's position on the question of the agent intell-
ect of Aristotle and the Divine Illumination of St. Augustine. His position 
makes the two doctrines to mean the same thing. The agent intellect is God; 
Illumination is from God. Always the operation of the agent is on the poss-
ible. As was already noted, the possible intellect~!! is not capable of 
knowledge. It receives the species of things, undergoes the action of the 
agent, and is illuminated by it. Thus it is that knowledge is born in the ~ 
soul.38 
37~. ~.c. 28, p. 103: Ergo de necessitate puer arguit sic apud sea quod 
est pulchrius est melius; et quod est melius est magis eligendum: ergo I 
pamum pulchrius est magis eligendum. Et tamen nescit quid vocetur argu-
mentum; ex quo conoludit auctor quod homo arguit a natura sine difficulta-
te et labore. Et hoc patet per rationem: quia amnis homo reddit causas 
et rationes diotorwn. et faotorum suorum, et rerum aliarum, in qui bus ex-
oitatus est. Sed hoc fieri non potest nisi per argumentum; quin argqmen-
tum facit fidem de re dubia per assignationem causae et rationis. Sed quod 
omnibus notum est, nosoitur naturaliter. Quod enim omnibus individuis eius-
dam speciei convenit, oportet, quod naturaliter eis conveniat: ut gemitus 
infirmorum, et latratus canum, et calefactio ignwm; et sic de omnibus pa-
tete Et Aristotles non dicit, ut patet quinto Ethicorum,lO. (Underscoring 
ours.) 
38~. ~. 23, p.74: Nam omnes modern dicunt quod intellectus agens in ani-
mas nostras. et illuminans eas, est pars animae,ita quod in anima sunt du-
as partes, agens scilicet et possibilis; et intellectus possibilis vocatur 
ui est in otentia ad soientiam et non habet de se· sed uando reoi it 
35 • 
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The human intelleot, or possible inte11eot, reoeives its knowledge from 
without. It is aoted upon and reoeives enlightenment fram the agent intel1-
act. "Anima vero humana dioitur ab eis possibilis, quia de se est impotens 
ad soientias et virtutes, et eas reoipit al~u~de. Inte1leotus agens dioitur 
qui inf1uit in animas nostras i1luminans ad scientiwn et virtutem; quia 1i-
cat inte1lectus possibi1is dioi agens ab aotu intel1igendi tamen sumendo 
.. 
intelleotum agentem ut ipsi sumunt, vocatur irirluens et i1luminans possibil-
em ad oognitionem veritatis."39 A statement very similar to this appears 
in the Communium Naturalium. The agent intellect is again represented as 
illuminating the agent inte11eot: "Intel1ectus agens il1uminat possibi1am 
et faoit scire."40 Likewise in the Opus Tertium he says that the human soul 
is adapted to receive illuminations fram the agent intellect: If anima humana 
sit nata reoipere i11uminationes ab agente."4l 
In each statement Bacon's words reveal that he oonsidered the operation 
of the agent intellect to be direotly exercised on the possible. This is 
rather different fram St. Thomas, for St. Thomas refers to the aotion of the 
agent intelleot as an abstractive one, and one direoting its efficaoy to ab-
straoting the universal fram the singular as it is found in the phantasm.42 I 
But this theory belongs to the 'moderns.' For Bacon, the soul does not make 
species rerum et agens influit et illuminat ipsum, tuno nasoitur soientia 
in eo; et hoo est verum. 
3~Op. Maj. 2, 5, pp. 38-9. 
4 Communium Natura1ium, p. 298. 
4!Op. Ter. 23, 75. 
4 SumIDa'fheo1ogioa, I, 79, 3: Oportet igitur ponere a1iquam virtutem ex pa 
intel1ectus, quae faoit inte1ligibi1ia in aotu per abstractionem speoierum 
a oonditionibus materialibus; et haeo est neoessitas ponendi inte11eotum 
agentem. Cf. Ibidem, I, 79, 4; ~ Anima and ,ad 4; SCG, III, o. 76. 
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the universal.43 
The harmonizing of two metaphysios~ not so muoh oontrary to one another 
as they are different~ has resulted in the assigning to the agent intelleot 
. . 
a role unique in the aoquiring of philosophi~ lnowledge. And sinoe God 
illuminates human souls in their knowing of the truths of philosophy~ it is 
evident that their work is not alien to divinersdom: "our igitur Deus il-
luminaverit animas eorum (i.e. humanorum) imperoipiendis veritatibus phil-
osophiae, manifestum est quod eorum labor non est alienus a sapientia divini~ 
43Communium Naturalium, II, 3,8,10, p. 102: Vanissimum est dioere quod 
anima facit universale. 
44~. Maj. 2,5, p.41. 
I 
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CHAPTER II I 
ST. BONAVENTURE 
1- ...... 
St. Bonaventure tried to suno~t the diffioulties presented to I philos-
ophers on the advent of Aristotelianism. His philosophy openly oentexered in 
God. beoause he is Augustinian in inclination a\ well as in tradition.n,l is a 
defense up to the very end of thefumrumental doctrines of the ancien.nt 
school, and a disapproval of the innovations of St. Thomas. 2 His phiI':'loso-
phy, then is not so muoh a synthesis of tradition with novelty, as it v is an 
attempt at a fuller explanation ~d a more oomplete expression of Au~stin-
ian thought. 
As might be expeoted, St. Augustine figures largely in his writin_ngs, 
prinoipally beoause Augustine has given to his disoiple s a theory of x illum-
ination and an explanation of the relations between the Creator and h:ibis 
creatures, which is in oloser harmony to the answers which Bonaventurere was 
seeking f rem philosophy than any other. Augustine stressed the dootrUoine 
that God illumines the soul of man.3 In this there is an emphasis on _ the I 
lMaurice De Wulf, Histoire.2! ~ Philosophie Medievale, p. 114: L' etlXlUde de 
Dieu est le oentre de la philoso~ieBona.venturienne; oar il est Auguu,ustin-
ien par inolination autant que par tradition. 
2Ibidem: Bien qu'il ait dtfendu jus~'~ la fin les dootrines organiquuues de 
l' anoienne ecole et qu' i1 desapprouve les innovations de Thomas d' AqU11Uin, 
. ,. ,; /. ,; ... il n' est pas engage dans les polemiques vehementes qu' elles suscitereeent. 
3Cf. St. Augustine, 83 Quaestionum, quaests. 51, et 2 et 4 (PL 40, 32 sq.) 
et 53, n. 2 (PL 40,36); £!~. XIV, c. 15 (PL 42,1052). 
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dignity o£ the human soul, and there is a stringer emphasis, when we realize 
that Augustine said that between the soul and God there is no need o£ any 
other being, angelio or otherwise.4 This nearness o£ the soul to God has its 
, . 
implioations and explioations in the dootrine o£ how we know the truth. 
Truth is above the soul, independent o£ it, and greater than it. Now, there 
being nothing above the soul itsel£ save God,;ruth must be God Himsel£.5 In 
Augustinian thought, Truth is always a mani£estation o£ God or God Himselt. 
Truth being that, and the relation between God and the human soul being so 
olose, the knowledge o£ truth to whioh the soul attains must be a knowledge 
ooming from God. This is true ot all truth, whetaer it be truth demanded 
by Christian dogma or by philosophy.6 All truth is known in the unoreated 
Light or in the Eternal Reasons. 7 
Haw St. Bonaventure de£ended this tradition and yet ooped with the prob-
4St • Augustine, De Quan. An. 34, 77 (PL32, 1077): "Quamadmodum fatendum est 
animam humanam. non"'""'(;'Ss'e quod Deus est : ita praesumendum nihil inter omnia 
quae oreavit, Deo esse propinquiua. 
Cf. De Vera Relig. 0.55, n. 113, o. 44,n.92 (PL34, 172 & 159) De Trin. XI, 
sc.5,Ii."8'[PL42,990 sq.) -
st. Augustine, De Lib. Arb. 2,15,39 (PL32,1262): Tu autem concesseras, si I 
quid supra mentesilciStr~esse monstraram, Deum te esse oon£esserum, ai 
adhuo nihil esse superius. Quam tuam conoessionem aocipiens diseram satis 
esse, ut hoc dem.onstrarem. Si enim aliquid est exoellentius, ille potius 
Deus est; si aut em non est, iam veritas est. 
6st• Augustine, De Doot. Christ.Prol. 8 (PL 34,18): Omne verum ab ill~ est 
qui &it: Ego sum verI'tas. 
7Ibidem,En. in Ps. 118,18,4 (PL 37,1553): Deus itaque per seipsum, quia lux 
est, illUminat-Pias mentes ut aa quae divina dicuntur vel ostenduntur, in-
telligant. Sed si ad hoo ministro utitur angelo, potest quidem &liquid 
agere angelus in mente hominis, ut oapiat luoero. Dei, at perhano intelligat. 
lems offered by Aristotelianism is given in his epistemology, and partioular-
ly in his dootrine on the agent intelleot. Man, the oreature oomposed of 
body and soul, is rational in virtue of the powers of his soul. That the 
, . 
body of man is a compositum is not questionatl~, but is the soul?8 The 
rational soul must be oomposed of matter, because it both moves and is 
moved. 9 Some say that the rational soul has nortter, but that it is a 
simple spirit. Because we must admit that the rational soul oan suffer, and 
act, and be changed from one property into another, it is not enough to say, 
as those who maintain that the soul is a simple spirit do, that the soul is 
a oomposite of quo est and quod est, but we must admit that there is in the 
rational soul a oomposition of matter and for.m. IO Then, as in the dootrine 
of Alexander, the human soul is not made fram the substance of God.11 
8 St. Bonaventure, II Sent., (A.C. Peltier, ed.), d.17,a.l.q.2, tome 3. 
9Ibidem.,p.ll: ConOluS'IO"'i Anima rational1s habet materiam, cum intra se 
habeat movere, et moveri, fUndamentumque existentiae retineat, et sio hoo~ 
aliquid. 
lOIbidem: Ad praediotorum intelligentiam est notandum, quod oirca hoo diver-
si diversa opinati Bunt. Quidam enim dixerunt nullam animam., neo rational-
em, neo brutalem, habere materiam, quia spiritus sunt simplioes; animam 
tamen rational~ dixerunt habere oompositionem ex quo est, et quod est, I 
quia ipsa est hoc aliquid, et nata est per se et in se subsistere. Sed cum 
planum. sit animam rationalem pati posse, et agere, et mutari ab una propri-
etate in aliam, et in seipsa subsistere, non videtur quod illud sufficiat 
dicere, quod in ea sit tantum oompositio ex quo est, et quod est, nisi 
adatur in ea esse compositio materiae et for.mae. 
llIbidem, d.17,a.l.q.l, page 8: Conclusio: Anima human non est oreata ex 
Dei substantia. 
Ibidem: Sed oum Deus nullius sit pars constitutiva propter suam summam per-
fecti~nem et absolutionem, positio haec fuit stulta et errones. 
40. 
That the rati onal soul has a material and a formal prinoiple is evident 
enough for Bonaventure, and his acoeptanoe of the terms aot and potenoy 
show that he was ready to reooncile opposing views. The meanings, however, 
, . 
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given to those terms seem to vary. The ter.ms have been applied to man's 
intelleot, so that philosophers speak of an agent and a possible intelleot. 
The Arabian philosophers say that the agent intilleot is a separated sub-
stanoe and the possible intelleot is the human soul joined to the body. 
This plaoes the agent intelleot in one substanoe and the possible in an-
other. Some say that the human soul is enlightened by the tenth intelli-
genoe and that the agent intelleot is a substanoe under God. But this is a 
false and erroneous opinion, for no created substance has the power of il-
luminating and perfeoting the soul, properly understood.12 This position 
perils Augustine's dootrine that between the human soul and God nothing is 
interposed. The need of a separated intelligneoe would oontradiot this. 
others of these hold that the agent intelleot is God Himself. They base 
their opinion on the words of St. Augustine and St. John. In several plaoes 
Augustine has said that God is the Light whioh illuminates us, the Teaoher I 
Who instruots us, the Truth whioh direots us.13 John has written "erat lux 
1211 Sent.,tame 3, d.24,p.l.a.2,q.4,opin.l: Quidam namque dioere volue~nt, 
quodl1Dtelleotus agens sit intelligantia separata; intellectus autam poss-
ibilis sit anima corpori oonjuncta. Et modus iste ponendi et dioendi tund-
atus est super verba philosophorum, qui posuerunt animam rationalem illus-
trari a deoima intelligentia, et perfici ex ooniunotione sui ad ill~. Sed 
iste modus dioendi falsus est, et erroneus, siout supra improbatum tuit, 
dist. viii. Nulla enim substantia oreata potentiam habet il1uminandi et 
perfioiendi animam, proprie intel1igendo. 
130f. St. Augustine, En. in Ps. exviii, serm. xviii, (PL 37,1553). 
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~era, quae illuminat omnem hOminem."14 The,r seem to argue that if it is God 
who illuminates us, why oan't God be the active intelleot, ahd thus the 
direct light of the human soul? Even though this might be true and oonson-
. ' . 
ant with Catholic faith, still there is give; 'to the human soul a power 
proper to it, a power for knowingJ just as to other creatures there is 
given power for other operations peouliar to t\em. So, although God is the 
principal agent in the activity of eaoh creature, He gives to eaoh an active 
power of its own through which it operates its own proper aotivity. To the 
rational being, therefore, God had given, not only a possible intellect, 
but also an acting one. It is not reasonable then to hold that the rational 
soul is the possible intellect only and that the agent intellect is a sub'!"; 
stance other than the soul. Eaoh intellect is in the soul,lS one no less 
than the other. 
St. Bonaventure aoknOW'ledges that these dootrines receive verbal suppo~ 
l4St • John, 1,9. 
1511 Sent. d.24, p.l.a.2,q.4,sub opin.l (tome 3): Alius modus intelligendi 
est, quod intelleotus agens esset ipse Deus, intellectus vero possibilis 
esset noster animus; et iste modus dicendi super verba Augustini est fund-
atus, qui in pluribus loois dixit et ostendit quod Lux quae nos illumin-
at, Magister qui nos docet, Veritas quae nos dirigit, Deus est, iuxta il-
Iud Joannis. ~ ~.!!!!, ~ illuminat omnem hominem, eto. Iste 
autem modus dioendi, etsi verum ponat et fidei Catholicae oonsonum, nihil 
taman est ad propositum. quia cum animae nostrae data sit potemtia aq in-
telligendum, siout aliis oreaturis data est potentia ad alias actusJ sio 
Deus, quamvis sit principalis operans in operatione oujuslibet oreaturae, 
dedit tamen ouilibet vim activam, per quam exiret in operationem propriam; 
sio oredendum est indubitanter quod humanae animae non tantummodo dederit 
intelleotum possibilem, sed etiam agent em, ita quod uterque est aliquid ip-
sius animae. 
I 
I 
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A seoond interpretation of the seoond dootrine is that the intelleotus 
~e~~ possibilis are two different intelleots bestowed on one substan~e. 
The agent is referred to as the for.m, and the possible as the matter, be-
, . 
1- .. ., 
oause the agent intellect is ordained to abstraoting the species and the 
possible to reoeiving and taking them up unto itself. Now, the possible 
intellect is not purely passive (as matter woul; be); rather it has the 
power to turn to the phantasm, and with the help of the agent intellect to 
receive it. Neither is the agent intellect purely active, for it must re-
oeive help in order to understand things; that help oomes fDom the species 
which is united to t he intellect after being abstracted from the phantasm. 
In short, the possible intelleot is not purely passive, for it has an oper-
ation and an initiative of its own; neither is the agent intellect purely 
active, for it receives some help from the species in understanding. Hence, 
the agent cannot know without the possible, nor the po'ssible without the 
agent. One act of knowing requires for its completion the ooncurrent aotion 
of the two intelleots. 18 
materia reperire. Sed hic modus dioendi non oonsonat veritati: si enim 
intellectus possibilis esset potentia pure passiva, et se teneret ex parte 
materiae, in omnibus posset poni, in quibus est reperire materiale prinoi-
pium. praeterea, siout ooulus non dioitur visus, sic talis potentia non 
debe ret dioi intelleotus. • 
l8Ibide.m,p. 175: Alius vero modus intelligendi est, ut dicitur quod intell-
ectus agens et possibilis sint duae intellectus differentiae datae uni sub-
stantiae, quae respioiunt totum oompositum. Appropriatur aute.m intellect-
us agens formae, et possibilis materiae, quiae intelleotus possibilis or-
dinatur ad susoipiendum; intelleotus agens ordinatur abstrahendum: neo 
intelleotus possibilis est pure passivius, habet enim supra speoie.m exist-
entem in se phantasia se converte, et oonvertendo per auxilium intellectus 
agentis illam susoipere, etde ea judioare. Similiter nec intelleotus 
agens est omnino in actu: non enim potest intelligere aluid a se, nisi 
I 
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Bonaventure's position does not eliminate sense knowledge or extramental 
knowledge. It is, rather, an attempt to explain lmowledge of things of the 
world, of the soul itself, and of what is abQY~7the soul, so that natural 
knowledge is proteoted and the natural operation of a knowing subjeot ex-
plains knowledge had~~. The terminology is Aristotelaan, but the oontent 
is Augustinian- To fully determine his positio! let us oonsider the remain-
ing possible interpretations of the faotors of the rational soul. 
It might be said that the agent and the possible intelleots are one and 
the same intelleot, differing only in oomparison. This position is based 
upon the faot that the soul is agent, when oonsidered ~~, and possible 
When oonsidered as united to the body, to phantasms, or to the phantasia. 
But this deviates from the truth, beoause the separated soul has an agent in-
telleot, the possible. Therefore, the separated soul, despite the laok of 
".. 
the body, has an agent and a possible intelleot. 
not, then, aooount for a possible intelleot.19 
Conjunotion to a body oan-
adjuvetur a speoie, quae abstraota a phantasmate intelleotui habet uniri. 
Inde nee possibilis intelligit sine agente, neo agens sine possibilis. 
19Ibide.m, pp.175-6: Quartus aute.m modus assignandi differentiam inter poss-
ibile.m et a gent em, quo soilioet differunt siout potentia absoluta et oom-
parata, duplioiter habet intelligi. Uno modo, ut intelligatur quod una 
omino et eadem est potentia intelleotus agens et possibilis, differens oom-
paratione sola, ut agens sit prout est in se oonsiderate, possibilis vero 
prout uniter oorpori, et phantasmatibus, vel phantasiae. Et hie modUS di-
oendi videtur fundari super verba Philosophi, qui vult quod intelleotus 
agens semper est in suo aotu; possibilis vero aliquando sio, ali quando non. 
Quod enim anima lassetur, et perturbetur in aotu intelligendi, hoo est ex 
oonjunotione sui ad oorpus. Sed hic modus ponendi defioit a veri tate: 
quoniam anima separata habet intelleotum quo est omnia facere, habet etiam 
intelleotum quo est omnia fieri; ergo habet agentem et possibilem, etiam 
oum separata est; ergo intelleotus possibilis non inerat ei solum ex oon-
'unotione sui oum eor ore. 
I 
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Dependence on body. or anything associated with bodily conditions, 
suoh as phantasms. or phantasia, cannot be the reason for holding that there 
is a possible intelleot. The interdependence and the interaotion of one 
, . 
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intellect with another is what is needed to explain this demand. 
It is evident that Bonaventure has used in his explanation the seme 
terms whioh St. Thomas Aquinas used in his, bu\ instead of the special 
traits which St. Thomas saw for each intell ect and according to which he 
distinguished thsn., Bonaventure sees that the two intellects are really two 
phases of the seme operation, the operation of knowiDg. For Bonaventure, 
the agent intellect partakes of the passivity of the possible,' and the 
possible partakes of the activity of the agent. Aristotle in the third book 
of his E.! AnSma has said that the agent and the possible intellects are two 
different intelleots, one mioh abstracts the specie s from the objeot, the 
agentJ and the other the one whioh reoeives the speoies, the possible. Thig. 
position. Bonaventure says. is true. 20 
If others want to interpret the dootrine of the agent intellect as mean-
ing that our intelleot has in itself an innate, habitual cognition of 
universals, they are not interpreting in a mtUmer harmonious with the real 
meaning of the Philosopher. Aristotle has said that the soul is oreated as 
20Ibidem, p. 175: Et iste modus dicendi versus est, et super verba 
Philosophi fundatus: dicit enim agentam et possibilam esse duas differen-
tias intellectual unde siout duo intelligimus necessario in medio. ad hoc 
quod abstrahat species ab objecto. videlicet luoam et diaphaneitatam, ita 
quod per unum abstrahit. et per aliud defert et suscipit; sic et in pro-
posite conformiter pot est intelligi, ita ad unum actum haec duo concurrere, 
ut hoc sine illo non habeat operationam suem complete. 
I 
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a ~abula~. not that it has knowledge as an innate habit, but that it 
acquires knowledge in the medium of sense and experienoe.21 
The third possibility might also mean that the intelleotus agens 
, . 
differs fram the intellectus possibilis as hlb!t differs from power. not that 
the aoting intelleot is purely habit, but that it is a power with a habit 
(~otentia habitualis). This is probable and is consonant with Catholio 
.. 
doctrine and the texts of philosophers. Dionysius says that intelleotual 
substanoes are lights (lumina). Therefore, the perfeotion and the oomplet:ion 
of the intelleotual substanoe is spiritual ligpt (lux). Fram this it is 
concluded tha t that power which belongs to the soul beoause of its intelleot, 
is a certain light (lumen) in it. Wherefore, the Psalmist says: Signatum 
est super ~ lumen vultus.:!::!, Damine.22 
21Ibide.m: Et hic modus ponendi fundari videtur super verba Boetii, qui 
dicit quod summam retinens singula perdit; quod voluerunt aliqui intelligi 
sic: quod intellectus noster dioatur habere apud se oognitione.m ~ 
universalium habituale.m innatrun, alioquin non posset per virtutam surun, 
abstrahendo etiam a sensibus et a phantasmatibus, facere intelleotum 
possibile.m aotu intelligentem: amne enim quod deduoit alterum de potentia 
in aotum, est ens in actu. Sed iste modus dicendi verbis Philosophi non 
consonat, qui dioit animam esse creatam siout tabulsn rasam, neo habere 
cognitionam habitum sibi innatum, sed acquirere mediante sensu et experi-
entia. 
22Ibidem, pp. 175-6: Alius modus dioendi est. ut dioatur intellectus agens 
differre a possibili, siout habitus a potentia: non quia agens sit pure 
habitus, sed quia est potentia habitualis. Et iste modus dicendi 
probabilis est et verus, et super verba philosophica et oatholioa turldatus. 
Verum enim est secundum Dionysium, quod substantiae intelleotuales, eo 
ipso quod intelleotuales substantiae, lumina sunt: ergo perfeotio et 
comple.mentum substantiae intellectualis lux est spiritaualis: igitur 
ilIa potentia, quae oonsequitur animam ex parte intelleotus sui, quoddrun 
lumen est in ipsa; de quo lumine potest intelligi illud Psalmi: Signatus 
~ super ~ lumen vultus tui, Damine. 
Cf. Psalm, 4, 7. 
I 
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This lumen the Philosopher seems to have known as the intellectus 
agens. Bonaventure thinks. for Aristotle says in De Anima II! that tmt 
intellect to whioh aotion belongs is a oertain habitus. suoh as light. for 
, . 
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in some way light makes oolors in potenoy to be colors in aot. Just as the 
eye of a oat has not only the power of taking into itself the species 
through a light medium. but also the power of ~ing the speoies in itself 
thru the nature of a light placed wi thin it: so the intellect by its nature 
can take in the species or. by the power of the light naturally inserted in 
it. it may make the species in itself.23 
This interohangable use of the terms lumen (an Augustinian term) and 
intellectus agens (an Aristotelian term) equates Augustinian illumination 
with Aristotelian abstraction- This interpretation. which makes the words 
of the Philosopher coincide with the words of the Psalmist is acceptable to 
Bonaventure_ Aocepting this position. Bonaventure assigns to the soul act .... 
and potency. both of which are proper to it. The soul's potenoy to know can 
be. and is. realized by the aotual factor. the intellectus agens or lumen. 
Intelleotual operations are operations within the soul and natural to the I 
soul. 
Beoans e of creati on. the ratioml SCAlI is the image of God naturally.24 
23IbidElll; Et hoc lumen videtur Philosophus intellexisse esse intelleotum 
ag ent em a dicit enm quod ille intellectus. quo est omnia faoere. est 
siout habitus quidam. ut lumena quodam enm modo lumen faoit oolores po-
tentia. aotu colores. siout habetur in libro III de Anima. Hujus autam 
smile potest poni in ooulo oati. qui non solum habet potentiam susoipiendi 
in se speoiem. per naturam perspioui. siout alii. sed etiam potentiam 
faciendi in se speciem. per naturam luminis sibi inditi. 
24Ibidem. d.16. a.l. p_ 1. (tome 2). p. 632. Ad quod intelligendum 
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By its very nature it has acting and passive factors, whioh belong to it 
intrinsically, eaoh of whioh needs the other for -the completion of its own 
proper act. The words of Dionysius whi oh would have us endowed "With an 
, . 
.. .. 
in!; ellect known as a lumen or created light. or Augustine's words that we see 
in a light, and the mrds of Aristotle. assigning to the created mind an 
agent intellect, are taken to mean the same. To c anplete the soluti on to 
• 
the problEIII. of the agent intelleot. we must see how that created light (agent 
intellect) operates under Divi:ce Illumination. or how Divine Illumination 
operates on it. 
The agent intelleot in the rational soul is not God. beoause the 
spiritual Light whioh is God is most simple and is not able. therefore, to 
be the perfeotion of things of different natures. However, since God is 
almighty, He is able to produoe and to make a oreated light which in some 
way conforms to Himself. This created light is not self-sufficient, even 
after it has been produoed, for it needs the influence of the highest Light -
the Light creative -. Thus, the human sall, which has its own proper light 
(a creal:; ed light) in itself, by whioh it is completed, is both produced and 
conserved by the eternal Light.25 
notandum est, quod quaedem est similitude per convenientiem omnimodam in 
natura, et sio una persona in Trinitate est alterius simil1s; quaedam, per 
participationam alicujus naturae universal1s, sicut homo et as1nus assimi-
lantur in animal1; quaedam vero secundum proportionabilitatam, sicut nauta 
et auriga conveniunt seoundum oomparationam ad ilIa quae regunt; quaedam 
est similitudo per convenientiem ordinis, siout exemplatum assimilatur 
exemplari. Primus enim duobus modis nulla creatura potest Deo assimilari, 
seoundis duobus modis omnis creatura assimilatur J sed 11190, quae 
assimilatur magis de longinquo, habet rationem vestigii; ilIa vero quae de 
proximo. habet rat1onem. imaginis: talis autem est creatura rationalis, 
I 
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The relation of the created to Creator is expressed in the dependence 
of oreated on Creator, of light on Light. This dependenoe is found in 
knowledge of the troth to which the rational soul attains. St. Bonaventure 
, . 
.. .... 
tells us that it is God who illuminates us, that the lumen (created light) 
receives its light frCIII. the Lux (the unoreated light). Altho stated in 
general terms, one cannot but recognize that tiis illUIllination oocurs in 
every activity of the oreated. Indeed, it is not just a oonourring 
illuminati on; it is from creati on a produoing one, and from then on a con-
serving one. Thus, it is found in tbe chief activity of man, that of know-
ledge and intellectinge 
The human mind, :naturally inclined to Troth,26 knows troth. This is 
the necessary and eternal troth. Now, whm it knows with certitude, does it 
utpote homo. 
25Ibidem, d. 17. a.l, q.l, (tome 2). pp. 9-10: Ad illud quod objioitur, .,.. 
quod Deus est lux spiritualis, dicendum quod non est s~ile de luce 
spirituali, et corporali omnino. Lux enim spiritualis quae Deus est, 
cum sit simplioissima, non potest esse perfectio rerum diversarum naturarunu 
cum autan sit amnipotentissima, potest produoere et faoere lucan creatam 
aliquo modo sibi oonformEiDli quae tamen sibi non sufficit, etiam postquam 
produota est, nisi adsit ei summae luois influentia. Et sio intelligendUIll I 
est in ipsa anima humana, quod ipsa habet luoan propriam, soilicet 
creatam, per quam completur, quae a luce aeterna et producitur et oon-
servatur. 
26 In Hexsmeron, Sermon IV, (tome 9, Peltier, Ed) p. 50: Ergp veritas 
Iiidioat, quod mens nostra fertur naturali inclinatione ad veritatEID. •• 
I" 
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knOW in the light of the eternal truth itself?27 There are three ways to 
interpret the phrase "knowing in the eternal reasons". In one way it is 
said that the dootrine means that the eternal truths are the whole and sole 
, . 
• •• 
'ratio' of our knowledge of things. That would fail to distinguish between 
knowledge ~ ~ and knowledge .!!! I!: tria. knowledge in the proper genus and 
knowledge in the Word, soienoe and wisdom.. natuje and graoe. reason and 
revelation. This interpretation is not aooeptable. 28 
Another way wOlld have it that tknow1llg in the eternal reasons' means 
that a oertain influenoe of the eternal reasons is exeroised in the soul. 
This does not mean that the eternal reasons are ~ .!! attained to, but 
only that their influElllce in the soul is. This, however. is insufficient. 
It falls far short of the dElD8.nds expressed in the words of Augustine,29 
who insists that the soul is regulated by eternal reasons, which are above 
the scul, not in the soul. Therefore, to Bay the!; the soul, in knowing in ,... 
the eternal reasons, does not go beyond an influenoe of the uncreated light 
is wrong.30 
27De Humanae Cogni tionis Ratione Bancti Bonaventurae, Quarraohi ed.. p. 49: 
SUpposito. quod rationes aeternae sint realiter indistinotae in divina 
arte sive oognitione. quaeritur. utrum. sint rationes oogn,oscendi in omni 
oertitudinali oognitione: hoo est quaerere. utrum quidquid scitur a 
nobis oertitudinaliter. cognosoatur in ipsis rationibus aeternis. 
28De~. Cog. Ration. p. 61: Ad praedictorum. intelligentiam. est notandum. 
quod oum dicitur. quod a.mne quod cognosoitur oertitudinaliter. oognosoitur 
in luoe aeternarum rationum. hoo triplioiter potest intelligi. Uno modo, 
ut intelligatur. quod ad oertitudinalan ccgnitionam. conourrit lucis -
aeternae evidentia tanquwm ratio cognosoendi tota et sola; et haec intelli-
gentia est minus reota. pro eo quod secundum ~null~set rerum oognitio 
nisi in Verbo. et tuna non differret aogn,itio viae a cognitione patriae. 
nec oognito in Verbo a oognitione in proprio genere. nee ocgnitio scientiae 
a oognitione sapientiae. neo cognitio naturae a oognitione gratiae. neo 
I 
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It might be mentioned here that although St. Bonaventure's reason for 
rejecting this second interpretation of the doctrine is based on authority 
and is for that reason weak, and perhap s naive, he has reference to the 
. ;;. .;, 
Augustinian dootrine that between the hUlll8.ll soul and its oreator no other 
being intervenes, not even an inf'luSloe of the Creator.3l Refusal to aocept 
even an influenoe is a strong mmifestation of .. the dignity oonoeded to the 
cognitio rationis a cognitione revelationis; quae omnia cum sint falsa, 
nullo modo est ista via tenenda. Ex hac enim sententia, qua qui dam 
posuerunt, nihil certitudinaliter cognosoi nisi in mundo archetypo et 
intelligibili, siout fuerunt Academici primi, natus f'uit error, ut dicit 
Augustinus contra Acadamicos libro secundo, quod nihil amnino contingeret 
scire, sicut posuerunt Aoademici novi, pro eo quod ille mandus intelli-
gibilis est occultus mentibus humanise Et ideo volentes tenere primsm 
suppositionam, inoideruDt in manifestum erroram; quia modicul error in 
principia magnus est in fine. 
29Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate XIV, c.xv, n. 21. 
30.!?! 2. Cog. Ration:; p. 62: ~ modo, ut intelligatur, quod ad oogni-
tionem. oertitudinalEID. neoessario conourri t ratio aeterna quantum ad quam 
influentiam, ita quod cognoscens in cognoscendo non ipsam rationem 
aeternam attingit, sed influentiam eius solum. Et hie quidem modus dioeruK 
est insuffioiens secundum verba beati Augustini, qui verbis expressi. et 
rationibus ostendit, ~od mens in oertitudinali cognitions per ineammuta-
bUis et aeternas regulas habeat regulari, non tanquam per habitum 
~ mentis, sed tanquam per eas, quae sunt supra ~ in veritate aeterna. 
Et ideo dioere, quod mens nostra in oognoscendo non extendat se ultra 
inf'luentiam luois inoreatae, est dicere, Au~stinum deceptum fuisse, cum I 
auctoritates eius exponendo non sit facile ad iatum sensum trahere; et 
hoo valde absurdum est dioere de tanto Patre Doctore maxime authentioo 
inter amnes expositores sacrae Soripturae. 
31Ut supra. 
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rational soul in Augustinian-Franciscan philosophy. 
If we consider an influence, we then ask, what might that influence be? 
Is it the general concursus whioh God gives to all creatures? If it is 
. 
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general then God is in no greater sense the giver of wisdom than He is the 
giver of fruitfulness to the land. If it is a special concursus, then it 
is grace. Hence, it follows that all knowledge.is infused, and that there 
is no innate or acquired knowledge. 32 This makes the position unacoeptable 
to Bonaventure. 
Between the positions which s.tate that the eternal reasons are the whole 
and sole ratio of our knowing and that when we know in the eternal reasons 
we know in an influence of the eternal ligh~, there is a via media. This 
position, though last to be treated, is not the least; it is the position 
which Bonaventure accepts. The ~ media states that in certain knowledge 
the eternal reasons are required as regulative and motive ratio, not, to be .~ 
sure, as sole ratio in all its olarity, but along with the oreated ratio. 
The eternal reasons are known in part by us in this life.33 
32Ibidem: Praeterea, ilIa lucis influentia aut est generalis~ quantum Deus 
influit in omnibus creaturis~ aut est speoialis~ sicut Deus influit per 
gratimn. Si est generalis; ergo Deus non magis debet dici dator sapi~ntiae 
quam fecundator terrae; nec magis ab eo dioeretur esse scientia, quam pe-
ounia. Si specialis~ cuiusmodi est in gratia; ergo secundum hoc omni~ oog-
nitio est iniusa et nulla est aoquisita vel innata: quae omnia sunt absurda. 
33De~. Cog. ~. pp. 62-3: Et ideo est tertius modus intelligendi, quasi 
medium tenens inter utramque viam, scilioet, quod ad oertitudinalem oog-
nitionem ne~essario requiritur ratio aeterna ut regulans et ratio mot iva, 
non quidam ut sola et in sua omnimoda claritate, sed oum ratione oreata, 
et ut ex parte a nobis oontuita seoundum statum viae. 
Et hoo est quod Augustinus insinuat deoimo quarto de Trinitate~ oapitulo 
decimo quinto: "Commemoratur impius, ut convertatur-ad Dominum, tanquam ad 
eam luoem, qua etiam~ oum ab illo averteretur, quodam modo tangebatur. Nam 
hinc est uod et im ii co itant aeternitatem et 
I 
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The nobility of knowledge and the dignity of the knower are suoh that 
they require the 'regulative and motive ratio' of the eternal reasons, that 
sOlllehow the mind attain to the eternal laws and the inoommunioable reasons.34 
, . 
.. .. ; 
certain knowledge demands immutability on the ];art of knowledge and infal-
libility on the part of the knower. The oreated truth is not immutable, nor 
is the oreated light infallible, sinoe both wer: oreated and brought from 
non-being into being. Certain knowledge, requires, therefore, that there be 
a reoourse to that truth in all ways immutable and stable, and to that Light 
in all ways infallible. Again, if we consider that things have being in the 
m.ind, in their own proper genus, and in the eternal art, and that of these 
three only the one in the eterml art is immutable, we will be led to oon-
olude that oertainty recpires by its very nobility that we attain to the 
eternal reasons.35 
reoteque laudant in haminum moribus. 
34Ibidam, p. 63: Ubi et subdit, quod hoo faoiunt per regulas, quae soriptae 
sunt in libro luois ill ius, quae veritas dioitur. Quod autam mens nostra 
in oertitudinali oognitione aliquo modo attingat illas regulas et inoom-
mutabiles rationes, requirit neoessario nobilitas oOgnitionis et dignitas 
oognoscentis. 
35Ibiden: p. 64. Nobilitas, inquam, oognitionis, quia cognitio certitudinal 
esse non potest, nisi sit ~ parte scibilis immutabilitas, et i,nfallibil-
~~ parte soientis. Veritas aute.m oreata non est tmmutabilis simplici-
ter, sed ex suppositione; similiter neo lux oreaturae est omnino infalli-
bilis ex propria virtute, cum utraque sit oreata et prodierlt de non~sse 
in esse. Si ergo ad plenam cognitionam fit reoursus ad veritate.m omnino 
immutabile.m et stabilem, et ad luoe.m omnino infallibile.m, neoesse est, 
quod in huiusmodi cogni tione reourratur ad artem supernam. ut ad luoe.m et 
veritatem.: luoem, inquam, dantem. infallibilitatem soienti, et veritatam. 
dantam immutabilitatem. soibili. Unde cum res habeant esse in mente, et 
in proprio genere, et in aeterna arte, non suffioit ipsi aniiae ad 
certitudinale.m scientiam veritas rerum, secundum quod esse habent in se, 
vel secundum quod esse habent in proprio genere, quia utrobique sunt 
mutabiles, nisi aliquo modo attingat eas, in quantum aunt in arte aeterna. 
I 
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The dignity of the knower points to this same conolusion. The rational 
spirit has a superior and an inferior part.36 The inferior is deliberative 
in actions. It is not self-suffioient, but requires the superior. The 
, . 
superior, or 'higher part of mm' by which tfre ..... rati onal spirit is the 
image of God, inheres in the eternal reasons. Through these man judges 
and defines in certain knowledge. This knowing ... with certainty and inherence 
belongs to the rational spirit by reason of its dignity and nobility as 
image of God.31 
From the mind of God, acoording to the exemplarism of the Divine Art, 
to the oreated object, to the mind knowing with oertitude' in the Eternal 
Laws, Truth makes its way. God, the origin of all that is, in the order 
of mower and of knowables, is needed to acoount for the certainty with 
which the human soul is imbued. The cirole, the symbol of perfeotion, 
exemplifies the perfect circuit made by Xruth in its egress from its center ..... 
to its bounds, reaohing the limits, but always remaining aloof from them.; 
returning from them, but always being with them to maintain them in their 
limitedness. 
36Cf. St. Augustine, .E!.~. XII, o. 12, n. 11 (PL 42,1001); Ibidem, oc.2 
et 3 (PL 42,999). 
i 31.Q!~. Cog • .!!!!., p. 64, Ipsum etiam requirit dignitas ex parte sci~ntis. 
! Cum enim spiritus rationa1is habeat superiorem portionem rationis et 
interiorem, siout ad plenum indioium rationis deliberativum in agendis, 
non suffioit portio interior sine superioril sio at ad plenum rationis 
indioium in specu1andis. Haeo autem portio superior est illa, in qua est 
imago Dei, quae et aeternis regulis inhaeresoit, at per eas, quidquid 
definit oertitudinaliter, iudioa et definit; et hoo oompetit ei, in quantum 
est imago Dei. 
I 
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in this way, sim e the intelleotual power is free to know all. Moreover, 
intelleotual oertitude must come from sometiling not having this natural 
alligation to a determinate objeot, but it must oome through something hav-
. 
ing liberty without the defeot of mutability·~ fallibility. Suoh freedom 
oannot oome from the oreated mind, sinoe by reason of its having been eduoed 
fram nothingness it is not infallible or-~utable. This oan be found only 
.. 
in the ratio of the eternal reasons, for freedom. from mutability and from 
faillibility is the 'ratio' of eternal Truth, to whioh the image must have 
reoourse-as to the fount of all oertitude.4l 
To understand the inadequaoy of the sensible abstraotions let us con-
sider the prooess of abstr~ion. The sensible speoies of the objeot present 
themselves to the sense organ. In this organ they are received as phantasms. 
Without interruption, the speoies as phantasm, is brought to the imagination. 
In this prooess. the corporeal power is as a passive power. while the 
imagination is as an aotive one. That kind of abstraotion found in the 
imagination does not rise above that abstraotion found in the partioular 
sense. When the speoies (now intelligible) oomes to the intelleot a new 
4lIbidem, pp. 66-7, ad 11: Ad illud quod obicitur de sensu, dioendum, quod 
non est simile de oertitudine sensus et intelleotus. Certitudo enim 
sensus venit ex alligatione potentiae operantis per modum naturae oiroa 
aliquid determinatae. Certitudo autem intelleotua non poteat venie 6x hac 
parte, cum sit potentia libera ad intelligendum amnia; et ideo oportet, quod 
veniat per aliquid non habens alligationem, sed liberlate.m sine defeoti-
bilitate mutabilitatis et fallibilitatis; et talis est lux et ratio 
sanpiternae veritatisa et ideo ad illam reourritur ad fonts amnis 
oertitudinis. 
I 
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kind of abstraction is there required, and that is a new kind of light. It 
is true that the sense and the imagination are themselves powers, passive 
and actual, but they are not the powers of the intellect. The intellect 
. 
. ... 
needs more an active power distinct from the possible than imagination or 
sense need an active power.42 This is an account of the rational soul's 
gaining of knowledge (soientia) of a thing. ~d it is correot as far as it 
goes and as it is explained by the Philosopher.43 But it is not an aocount 
of the ultimate and universal truth which the soul reaches. The ultimate 
and universal is explainable only if the Eternal Rules regulate and move -
only if the Eternal Light illuminates. 
Such is the part the Eternal Verities play in all knowledge that is 
certain. Regulative and motive oooperation, even, ~ via, must be had. It 
should be noted that the Eternal Light does not aooount for the operation , 
and the activities of the human soul, for the soul may turn either to or ..... 
from God. But the eternal light does account for the truth known, the 
reason why it is attained, and how it is reaohed. 
42In II Sent.,d.24,p.l,a.l,q.4,ad 2 (tome 3) pp. 176-7: Ad illud quod obi-
CItur de imaginatione, quod non differt potentia aotiva et passiva, dici 
potest quod magis differt, quam in intellectu, quia organum corporali, in 
quo recipiuntur phantasmata est ei loco potentiae passivae; ipsa vero vis 
imaginaria est 1000 potentiae activae. Aliter potet dici, quod non ~st 
simile, quia oum species defertur a sensu usque ad imaginationem, non ex-
it genus abstractionis, quae quidem fuit in sensu particulari: sed cum 
species pervenit ad intellectum, novum genus abstractionis ibi exigitur, 
et aliud genus luminis: ideo magis indiget potentia act iva distinota a pos 
sibili ipse intellectus, quam imaginatio vel sensu. 
43Cf • .!~.~, un. 2, fund. I, (tome i). 
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st. Bonaventure has developed the dootrine of Augustinian illumination 
so that he has retained for the knowing oreature, its own proper natural 
aotivity and its dignity and nobility as image of God. At the same time he 
, . 
1- .. "? has demanded that the creative, providential, conservative and illuminative 
p~er of God be exeroised on the oreature. Divine illumination funotions 
somehow; quemadmodo, attaining to the divine relsons. No intermediary be-
ing allowed, it is hard to explain how the creature operates naturally. Is 
the oooperation perfeot or imperfect? All that oan be gleaned is that the 
co-operation and the attainment is as perfeot and as direot in this life as 
it oan be. 
Considering knowledge as Truth, as does St. Bonaventure, what must we 
say is the prinoipal oourse of man's knowledge? Is it the objeot presented 
by way of speoies to the intelleot, or by the light of the aoting intelleot, 
or by the unoreated Light? It seems that it must be said that Truth is in ,... 
the mind as an effeot of the divine Light, and that the Eternal Reasons are 
the cause, ultimately, of the knowledge had. The objeot is oause only inso-
far as the eternal Light is the souroe of its truth; the oreated light is 
cause, but it is oause only insofar as the Eternal Light is the souroe of 
all light. 
. 
Bonaventure's treatment of the agent intelleot makes the oreated agent 
intelleot just so powerful in its own right that the effioacy of the Divine 
Light in human understanding is hard to determine. On the other hand, Divine 
Illumination is so neoessary that the rational soul oannot exercise its cog-
ni ti ve powers to attain certitude without help from God. To the aoting in-
I 
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telleot he has assigned abstraotion of speoies,44 but this function is not 
suffioient to explain oertitude. The formal neoessity of Truth requires 
that the intelleot be guided and oontrolled by the principle of eternal 
. . 
;. .. ; 
Truth. The aotivity of the agent intelleot is thus at once limited and 
unlimited in its proper activity of abstraction. for it receives knowledge 
of sensible things in the fashion of limitation.impliott in all created 
beings, and yet it reaches to certain knowledge in the unlimited eternal 
light. Again. it is limited, because it must depend upon the possible in-
telleot. so much so that it cannot be said that it abstracts, if the possi-
ble oan not be said to reoeive the speoies. While then., we may oall the 
agent and the possible intelleot two different intellects,45 we must remem-
ber that the conourrent aotion of the two is necessary for one act of know-
ing. Unity of knowledge seems to demand that. We must also remember that. 
although we have examined their activities as being separate from one an-
other, they are not separate, but are really two phaseLof' one operation. 
Interdependent action charaoterizes the activities or the two.46 
The created light whioh Eonaventure thinks Aristotle knew as an agent 
intelleot,47 oannot achieve perfeot knowledge, even though the human spirit 
by its nature is endowed with faoulties proper to the aotivity of knowing. 
Humblest human knowledge, howsoever fragmentary, needs, by reason of its 
dignity and its nobility. the immutable objeot and i~ulible knowledge. 
44Vide notae 18 et 20. 
45vide nota 20. 
46vide notae 18 et 20. 
47Vide nota 27. 
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Truth itself. It is this necessity which defies us to define the content 
of intellectual knowledge, and it is this whioh presents us with difficulty 
when we try to define, or adequately describe! the role of the agent in-
tellect in Bonaventure's epistemology. 
The agent intelleot is used by Bonaventure to explain how the human 
spirit reaohes knowledge by the efi'ioacy~?f it, own nature, for by reason 
of its nature as image of God it has a oognitive, effioient power. How-
ever, beoause the truth which it attains is above it, and greater than it; 
and beoause no intervention between God and His creatures is possible, the 
soul knows Truth only beoause it attains to it, that is, it goes above it-
self in some way_ It is noted that at the moment Bonaventure explains the 
natural efi'iciency of the creature, he has no more to do with a divison of 
intelleots; he no longer considers the human spirit as being endowed with 
an intelleotus agens et possibilis, but from then on considers only the .~ 
human mind, the anima humana, the human spirit. The role of the agent in-
telleot seems to be a role symbolizing the aotivity natural to an image of 
God; and that is all. I 
.' 
CHAPTER IV 
John Peokham 
John Peokham's philosophic texts prove tt~t he is fervent for Augustin-
ian tradition. l This simple historical fact allies Peckham with others of 
his time. the medieval Augustinians. who adherl to Christian tradition. He 
brings 'back 'en bloc' current Augustinian ideas for all those who conoern 
themselves with metaphysics and natural philosophy.2 His psychology follows 
closely that of St. Bonaventure.3 These preliminary notes make unnecessary 
a restatement of the Augustinian principles ~hich Peokham, St. Bonaventure. 
and others who follow in the same Augustinian tradition have held. 
Before staing his own position Peokham gives in the manner of his day, 
the positions whioh he deems worthy of oonsideration and refutation. Opin-
ions, many of which are erroneous, have been offered for our consideration ~ 
by the philosophers.4 One of these opinions hOlds that there is one agent 
lMaurice De Wulf, loc- cit., p. 222: Les textes philosophique {ditea prouv-
ent que Pecham un~eKte fervent de la scholastic traditionelle. 
2Ibidem, p. 223: De mem, il reprend en bloo les idees augustiniennes oour-
antes pour toute oe qui ooncerne la metaphysique et la philosohie de la 
nature. 
3IbidemJ La psyohologie de Pecham serre de pr~s oelle de Bonaventure. 
~John Peokham, Quaestiones tractantes ~ anima, Beitrage, XIX, 5-6, 19~8, ed-
ited byP. Hieronymus Spettmann, O.F.M •• Quaestio V, Respondeo, line 15, p. 
65: Soiendum (est) quod in ista quaestione plures reperiuntur errores phil-
osophorum. (Hereafter referenoes to Peokham's work will be indicated by 
Quaestio.) 
61. 
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intelleot for all# an agent intellect which cannot be united to us exoept by 
the material intelleot. Aristotle had said that the agent intellect knows 
all aotually. These men interpret him as follows: The material intelleot , 
, . 
. ~ 
is called the possible, and is the one which at times knows and at other 
times does not. Now, it does not both know and not-know unless it is con-
sidered with referenoe to individual things. Bit as regards the oonsidera~ 
tion of speoies, it always knows the sane. Henoe, when the acting intelleot 
is considered as regards some one individual, there is at times understand-
ing, but at other times there isn't. But absolutely, the acting intellect 
always knows. This is the position of Averroes.5 
This position is not tenable for Peckham. He maintains that material 
intellects, that is possible intelleots, are numbered acoording to the number 
of indivduals. This dismisses the possibility of one material intellect for 
all. Now, if the acting intellect does not always know in act as regards ~ 
this individual# Peckham asks, in ~at way might the aoting intelleot be-
come intellecting in act as regards that individual? To answer this question 
5Ibidem, lines 16-27: Fuerunt enim quidam ponentes intellectum possibilem 
esse unum in omnibus secundum numerum, nec ipse solum sed etiam intellectum 
a gent em, qui non oopulatur nobis nisi per intellectum materialem, ut dicunt 
huno esse unum. Et quod dioit Philosophus eum intelligere omnia in actu~ 
exponunt possibilis (et qui) intelligit quandoque et quandoque non int,lli-
git, (hoc non facit) nisi respectu individuorum singularum; simpliciter au-
tem in respectu specei semper intelligit hic idem. Similiter dicunt de 
intelleotu agente, quod respeotu unius individui alicuius invenitur quando-
que intellectus et quandoque non. Sed semper invenitur intelligere, cum 
acceptus fuit simplioiter. Idem enim est modus in actione duorum intellect-
uum. Haec Averroes. 
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we would have to grant either another agent intellect. as regards this and 
other individuals, know continuously and always.5 
Others have held that the possible intellect is immaterial. Consequent-
. 
;;. ,;, 
ly. since it is substantially free of all matter, it is not the esse of a 
particular being. Therefore. it is not the perfection of man in the same 
way that the sensitive soul is the perfection .~ man, but equivocally.7 The 
basis of this doctrine is destroyed by the fact that although the possible 
intellect is free of corporeal matter, it is not free of spiritual intellig-
ible matter.S This is what Augustine has said in Contra Manichaeum. 9 The 
possible intellect is, therefore. immaterial through the exclusion of trans-
mutable matter; but it has something simi liar to matter through which it is 
a 'this', by which there is a principle of individuation in separated sub-
6Ibidem, lines 2S-33: Sed ista posito in praecedenti reprobata est, ubi 
ostensum est quod numerantur intellectus materiales (secundum) numerum in~ 
vi duorum. Amplius: Si intellectus agens non semper intelligat in actu 
respectu huius individui, quaero qualiter fiat actu intelligens respectu 
eius? Et erit dare agentem alium aut necesse est primum respectu huius et 
aliorum intelligere continue et semper. 
7lbidem. Quaestio IV. lines 23-6. p. 49: Primo dioo fundamentum sumsit in 
substantia intelleotus possibilis ponendo intelleotum possibilem immateri- I 
alem et per oonsequens ab omni materia substantialiter absolutum et per 
consequens non esse aliquid entium particularium et per consequens non esse 
perfeotionem hominis eodem modo quo anima sensitiva sed aequivoce. 
Slbidem, lines 27-2S: Hoc igitur primum fundamentum multipliciter eluditeur. 
tum quia quamvis careat materia corporali privata, non tamen materia $piri-
gtuali intelligibili. 
Cf. St. Augustine, Contra Manichaeum, l,6 (PL 34,178, n. 10) 
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It cannot, therefore, be held that the possible intellect is absolutely 
immaterial. On the contrary, it must be admitted that it has in it some-
, . 
. ~ 
thing similiar to matter. Even the Commentator has admitted that the intell-
igible has something simi liar to matter and something similiar to form. As 
he says that in some way the sensible is divid,d into matter and form, so 
it is necessary that the intelligible be divided into parts similiar to 
those two (i.e_ to matter and form).ll This being so, there is no need or 
reason for holding that there is one intellect, possible or agent, for all 
men. Indeed, the need of matter and form, the principles of individuation,12 
in the intelligible as well as the sensible, demands more than one intell-
ect for all men. 
Avicenna and his followers have held that there is one created agent in-
tellect for all. In a similiar manner Avicenna has held that the soul of ~ 
the world influences all human souls. Thus, since it influences all human 
souls in the act of knowing, it is separated intelligence. It is impossible 
10Quaestio IV, lines 3-5, p_ 50: Ergo est immaterialis per exclusionem ma-
~eriae transmutabilis, sed habet aliquid simile ipsi materiae, per quam est 
hoc, per quam est distinctio naturalis in substantiis separatis, ut ipse 
dicit. 
II Ibidem, lines 32-5, p. 49: Et ipse etiam Commentator fatetur, quod ~abet 
aliquid simile materiae et aliquid simile formae, sicut dicit quemadmodum 
sensibile esse oportet dividi in consimilia his duobua, scilicet aliquid 
simile formae et aliquid simile materiae. 
12Ibidem, lines 1-2, p. 51: Amplius nee materia est tota causa individuati-
onis, cum materia ponatur una in multis; sed complementum individuationis 
est a forma. 
I 
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that any separated or conjoined substance, (even if it existed)1 influence 
all intellects, or even two different ones. Thus, if it is the agent as 
regards one, it cannot at the srune time be .t~e agent as regards another. 13 
.~ 
On the strength of this argumentation, Peckham rejects the second position. 
The third position is that which holds that there are individual agent 
intellects, in the light of whioh the many see. These holding this position 
say that one power of the soul is an acting intelleot (whioh is the soul's 
active part); and another (whioh is as the material part of the soul) is the 
possible intellect. 14 They adhere to this because Aristotle has sa~d that 
in everything there is that which is in potenoy, and like to matter; and 
that which is cause and agent, and like to form. But contrary to this in-
13 Quaestio V, lines 33-41, p. 65 to p. 65, lines 1-2: Alii fuerunt - siout 
Avicenna at sui - ponentes}iuralitatem intellectuum materialium, sed in-
tellectum agentem esse unum et creatum. Iuxta quod ponit Avicenna animrum 
mundi influere super omnes animas humanas, doc ens VI Naturalium: 'Addisc~ 
non est nisi inquirere perfeotum aptitudine.m coniug;ndi se intelligentiae 
agentil quousque fiat ex ea intellectus.' Sed quia substantiae separatae 
nihil a@lnt nisi per intentionem, impossibile est eas cognitione naturali 
simul pluribus intendere. Impossibile est aliquam substantiam separatam 
vel coniunctam, si esset super omnes, immo neo super duos diversos oadere. 
Item, angelus adestl ubi operatur. Et ista si esset agens (respectu unius) I 
l4non posset simul esse agens respeotu alterius. 
Ibidem, lines 3-9, p.66t Ideo tertio modo sunt ponentes quod singuli intel 
leotus agentes, in quorum lumine vident singuli et multi. Et isti diount 
potentiam animae esse intellectum agentem, partern scilicet eius acti~, 
partem autem eius quasi materialern eius esse intellectum possibilem. ~t 
hoc est quod dicunt Philosophum dicentum, quoniam sicut in unoquoque est 
aliquid quod est potentia et quasi materia et aliud quod est causa et 
agens. 
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terpretation of the Philosopher are his own words whioh state that the agent 
and the matter are never in the same thing. 15 
From this it follows that the agent intelleot is to the material intell-
. 
. ~ 
ect as art to its material and as the mover to the moved. It is impossible, 
therefore, that this agent intelleot of whioh the Philosopher speaks, be a 
part of the soul, sinoe it is, as the Philosop~r himself has said, abstraot, 
unmixed, and impassible. In its own substanoe it is activity and knowledge 
in aot. It does not at all times know and at others not-know. Were it to 
be said that the soul does have the active faculty as one part of itself 
and the passive as another, it would at the same time have all knowledge be-
cause of the acting intellect and all ignorance because of the passive. And 
since knowledge issues from the conjunct of soul and body, (for even greater 
reason will there be no knowing in the soul acoording to one part, since 
not knowing is not there as regards the other part.) Henoe, it is impossible 
that any natural light, that is any oreated individual agent intelleot 
15Cf~ -Aristotle, De Generatione Animalum, I.2l,729b9-l2(MoKeon edition of 
Basic Works of llristotle. p.676): For, if we oonsider the question on I 
general grounds, we find that, whenever one thing is made from two of 
whioh one is aotive and the other passive, the active agent does not ex-
ist in that whioh is made; and, still more generally, the same thing ap-
plies when one thing moves and another is moved; the moving thing does 
not exist in that which is moved. 
Quaestio V,lines 9-10, p.66: Sed contra: agens et materia nunquam ooin-
oidunt in-idem numero secundum Philosophum. 
could give to the human intellect the act of knowing.16 
There is a fourth position which says that God perfects every human in-
telleot and constitutes it in the aot of knowing~ not per ~ but by some 
, . 
. ~ 
created light.17 To prove this position its advocates qlote St. Augustine 
who said that the mind sees in an inoorporeal light of its own gen~s.18 But 
to say that the soul sees in an incorporeal li~t of its own genus is to say 
that it sees in a created light. However we must note that suoh light is 
called a light of its own genus, only in the sense that it is spiritual. 
But the Light and the Reasons in which all things are seen are incommutable 
and eternal. 19 Wherefore, Augustine has said that is not my truth nor your 
l6Ibidem~ lines 11-26: Item sequitur quod agens se habet ad intellectum 
materialem siout ars ad materiam et sicut mavens ad motum, immo sicut lux 
ad diaphanum secundum Commentatorem. Nulla autem forma se habet ut arti-
fex respectu materiae suae. Impossibile ergo est intellectum agentem, de 
quo loquitur Philosophus, esse partem animae, oum sit - ut ipse dicit ab-
stractus, immixtus neque possibilis et est in sua substantia actio et .~ 
scientia in aotu atque (idem) est cum re, neque intelligit quandoque et 
non intelligit etc. Est ergo in anima intellectus hio agens siout motivum 
in mota, oum tamen ipsa anima habeat aliquid activum, sed non aliquid, 
de quo verae sunt praedictae proprietates. Quod si esset, essemus simul 
omnia scientes secundum unam partem et omnia nescientes secundum alian 
part em. Quod est impossibile. Cum enim intelligere sit coniuncti ex an- I 
ima et corpore, multo magis nullum erit intelligere animae secundum unam 
part em, quod non sit ei scire secundum aliam. Impossibile (ergo) est Lu-
cem aliquam naturalem posse intellectum humanum constituere in actu intell-
igendi. 
l7Ibidem,lines 27-9: Ideo est quarta positio dicentium quod Deus perfiQit 
omnem intellectum et in actu constitui intelligendi non per se, sed per 
ali quod lumen creatum. 
l8Ibidem, lines 29-34: Quod etiam probare se oredunt per verbum Augustini 
dioentis 'Credendum est, inquit, mentis intellectualis ita conditam esse 
naturam, ut rebus intelligentibus naturali ordine disponente tota mente sio 
ista videa in quandam sui luce generis incorporea, quemadmodum oculus 
carnis videt quae in hac corporea luce circumadiacent.' Haec Augustinus. 
Cf. St. Augustine, De Trinitate, o. l5,n.24 (PL42,lOll). 
19Quaestio V, p.66,lines 34-9: Dicas quod anima videt in luce generis ergo in 
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truth, but the incommutable truth in which all things are known, so that it 
is as a private and public light. 20 It is secret by reason of the object, 
and public as the ratio of knowing. 21 
;;. ... ., 
Having consider0d the possible positions which one could adopt, Peckham 
concludes that it is not by means of either a created light or lights, or 
by means of an intellect or intellects that th: human soul knows intell-
ectually. The human intellect knows in the unoreated light itself.22 In-
tellectual activity is then made to be dependent upon God. Peckham, backed 
by the authority of Augustine and Anselm, is not perturbed by this oonclu-
sion, and decisively adds 'omnis operatio est a Deo. n23 This operation 
luce creata. Sed quod lux sui generis appellatur, non dicitur (nisi) quia 
spiritualis est. Sicut patet ex praecedent capitulo, ubi dicitur quod ilIa 
lux et rationes, in qua amnia videntur, incommutabiles sunt et sempiternae. 
20Ibidem, p.66, lines 39 sq. to p. 67, lines 1-4: Unde Augustinus II De Li-
bero Arbitrio ultimo: nNullo~odo negaveris)esse inoommutabilem veritatam 
haeo <nnia, quae incommutabiliter vera (aunt, con~tinentem, quam non ..... 
possis dioere meam vel tuam vel <cuiusaumque haminis, sed) omnibus 
inoammutabilia vera oernentibus tamquam miris modis seoretum et publicem 
lucem praesto esse.' Haeo Augustinus. . 
Cf. Augustine, De Libero Arbitrio, II, 12, n. 33 (PL 32,1259). 
21Quaestio V, line-5, p. 67: Secretum quidem est in ratione obieoti, publi 
ut ratio lntelligendi. I 
22Ibidem, lines 6-7: Igitur fatendum est quod intelleotus humanus videt, 
quaecumque intellectua1iter oognosoit, in ipso lumine inoreato. 
23Ibidan., lines 16-18: Augustinus, De Moribus Maniohaeorum III: n Aliquid 
est, in quantum ex Deo est." Sicut;probat Anselmus, De Conoordia 
Praesoientiae et Praedestinationis, et ~ Conoeptu Viriinis, cap. 5,.et 
De Casu Diabo1i, oape 8. 
cr. AugustiIJS: De Gene ad Litte XI, 13 (PL 34,436, n. 17) 
Anselmus: De Conoord. Praeso. et Praede, c. 7 (PL 158,517): Quicquid 
a1iquam habet essenti~, a Deo est."; De Conoeptu Virg., c. 5 (PL 168,438). 
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coming from. God is the perfeotion of the aot and the doer. 24 Suoh human 
operations as sensing and moving are from God as an effioient power onlYJ 25 
whereas intelleotual operations depend on Htm as the light which enlightens • 
. . ..., 
Does thi s mean that by sole reason of the illuminating power of God the 
human soul knows? It seems not. for Peokham has said that knowing demands 
something on the part of the rational swl whiT is apt to know truth. and 
something on the part of the incommunioable light.27 Reoognizing that the 
soul in itself has something of the nature of an agent intellect Peokham 
does allow that the agent intelleot. as it is part of the soul. moves the 
other part. (that is the passive part or the intelleotus possibilis). This 
movement is not a direct attainment of truth but it is a movement by whioh 
the possible intelleot is transformed into the similitude of all things. 
end brought to the light. The activity here ascribed to the rational soul 
requires for its oompletion an agent and a possible intelleot. IntelleotuaJ.. 
24Quaestio V. lines 9-15. p. 67: Ad ouius intelligentiam notandum quod 
omnis operatio est a Deo. Et operatio est perfeotiooperationis vel 
operantis. Sed quaedam est perfeotio operantis in esse primo. quaedam 
in esse seoundo intra terminos naturae. Iuxta quod perfeotio hominis I 
dicitur esse consideratio veritatis. Quaedam autem est perfeotio in esse 
seoundo supra terminos naturae. Et ita oonvenit in ordine effioienti 
ad finem supernaturalem per direotionem bonitatis. 
25Ibidam. lines 14-5: Igitur primi generis operationes humanae sicut motus 
et sensus. aunt a Deo secundum rationem potentiae efficientis tantum. 
26Ibidam, lines 20-1: Operatio autem intelleotualis est ab ipso seoundum 
rationem non tantum potentiae effioientis, sed seoundum rationem luois 
refulgent is. 
27Ibidem. p. 68. lines 3-8: Ratio autem huius quod prinoipaliter intenditur 
est quod intelligere non illustretur solum ab illa luoe. (sed) sumitur 
(aliquid) a parte etiam naturae anllnae rationalis. a parte etiam ipsius 
luois inoammutabilis. a parte inquam animae rationalis. quae nata est ad 
oognitionem veritatis. 
Quaestio!!. p. 75. ad 4: Ad quartum dioendum quod intelleotus agens. 
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activity oannot terminate in this activit,y exercised by the SOUll for as 
Peckham maintdns,28 the rational soul (which is rational because it attains 
truth)29 reaches a certitude accountable for only by ~ incommutable light, 
a first and eternal reason.30 
Augustine has spoken·of superior and inferior reason. Let us consider 
whether this is the agent ~d the possible int~lect of which Aristotle has 
spoken. The agent intellect of which the Philosopher speaks is not a 
part of the soull it is God, the light of every mir.d, the ligJtt in whioh 
all is known. Of Rim alone can those properties, of which the Philosopher 
speaks, be predicated. God only is unmixed, impassible, and always knowing. 
Of Rim al one can it be said that Ris substance is Ris action.31 
seoundum quod est pars animae, non dirigit aliter quam, ut dictum est, 
transformando intelleotum possibilem in similitudinam rerum intelligibilium 
et movendo ipsum ut applicetur lumini. Illarum igitur rerum conoeptio 
est intellectus possibilis. Et hoc secundum vim passivam. Illustratio ~ 
autem. earum est secundum vim aotivam agentis, partim creati. partim 
increati. 
28Ut supra. 
29Ibidem, line 8: Quia hoc est rationale, quod potest veritatem. cognoscere. 
30Ibidem., Quaestio V, p. 61, Argwm 5: Item, si ratio est oreata, secundum 
quam iudicatur esse, siout debet, quaero de ratione iata: Quae, per quam 
alia videtur esse reota? Aut enim per se est reota - et tuno increata; aut 
ex alio videtur recta - ·et tunc aut ibitur in infinitum, aut pervenientur 
ad primam et aeternam rationem., per quam et in qua amnis rectitudo videtur. 
31Ibidem. p. 13, Respondeo: Dioo quod divisio intellectus per agent em. et 
possibilem et rationis per superiorem. et inferiorem., quamvis sit divisio 
eiusdem., non tamen per differentias eiusdan generis et rationis. Intel-
leotus siquidem agens, de quo Philosophus loquitur, non est usquequoque 
pars animae, sed Deus est, siout oredo. qli est lux omnium mentium, a quo 
est amne intelligere. Ipse enim solus est, oui conveniunt amnes propri-
etates i11ae nobiles, de quibus loquitur Philosophus. Quia est immixtus, 
impassibilis et semper omnia inte11igens, cuius substantia est sua actio. 
I 
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The agent intellect of which Aristotle speaks and which Peckhwn says is 
God. cannot (because it is not entirely part of the soul) be the superior 
reason of Which St. Augustine has spoken. 
. 
• 4"7 
Other considerations on the agent intellect will lead to this aune con-
elusion. According to all wise men the agent intellect is not united with 
higher or lower things except by the possible iftellect. Contrarily. the 
possible intellect does not move itself. so that it is not turned to the 
higher light except by the agent intellect. The Commentator has said that 
the proportion of the agent intellect to the possible is a proportion of 
the mover to the lJIl.tter moved. Further. the Commentator has said that 
the material intelleot can be perfeoted by material forms. But it is more 
befitting its dignity that it be perfeoted by non-ma.terial forms. by 
illumination desoending from a higher light.33 For these reasons. Peckham 
says. it must be gra.nbed that the intelleotus e.gens is not the same as 
superior reason. but that it is itself an active power which perfects both 
reasons. The material intellect is said to be the possibility (potentiality) 
of either reason.34 
32Ibidem. p. 74. lines 6-12: De intellectu agente patet etiam quod dictum 
est. Quoniam secundum omnes sapientes intellectus agens non copulatur 
cum superioribus vel inferioribus nisi per possibilem. Econtra possibilis 
non oopulatur oum superioribus nisi per agentem. Amplius intelleotus 
possibilis non movet se. ut applieetur superiori lumini. nisi per intel-
lectum agent em. Unde Commentator dioit quod proportio intellectus agentis 
ad intellectum possibilem est proportio moventis ad materiam motam. 
Cf. Aristotle. De Anima. III. 4. 
33Ibidem. QuaestiO-VI. lines 13-16: Intelleotus autem possibilis natus est 
utrobique. et a superiori et ab inferiori. illustrari. Unde Commentator: 
'Intelleotus materialis natus est pertiei per tormas materiales. Sed 
dignior est. ut est natus perfioi per tor.mas non materiales. i.e., oerte 
I 
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This then is the interpretati on which we are to give to the words of 
st. Augustine: The illuminating light of which he speaks is the uncreated 
eternal light, and that uncreated light; is the separated agent intellect • 
. 
;;. . .., 
The uncreated agent intellect is the perfection of superior reason only 
as it is the object of that reason. The oreated agent intellect has a certfil.U 
liglrb, but that light resembles an active powe~ (vim aotivam) while the 
higher reason, as apprehending the unoreated light, is as a passive power 
(vim eius passivam). This is to say that inasmuoh asthe soul has its own 
natural light, it has a oertain aotive power proper to itself. But higher 
reason, as power apprehending the unoreated light which is its object, is 
really a passive power, beoause the aotivity in this oase belongs to God 
and the passivity to the higher reasQn apprehendipg. It should be noted 
that although aotivity is not posited of higher reason in this oase, pure 
passivity is not either. The passivity is rather a passive power. Henoe ,.,.1 
it oannot follow that the superior and the lower reasons of vilich Augustine 
has spoken are the same as the acting and possible intellect of which the 
Philosopher has spoken.35 
Peckham has deter.mined that the Aristotelian division into possible and 
per illuminationes a superiori lumine descentes. 
34Ibidem, lines 18-20: Concendum igitur quod non est idem intelleotus agens 
cum ratione superiori. Sed est ipsa vis aotiva, quae perficit utr~que 
rationem. Et intellectus materialis dicit utriusque rationis possibilita-
tam. 
35Ibidem, ad 2: Ad seoundum <dioendum) quod lumen illud, de quo Augustinus 
loquitur, est lumen aeternum increatum. Quod non est rationis superioris 
perfeotio nisi siout obieotum. Et istud lumen increatum est intelleotus 
agens separatus. Unde non sequitur quod sit idem ratio superior quod agen~ 
Amplius: Intelleotus agens oreatus aliquod lumen habet. Sed illud 
I 
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agent intellect is sufficient to explain intelleotual aotivities. InasmuCh 
as the role assigned to the agent intelleot is that of illuminating the 
possible intellect, we may oonsider the agent intelleot as either part of the 
, . 
..... 
rational soul or as God Himself, "the true Light whioh enlighteneth every 
man." As ~ animae, the agent intellect moves the possible, not so 
that the rational soul knows truth, rut so that .the possible intellect is 
transfor.med into the similitudes of intelligibles and so that it is brought 
in contaot with the eternal lighb. Its function stops there. Inasmuch 
as the agent intelleot is God, it completes and perfects the insuffioient 
operati on flowing from the activity exercised by the created agent intelleot. 
It is only after the Unoreated completes and perfeots the action begun by 
the created that the rational soul knows. 
Now we askmether the eternal light is the reason for knowing whatever 
is intellectually known ~ ~.36 Augustine holds that all things are seen,... 
in the eternal light. Some have interpreted thi s to mean that all are 
seen in a light of the agent intellect, which is a likeness of the eternal 
light. This, however, is contrary to what Augustine has said in the De I 
Libero Arbitrio, II, 9. There he shows that this light is one, and is not 
a part of the nature of the intellect which understands.37 In several other 
respioi t vim aoti vam; rat io aut am superior, ut apprehendens, vim eius 
passivam. Unde non sequitur. 
36De Human. Cog. Ration., p. 179: Quaesitum est damwn ipsa Dei sapientia 
~ luce ~rna, utrum sit ratio cognoscendi, quidquia intelleotualiter 
cognoscitur in via. 
37Ibidam, p. 180: Dicunt aliqui, quod verbum Augpstini, ~od dicit, amnia 
videri in luce aeterna, intelligendum est sic: id est in luce intel-
lectus agentis, quae est expressa similitudo lucis aeternae. Contra: 
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plaoes Augustine has shown the divine oharaoter of the souroe of our under-
standing and knowing. S8 
Peckham maintains that in all intellectual knowledge the unoreated 
. 
light is someway altained.S9 .... It is the ratio of knowledge after the fashion 
of a light whioh gives illumination in all oertain knowledge. God by 
reason of his immediate power is the tmmediate~ause of the natural opera-
tion of every agent. By reason of His goodness. He is the oause of every 
meritorious aot as suoh; and so, too, as light and wisdom, He is the oause 
of every intelleotual act am. every operation of truth. God induoes into 
every operative power the being of the operation) into knowledge its evidence 
and oertitude; and into the rational will, its effioacy of meritorious 
action.40 
This does not exclude the natural, created inte1leotual light. Just 
as with the bodily eye there are three faotors; the natural light of the 
eye, the solar light, ani the presence of the objeot; so in the present 
case there is the created, imperfeot light of the intelleot, the over-shining 
uncreated light, and the possible intellect grasping the intelligible 
speoies.4l The created light of the soul is not of itself suffioient for 
Augustinus probat secundo de Libero Arbitrio, Deum esse, per hoo, quod 
lumen illud, in quo omnia V1demus, est unum non numeratum in omnibus' 
intelligentibus, ad nullius naturwn pertinens; siout patet intuenti. 
Cf. st. Augustine, De Lib. Arb. II, c. 11. 
38Cf. St. Augustine: 'EpfS'tda ii'dNebridium, 13, n. 4 
De Trin. X, c.5, n.ll 
De Trin. XII, 0.2, n.2 
De Confess. XII, c. 25, n. 35 
In Evan. Joan., c.4, Traot. 15, n.19 
De Lib Arb. o. 5, n. 13 
I 
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The human intelleot grasps the intelligible speoies.44 Through speoies. 
imaginary or spiritual and intelleotual. it knaws.45 The imaginary speoies 
is first imprinted upon the sense and then on the soul. It is that by whioh 
, . 
. ~ 
the thing which is present is seen. and the thing whioh is absent is known. 
The speoies is the ratio of knowing sensibly when the object is present. 
and it is the ratio of knowing spiritually or ~ginatively when the object 
is absent. This species is in the soul. for the object of which it is the 
speoies is not the soul, just as the stone is not in the soul. but the 
species of stone is in the soul.46 The intellectual species is twofold; 
one at the very peak of the intelligenoe. another in the treasury of intell-
eotual memory. This latter intellectual speoies is of six sorts: abstract-
ed. innate, impressed. expressed. 'reliota' and 'oolleots.,47 
44Videnote 41. 
45Quaestio VIII, pp. 84-85, lines 1-5: Ad primam questionem dioendum quod .~ 
intelleotus dioitur relative ad intelligibile, i.e. ad rem intellectam. 
Intelleotus autem intelleotualiter refertur ad intelligibile et non eoon-
tra. Neoesse est ergo, ut oum intelleotus fit intelligens de non intell-
igente, quod fiat aliqua mutatio oirca intelleotum per quam refertur. Quod 
esse non potest nisi per similitudinem ipsum determinante.m ad cognoscendpm, 
secundum tamen quod quae dam est species imaginaria vel spiritualis, quaed- I 
am intellectualis. 
46raide.m, p. 85, lines 6-11: Dioo imaginarium. quae imprimitur in sensu. 
deinde in spiritu. Per quam res videtur praesens, et cogitatur absens. Et 
re praesente est ratio oognoscendi sensibiliter, re absente per motum a 
sensu factum est ratio cognoscendi spiritual iter vel imaginarie. Et baeo 
speoies ita est in anima, quod non res ouius est. Lapis enim non est in 
anima. sed species lapidis. 
47Ibide.m. lines 12-16: Alia est species intelleotualis. sive quae est in 
acie intelligentiae, sive quae est in thesauro intellectualis memoriae. 
Et haec intenditur sex modis. Est enim quaedam secundum quosdam species 
abstraota, quae dam innata. quaedam impressa, quaeaam expressa, quaedam 
relicta, quaedam Dollecta. 
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The abstracted species is that whioh is taken up from the imagination and 
united to the intelleot. This abstracted speoies is merely the speoies of 
corporeal things.48 The innate speoies is a concreated notion of the soul, 
. 
49. 4; 
and is a species naturally inserted in us. In a way this innate speoies 
might also be an impressed species, 50 for the impressed species befalls the 
soul in time, either from an angle or from God.~l We know separated sub-
stances because the angles imprint on our souls their similitudes, and to 
be thus impressed is to know. These are the reason of Avicenna.52 The 
words of Augustine also substantiate the impression of speoies by God. 53 
The expressed speoies or similitudes (Peckham uses the terms 'species' 
and 'similitude' interdhangeably) is the similitude of all those things 
which are eternally or essentially in the soul. This species expresses the 
48Ibidem, lines 17-19 et 26: Dico abstraotam quae ab imagine haurituret 
paulatim, donec intellectui uniatur ••• et haeo species abstracta est tan~ 
corporalium. 
49Ibidem, lines 27-28: Dico speciem innatum notionem animae concreatam, 
siout dioit Damascenus, cap. I, quod cognitio existendi Deum omnibus ab 
ipso naturaliter inserta est. 
50Ibidem, lines 29-33: Et haec vocatur aliquando notio impressa, sicut dici-
tur VIII De Trin. cap. 5: "Neque in omnibus donis, quae oommemoravi, ali-
ud alio iudicaremus melius, nisi esset nobis impressa notio ipsius boni." 
51Ibidem, line 1, p.86: Impressam dico quae animae ex tempore accidit, sive 
ab angelo sive a Deo. 
52 Ibidem, lines 2-4: Ab angelo sicut dioitur in III Metep h. Avicenna: "Quod 
nos scimus de substantiis separatis, est quia nos imprimimur ab eis, iuod 
enim nos imprime.mur ab eis, hoc est nos scire ease 
53Ibidem, lines 4-6: Et sic etiam cognoscitur Deus per similitudinem. Unde 
De Trin. IX, cap.ll: "Cum Deum novimus, fit aliqua similitudo Dei illa 
not T'€'Ia. tI-
Cf. St. Agustine, De Trin. IX,ll (PL 42,969,n.16). 
I 
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similitude in the intelligence when the soul or the mind in se is known. 54 
The 'relicta' similitude is the speoies of those things whioh were essenti-
ally in the soul, and which, although they c,ease to exist, leave some ves-
, . 
... 
tige in the scml. This oan be seen in the movements of the soul- When 
these movements are present they are known and felt, but even after they 
have departed, they leave something behind in ~ soul. The 'something' is 
the reliota or abandoned speoies. 55 The 'collecta' or collected similitude 
is the species which acoounts for the notions one has of such things as 
justice, so that even though he does not have justice residing within him he 
is able to gather unto himself the notion of it.56 
From this it follows that things intelligible ~~, spiritual beings, 
if they are essentially and effioaoiously in the soul, are known by speoies 
expressed in the intelligence; they are not known through abstraoted species, 
for abstracted species come to the intellect by way of sense and imaginatio~ 
and are the species of corporeal things only. All other intelleotual things 
54Quaestio VIII, lines 8-10; p. 86a Dioo similitudinam expressam siout 
omnia quaesunt aeternaliter in aniI!&. vel essentialiter, exprimunt sui I 
similitudinam in intelligentia, oum aotu intelligentur et ipsa anima vel 
mens in se ipsa. 
55Ibidem, lines 18-20: Dico autem similitudinem reliotam, siout ea quae 
essentialiter fuerunt in anima, oum esse deficiunt, aliquod vestigium in 
anima relinquunt. Siout de animi affectionibus patuit. 
56Ibidem, lines 25-7: Dioo oolleot~ similitudinan siout ex regulis iustiti-
ae, etiam non habens iustiti~, potest aliquam sibi iustitiae solligere 
notionem. 
are known through innate, impressed, 'reliota' or 'oolleota' speoies. 57 The 
rational soul knows through the speoies above enumerated.58 The preoise 
manner in whioh these species are in the soul ,or on the soul, or how God 
and the angels do impress the human soul oannot be gathered from the texts 
available. It cannot be conclusively said either that the soul of itself 
or with the help of the uncreated light forms tJe species. What Peokhwn 
has said is that the unoreated agent intellect (if that is what the power 
proper to the soul is to be called) is a power formative of speoies and 
judioative of things. 59 Does the uncreated light illuminate the oreated 
light (whioh of itself operates imperfeotly)60 or the ~eoies (whether in 
the sense faculty in the soul, or in the intelligenoe?).6[ Or does it il-
luminate the possible intelleot which grasps the species?62 
57Ibidem, p.86, lines 34-5 to p. 87, lines 1-3: Igitur res intelligibiles 
per se seu spirituales non intelliguntur per speoies abstractas, sed si .~ 
sunt essentialiter et praesentialiter in anima cognoscuntur per speoies 
in intelligentia expressas. Alia vero omnia intelleotualia oognosountur 
per similitudines vel innatas vel ~pressas vel reliotas vel oollectas. 
58Ibidam, p. 87, ad 4: (sed quia) intellectus oognosoit rem vere simili-
tudinem, necesse est quod appetitus tendat in rem ipsam, (non in simili-
5 tudinem). Caritas ergo per similitudinan oognosoitur a re differentiam. I 
9Quaestio V, p. 68, in answers to objs, n.5: Ad obieotum de intelleotu ag-
ente dioo-quod anima aliquid habet in se activum, sicut virtutem formati-
vam speoierum, siout etiam virtutem iudioativam soilioet rerum. 
60Quaestio VI, p. 75, ad 5: Ad quintum (dioendum) quod ratio superior illus-
trat inferIorem non virtute vel luoe (sua) sed virtutis inoreatae, quae est 
eius obieotum. Intellectus autem agens oreatus aliquo modo illustrat vir-
6ltute propria, quamvis imperfeote. 
Vide notae 46, 47, 48, 49, 54, 55, 57. 
62Vide nota 33. 
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To answer this question it must be remembered that the three concurring 
factors must be on hand in every act of knowledge. (See p. 9, note 35). Now, 
when the human soul knows, it cannot be that the human soul knows because 
. 
... 
of its own created light and because of the incommutable eternal light. The 
created agent intellect moves and direots the possible intellect by trans-
forming it into the similitude of intelligibleihings and by moving it so 
that it is brought closer to the first light. Therefore, the conception 
of intelligible things belongs to the possible intellect, and this is as it 
is a passive power of the soul; whereas the illuminating of those things 
is an active power of an agent, belonging partly to a created agent and 
partly to the uncreated agent.53 
Passivity characterizes the power allotted to the possible intellect. 
The spontaneity characterizing the rational soul in Augustiniah philosophy 
is reserved for the created agent intellect, the agent intellects illuminat~ 
intelligible things so that they are taken up in their species by the poss-
ible intellect. The illuminating of the intelligible sp ecies by the light 
eternal and created is not sufficient for the assuming of the species by I 
the possible. The created light must move the possible intellect so that it 
is brought close to the light uncreated. The drawing close to the eternal 
. 
light, the knowing in the eternal reasons, consummates the act of knowledge 
by the rational soul. 
Does this position destroy the natural activity of the raional soul, Is 
63Vide nota 27. 
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its power limited or destroyed? The soul's own two-fold activity, i.e., a 
power formative of species and a power judicative of things,64 pertains to 
the ,human soul; but the act of knowing, the aot of going the necessary step 
. 
. '., beyond judgment to oertain truth, pertains to the illuminative divine in-
telleot.65 The power of the rational soul is the power (potential) through 
whioh the soul is born to transform itself into. the similitudes of all in-
telligible things.66 If this power (vis) is oalled an agent intellect, 
which is a kind of created natural light, then it differs essentially from 
the possible intelleot, as a power from a power, not as a faculty from a 
faculty.67 The power (vis) is one of the diverse powers of the same faculty 
(the potency to truth), just as in the same organ there can be the different 
powers, e.g. in the eye there are the powers of gleaming'and acuteness.68 In 
64Vide nota 59. 
65Quaestio VI, ad 5, p. 75: Ad quintum (dicendum) quod ratio superior illu~ 
trat inferiorem non virtute vel luce sua sed virtutes inoreatae, quae est 
eius obiectum. Intellectus autem agens creatus 8liquo modo illustrat vir-
tute propria, quamvis imperfeote. 
Quaestio V, line 25, p.66: Impossibile (ergo) estluoem aliquam naturalem 
posse intelleotum humanum constituere in aotu intelligendie 
Ibidem, p. 67, line 6: Igitur fatendum est quod intelleotus humanus videt, I 
quaeoumque intelleotualiter oognosoit, in ipso lumine inoreatoe 
66Quaestio VI, p. 73,_lines 22-4: Quod dioo potentiam illam, per quam nata 
est se in omnium intel1igibilium similitudinam transformare. 
67Ibidam, lines 24-6: Haeo igitur vis, si appellatur intelleotus agens -
quae et habet aliquid luminus oreati naturalis differt essentialiter,ab 
intelleotu possibili, siout vis a vis, non siout potentia a potentia. 
68 Ibidem, lines 26-27: Credo enim quod sunt diversae vires eiusdam potenti-
ae siout in eodem organo oouli differunt splendor et perspiouitase 
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lome way this created agent intellect operates by its own proper power, but 
.t functions imperfectly.69 The action of the uncreated light is needed 
~or the perfection of the created actor and its act • 
. 
Peckham does not hesitate to declare that tt~agent intellect is God, 
;hat that light is the light in which all know and by which all things are 
~awn. Neither does he hesitate to say that the}ational soul has a power 
,roper to its nature. But he does hesitate to admit that the power proper 
;oihe agent intellect can be predicate of the human intellect or that there 
~an be a created agent intellect. If we went to call the powers of forming 
:pecies and judging things the power of a created agent intellect, we may. 
'he activity of the created agent intellect is the expression of a proper 
t . f t 70 I d t 1 th 'e an ~mper ec power. n or er 0 exp ain e attainment of certain 
ruth adequately, we must say that a natural agent or natural light cannot 
onstitute the human intellect or be the sole manner of explaining the oper-
.tion of the human intellect, in the act of knowing.,7l Hence, Peckham con-
ludes that an agent intellect which surpasses and is the cause of all cre-
ted ones; an agent intellect of which the created ones are images,72 must 
9 Ibidem, p.75, line 18, ad 5: Intellectus autem agens creatus aliquo modo 
oillustrat virtute propria, quamvis imperfecte. 
Vide notae 33, 41, 27. 
1 Ibidem, Quaestio V, Vide nota 69. 
2Ibidem, Quaestio XXVIII, pp. 192-3: Respondeo: Imago est expressa simil-
itudo. Tamen autem est, sicut possibile est in genere creaturae, creatura 
rationalise Quod patet considerando eam ut a Deo egredientem et ut sub-
sistentem et ut regredientem. 
In primo considera naturae suae absolutam dignitatem, et in secundo Per-
sonarum Divinarum et potentiarum animae proportionalitatem, in tertio 
considera in anima Dei capacitatem. 
I 
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be and must be ever-present in all certain knowledge. That agent intellect 
is God. 
Clearly, Peokham does not give us a created agent intellect as effica-
. 
cious in its own nature as does St. Thomas. 11: did, however, seem to real-
ize the need of a natural power in the human soul. He would not grant, 
though, that this power could achieve all thatlhe philosophers had asked 
of the agent intellect; rather from the poin~ of view of immutable truth, 
an eternal agent intellect was demanded. It is readily seen that the 
problem of certain knowledge did not present itself to Peckhwn in terms of 
the need of a natural power of the rational soul, but in terms of account-
ing for the attainment of and the possession of unchanging truth by mutable 
creatures. The only way for Peckham to reach an agreement with the terms 
of his own problem was to say that the agent intellect was not natural to the 
soul, was not part of the soul, but was God Himself. But in another way he ,... 
has come to terms with the problem by holding that the agent intellect as 
part of the soul differs from the possible. The function assigned to the 
agent intelleot as it is pars animae is not such that the anima rationalis 
is oompleted in the intellective act. The agent intelleot transfor.ms the 
possible intelleot into the similitude of intelligible things and so moves 
the passive intellect that the soul is brought to the Light. It is by~he 
conferring of light from the light upon the human soul, that the soul is 
brought to the state of knowing. The immutable and eternal truth is not 
given by the intelligible objects, nor by the agent intelleot or the passive 
intellect, nor by divine illumination. CeDtainly, it cannot be said that 
I 
84 • 
• 
divine illumination alone is the efficient cause of the rational soul's 
knowing, but rather that the rational soul, the intelligible objects and the 
Divine light are all in their own way efficiently oausal • 
. 
. ~ 
There is expressed in Peckhmn's dootrine the interaction and interde-
pendence of one intelleot on the other, that is of the possible on the 
acting and of the acting on the possible, such ~ is found in St. Bona-
venture's. There is a dependence of the possible on the actual, a dependence 
which is evident in the transforming of the possible by the agent into the 
similitude of all intelligible things, and in the moving of the possible by 
the agent so that the possible is brought to the eternal light, and whioh is 
not found in Bonaventure. The created acting intellect, in its turn, is 
dependent upon the first light as the source of its natural illuminative 
power. 
Peckham's words give evidence to dependence, and inter-dependence; to actr 
ion and to interaction; to a dependence of natural knowledge on divine. Thus, 
although he gives us a kind of created agent intellect, he gives us one not 
active in its own right and nature; hence, an acting intellect able to know I 
,only by means of God, the First and Eternal Reason of all Knowledge. 
·' 
CHAPTER V 
Roger Marston 
. 
Roger Marston, John Peokham's disciple ~~ges himself alongside those 
who hold to pure Augustinism. His dependenoe on St. Bonaventure, and above 
all on Peokham, shows clearly his adherenoe to:he olassic doctrines of 
Franoisoan metaphysios, theology, and psychology. I He accepts, as do 
Alexander of Hales, st. Bonaventure, and John Peokham, the Aristotelian 
division into agent and possible intelleot, orediting Aristotle as the 
source of the terms 'possibilis intelleotus et agens.· 2 
These terms, he remarks, have been variously interpreted, but he thinks 
it is far better to hold that the agent intellect is distinct from the 
possible, for by this distinction all contrarieties, whether of philosophers 
or of teachers, will be solved; rather tl:an shamelessly to deolare that 
Aristotle denied in every sense that the agent intellect is a substance 
separated from the soul by its essence.3 
1Ma.urice De Wulf, Histoire ~ la Philosophie Me'di6vale, tome deuxieme, 
third edition, 1936 (Paris, Louvain), p. 240: Marston se range parmi les 
augustiniens les plus pure. Se d{pendance vis-a.-vis de Bonaventure, et 
surtout de Pechem 'a qui 11 emprunte des passages entiers, explique sa 
P1ei~e adhesion aux theories devenues classiques de 1a m'taphysique, de 
" . 1a theodicee et de 1a psychologie franciscainas. . 
2Roger Marston, Quaestiones Disputatae de Anima, Quarrachi, 19321 p. 259, 
Quaest. III, sub Resp.: et haec verba 'possibi1is inte1lectus et agens' 
sint a Phi1osopho. 
3Quaest. III, p. 259: longe melius est intellectum agentem distinguere, 
qua distinctione omnes contrarietates seu Philosophorum seu magistrorum 
solvuntur, quam impudenter definire quod Philosophus amni sensu negaverit 
intel1eotum agentem esse substantiam separatam ab anima per essentism. 
85 
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From anoient times experts in philosophy have taught both that the 
agent intelleot is a separated oreated intelligenoe , and that it is a part 
of the individual rational soul, and that it is God. They teaoh that the 
. 
intelleot is said to be agent from its aot of' rlluminating the possible 
intelleot. In another way, and neoessarily inoompletely, it is said to be 
agent as it is part of the soul. Finally, it i1 agent as it illuminates 
and perfeots the soul oompletely and prinoipally, and in this way it is a 
separated substance; in faot, God Himself.4 
This last is the position whioh Marston adopts, not only beoause it 
will remove the oontrarieties between teachers and philosophers, but beoause 
the properties 'Whioh the philosophers assign to the agent intelleot are suoh 
as are proper only to the unoreated light whioh illuminate our intelleot.5 
The properties assigned by philosophers to the agent intellect are, in 
St. Augustine, attributed to the unoreated Light. 
! 4Quaest. III, p. 259: Experti enim in philosophia ab antiquo praedictas 
. sententias docuerunt. Intelleotus enim agens seoundum quod dioitur ab 
actu illuminandi ipsum intelleotum possibilam, aliquo modo, licet inoomplet~ 
dicitur esse pars animae, sicut perspiouitas naturalis in ooulo et 
naturalis quidwn £Ulgor, quo potest sibi medium aliqualiter illustrare, 
siout patet quod in ooulo leonia et oati sunt £Ulgor et perspiouitas partes 
quaedam ipsius organi. Sed seoundum quod intelleotus agens dioitur ab 
aetu illumjnsndi complete et prinoipaliter est substantia separata, Deus 
ipse, ut possint ab objeoto immutari. 
5Quaest. III, p. 259: Et ad istud sentiendum moveor et proprietatibus 
intelleotus agentis, oolleotis philosophicis dooumentis, quae lumini 
inoreato oonveniunt intelleotum nostrum illustraDti. 
I 
Some teaohers6 say that in order that we l'lB.y know, the eternal light 
produoes no 'speoial' effeot, but exeroises only the oammon providenoe by 
whioh it looks after things generally. Thes~ say that Augustine would have 
• J, 
us see all these things in the first truth, beo911se we see in a light derived 
from this first truth, that is, in a natural light of our awn mind. This 
derived light is part of the soul, and we see",l1 things in this derived 
light, so they say, just as we see all things in the sun beoause we see in 
a light derived from the sun. 7 This teaching, however, is not oonsonant 
with the teaching of Augustine. Augustine intends that the truth whioh I 
see is not my truth, since it is from the First Truth, the Truth in which 
I see all. Likewise, the truth whioh you see is not your truth, because 
it is from the Truth oommon to both you end me. Now, the position whioh 
adopts an interpretation of Au~stine holding that we see in a light derived 
from. the First, and that this derived light is in my mind, and that this 
light is mine, St. Augustine denies on aooount of the oommon truth which 
belongs to neither you nor me but is oommon to both. It seems that 
Bef. St. Thomas, Summa Theologioa, I, q. 12, a. 11, ad 3; q. 72, a. 4; q. 
84, a. 6; q. 88, a. 3, ad 1; St. Bonaventure, In II Sent. d. 24, p. 1, a. 2 
q.4. 
7Marston, Quaest, III, Respondeo, pp. 252-253' Patet hie opinio Magistrorum 
dicentium quod lux aeterna nihil agit per se ipsam speoiale praeter ' 
communam providentiam, qua res communiter administrata hoc ut intelligamusJ 
et, ut dicunt, ideo vult Augustinus, nos omnia didere in prima veri tate, 
quia videmus in luce ab eadem veritate derivata, in naturali videlioet 
lumine mentis nostrae, quod est pars animae, sicut dicimur omnia videre in 
sole, quia videmus in lumine a dole derivato. 
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Augustine intends more than these men say he does. 8 
Again Augustine has said9 tha.t the superior part at.' reason is that 
which turns to oontemplating the eternal reasons, 'While the interior deals 
. 
. . , 
with things temporal. Therefore, it seems that, since these portions are 
distinguished, the higher should see in the rules above it those things 
which it comprehends. Now, if it is said that,;.higher reason sees in those 
rules because it sees in a oertain light of its own derived from those rules, 
then it could be said that inferior reason sees in the eternal rules above 
the mind beoause it sees in a light derived from. them. This interpretation, 
however, is not in harmony with the words of Augustine. He definitely 
assigns two offioes to reason, and requires two modes of knowing: oognition 
in a superior light and cognition in the treatment of things temporal.10 
8Quaest. III, p. 253: Istud non videtur posse stare cum intentione 
Augustini, in 1000 praedicto, in libro videlicet Confessionum. 
Ibidem: Nam, siout patet ibidem, ipsi intendit invehere contra illos qui 
asserebant illud quod ipsi apprehendebant verum in dioto Moysi; In 
prinoipio creavit Deus caelum at terran, esse intentionem legislatoris, et 
non illud quod alius verum in eadem sententia oapiebat. Intendit ergo 
quod veritas, quam ego video, non est mea, oum sit a prima Veritate, in 
qua ego video, et similiter veritas, quam tu vides, non est tua, quia est 
a oommuni mihi et tibi veritate. Sed si veritatem, quam video, ideo 
dicerer videre in luoe aeterna, quia video in mente mea a luoe aeterna 
derivata, posset haec veritas dici mea, siout ipsa lux mentis meae dicitur 
mea. Hoo autem negat Augustinus propter oommunem luoem, in qua videmus 
ego et tu, ergo videtur quod plus intendat quam ipsi dicant. 
Ibidem, pp. 255-56: Patet igitur quod dicentes amnia videri in lumine 
aeterno, quia videntur a lumine ab ipso derivato, doctrinwn Augustini 
pervertunt, truncatas eius auctoritates, antecedentibus et oonsequentibus 
praetermissis, in quibus Sanoti intentio plenius in hac materia e1ucescit. 
Cf. St. Augustine, De Confessione XII, c. 25, n. 34, (PL 32,839) 
9Cf. St. Augustine, De Trin. XII, o. 12, n. 17 (PL 42,1007); Ibidem, 00. 2 
et 3 (PL 42,999) --
10Marston, Quaest. III, p. 253: Item, Augustinus, /De/Tr1nitate XII, o. 12 
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Let us oonsider the argument given for the existenoe of God in Augus-
tine's de Libero Arbitrio.11 In this argument Augustine has shown that no 
inter.mediary is interposed between God and His oreatures. Thus, if there 
, . 
1- c; 
is anything above the mind, that is God. What is true of God, is true of 
truth. Truth may be oompared to the objeots of the senses of sight and 
hearing, whioh at onoe are one in themselves afl oommon to many, and yet by 
their very nature belong to none of the 'many'. As it is wi th the visible 
and the audible, so it is with truth" whioh~~ is one, and still is 
generally known by many. Truth, therefore" beoause it is known by many" 
oannot pertain to their natures. Augustine thus proves that that truth in 
whioh inoommutable truths are known, beoause it is ever-present to be 
oontemplated by those wishing, oannot be of the nature of the rational 
dioit quod superior portio rationis dioitur quae intendit aeternis 
rationibus oonsulendis, inferior vero portio dioitur quae negotiatur in. 
istis temporalibus dispensandisJ ergo oum in hoo distinguantur superior 
portio et inferior, videtur quod superior portio in regulis supra se 
videat ilIa quae cernit. Si tu dicas quod ideo videt in regulis illis" 
quia in videt aliqua luoe mentis suae ab illis regulis derivata" eadem 
ratione posset dici quod ratio inferior videt in aeternis regu1is, quae 
sunt supra mentem, cum videat in a1 iqua luoe ab i11is regulis derivata. I 
Hoo tamen non est secundum dootrinam Augustini supra diotam ooncedendum, 
oum penes talem oognitionem in superiori 1umine et temporalium dispensa-
tione duo rationis offioia geminentur. 
l10f. St. Augustine. £!~.~. II, co. 5-11 (PI 32,1242). 
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soul.12 Besides, truth is greater than the individual soul, and is above 
it, for it is that truth in which all other truths are seen. Hence, truth 
is greater than the partioular soul. Since there is nothing greater than 
. 
the soul except God, truth must be God HimseIr!l3 
l2Marston, Quaest. III, pp. 253-4: Item Augustinus, De LiberoArbitrio, in 
libro II, nititur, quantum potest, et hoo valie subtiliter, probare Dewn 
esse; cuius intentio a cap. 5 usque ad medium 11 capituli suocinote 
accepta talis est; si aliquid est supra mentem nostram, neoesse es't quod 
hoc sit Deus. Hanc consequentiam supponit ex adversario, et probat 
antecedens per exempla varia in sensibus particularibus, dooens diffuse 
quo modo idem visibile potest totum videri a diversis, et similiter sonus 
idem audiri a multis, quamvis alia infor.mentur sensus diversorum; sicut 
omnes audiunt illud verbum quod dioo, quamvis aliud et aliud recipiantur 
in auribus singulorum unum tamen verbum dioo, ~od a singulis auditur. 
Illud autem quod pluribus est commune, ad nullius naturam potest pertinere. 
Unde veritas istis duobus sensibus oomparatur, non a:utem gustui vel taotui 
velolfaotui, quia nonpotest idem simul tangi vel gustari vel olfieri a 
diversis, sicut videri et audir~ potest idem a multis. Verum igitur, 
quod a pluribus intelligitur, non potest ad aliouius ipsorum naturam 
pertinere. Nunc enim non posset ab eis idEm intelligi, sicut neo idem 
gustatur a diversis vel tangitur, quia gustabile ad naturam transit 
gustantis. Haec autem veritatem eadem numero a pluribus intelligitur, 
siout 'quod duo et tria sunt quinque', quamvis per aliam et aliam 
comparationem, quae fit a diversis; sicut eamdem quidditatem intelligo 
ego definiendo hominem, quam intelligit alius consimiliter definiendo, per 
aliam tamen speoiem cognoscit ipse et ego.- Hoc igitur probato, quod 
eamdem veritatem intelligunt diversi, probat ulterius Augustinus, versus 
fine.m c. 9 et in principio 10, quod veritas, in qua vera incammutabilia 
cernuntur, non est aliquid animae, per hoc quod ipsa praesto est omnibus 
veritatem volentibus intueri; et idciroo non potest pertinere ad aliouius 
mentis humanae naturam, sicut superius exemplificavit de visu et auditu. 
Cf. St. Augustine, De Lib. Arb. cc. 9-10 (PI 32,1255). 
13St. Augustine, De LTbero-ArbItrio 2, 15, 39 (PI 32,1262): 
Tu autem ooncesseras, si quid supra mentes nostras monstrarem, Deum in 
esse confesserum, si adhuc nihil superius. Quam tuam oonoessionem 
accipiens dixeram satis esse, ut hoc demonstraran. Si enim aliquid est 
excellentius, ille potius Deus est; si autem non est, iam ipse veritas 
est. 
I 
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The light which is superior to all is not inferior to the soul~ because 
then the soul could judge of it. But we do not judge of it~ we judge ac-
cording to it; it is in this light that we see all truths. We say that t7 
. 
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and 3 are lo~t and we know this to be so and that it ought to be so, just 
as we know not only .mat kind are our bodies and our souls~ but what they 
should be according to the inoommutable truthslhich we comprehend. l4 Now, 
this light in which we behold all and according to which we judge~ could not 
be equal to the mind or in the mind, because those things which we behold 
in common are incommutable. Nothing immutable subsists in a mutable thing. 
It is evident that the human mind is mutable" for at times it glimpses more 
and at other times less of this light. How then, can it be held that this 
light could be in the soul? It is certainly evident from this argumentation, 
that the incommutable light is not in the mutable soul, and is above all not 
merely equal to it. l5 
14Quaest. III, pp. 254-5: Hoc habito, probat" in princ~p~o 12 oapituli, quod 
haec lux, quae praesto est omnibus~ ut ea incommutabilia cernantur, nn est 
inferior anima, quia tunc posset anima de ipsa iudicare. Hoc autem falsum 
est: nam secundum regulas interiores veritatis, quas communiter cernimus, I 
iudicamus; de ipsis vero nullo modo quid iudicat. Cum enim dicimus ttria 
et septem sunt decemr, ita novimus esse; quod ita debeat esse vel non ita 
nullus iudicat, sicut de corporibus et animis nostris non solum quales 
sunt, sed quales esse debeant secundum incommutabiles quae videmus. 
Cf. St. Augustine, De Lib. Arb. c. 12 (PL 32, 1259). 
l5Marston, Quaest. IIr;p:-25S:--Nec potest lux praedicta" in videmus vera 
communiter~ esse aequalis mente aut in mente~ sicut probat consequenter~ 
quoniam illa" quae videmus communiter, sunt incommutabilia; mens vero nos-
tra mutabilis est, eo quod praedictam lucemaliquandoplus.aliquando 
minus videt. 1JIanifestum est autem quod nihil immutabile subsisti t in re 
mutable. 
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In each and every argument taken fram Augustine, Marston reaches the 
conclusion that in the light above our minds we know all 'things 'Wi th 
certitude,16 that the light in which we see all things in cammon is God. 
, . 
..... 
The Augustinian principles,17 that between God and the rational soul not 
even an angelio inter.mediary is needed and that we do not judge of the 
eternal rules but according to them, are most tlearly oontained in Marston's 
premisses and conolusions.18 
It cannot be, he holds, that people would judge of injustice and evil 
in human conduct, unless they see how one ought to live aocording to rules 
16Ibidem, p. 256: Praedictam enim deductionem, qua ostenditur quod in luce 
ali qua supra mentem amnia certitudinaliter cognoscamus, idem Augustinus 
ponit, De Trinitate XIV, c.15, doc ens quo modo iniusti et mali multa recte 
reprehendunt ad mores pertinentia. 
170f. St. Augustine, De Vera Relig. c.44, n. 92; ibidem, 0.55, n.113 (PL 34, 
172, 159); 83 Quaestionum, q. 51, n.2 et 4 (PL 40,32); ibidem, q. 53, n.2 
(PL 40,36); De Trin. XI, c. 5, n. 8 (PL 42,990). 
18Marston, Quaest. III, p. 255: Ex quibus conc1udit Augustinus quod i1lud~ 
in quo communiter vera cernimus, Deus est, ex hypothesi habita in 
principio suae deductionis, videlicet quod, si aliquid supra mentam 
nostram, ipsum est Deus. Nam lux praedicta, ,ex quo est ipsa mente 
inferior nec aequa1is, ut jam superius demonstravit, necesse est quod sit 
quod sit ipsa mente superior. 
Ibidem, pp. 256-7: Unde dicit (Augustinus) sic: Quibus ea regulis I 
judicant, nisi in quibus vident quemadmodum quisque vivere debeat, etiamsi 
nec ipsi eodem modo vivant? Ubi eas vident?t Et probat consequenter quod 
nec in natura sua eas vident nec in aliquo habitu mentis. Dicit enim 
sic: nNeque enim in sua natura eas vident, cum procu1dubio mente ieta 
videantur eorumque mentes constat esse mutabiles, has vero regulas 
immutabiles videat quisquis in eiedam et hoc videre potuerit; neo in habitu 
mentis suae cum i1lae regulae sint iustitiae, mentes vero eorum constat 
esse iniustas." 
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neither of their own natures nor in their minds.19 Here we must distinguish 
between what the soul sees in itself and what it sees in the eternal light. 
It is certain that what it beholds in itself, it beholds in a natural light. 
, . 
4- .. ., 
But if we are to give Augustine's words their true force we must say that, 
as regards immutable truth, it is necessary that one should see in an 
eternal light, and not only in a natural ligh\ or a light derived from. the 
eternale20 
In this last treatment Marston seems to give us a kind of created agent 
intellect. Then there are two lights, which we may consider: one, a 
natural light, being in and of the mind knowing; the other, an unoreated 
light, being neither in the mind nor of the mind, being in fact, God Himself. 
The natural light of the mind may be considered a Ilumen derivatum' of the 
uncreated, but in itself it is not sufficient for the attainment of any but 
temporal truths. The uncreated lux, the eternal reasons above the mind by ... 
which the mind can judge, is needed to account for those truths which one 
and all know certitudinaliter. The two fold aspect of cognition demands 
this, for there is cognition whioh concerns deduotion made from. laws which I 
19ut supra. 
20Ibidem, p. 257: Item, De Trinitate XIV, c. 7: "Id agunt litterae, quae 
Idel iis rebus conscriptae sunt, quas res duce ratione invenit vera. esse 
lector, non quas veras esse credat, sed veras esse etiam ipse invenit 
sive apud se sive in ipsa mentis luce veritate." Eoce quod Augustinus 
distinguit inter cognitionElll rerum quam anima in se ipsa videt et quam 
videt in luce aeterna. Certum est autem quod ilIa quae videt in se ipsa, 
videt in lumine naturali, quam vocant praedicti lumen derivatum a luce 
aeterna; ergo necesse est quod aliqua videat in luce aeterna, ita quod 
non solum in lumine naturali, alioquin inculcatio verborum esset dioendo 
quod ipse lector vera cernit sive apud se sive in ipsa mentis luce 
ritate. 
c.7 n.9 
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are above the mind and is thus made in a superior light; and there is 
knowledge which concerns the treatment of things in time, and this knowledge 
is aohieved in a created light. But the superior aspeot demands the 
, . 
illumination given only in the eternal ligh;.~\ This, indeed, is the 
teaching of Augustine,22 who says that those things whioh man finds manifest 
merely in himself are ohanged by time, and he ,annot oonvince another man 
of them by reason, but the other man must take his word for it. However, 
regarding those things whioh are comprehended in a common light, one mind 
when it knows them, agrees to theml and another man, if he wishes, may 
know the same thing. Thus, there is knowledge which the hmnan mind has by 
believing, and, consequent on that believing, it knows; there is also 
knowledge whioh it has and whioh is immediately recognized as truth .common 
to all. 23 This knowledge is a seeing ~ veritate ipsa. 
21Vide #=10. 
22Mar st on, Quaest. III, p. 257: Quae vero sint ilIa quae mens cernit in 
se ipsa tantum et quae in luce aeterna, docet idem Augustinus, De 
Trinitate IX, c. 7. 
Cf. St. Augustine, De Trin. IX, c. 6, n. 9 (PL 42,965). 
23Marston, Quaest. III, p. 257: Quae vero sint illa quae mens oernit in se I 
ipsa tantum et quae in luce aeterna, docet idem Augustinus, De Trinitate 
IX, o. 7, dicens quod illa quae videt homo in se ipso tantum, per 
tempora variantur, nec potest alium de eo quod intelligit certificare, 
sed neoesse habet alius sibi credere, affirmanti se intelligere hoc vel 
illude Illa vero quae in oommune luce cernuntur, non oportet crede~ 
audientem, sed statim cum intelligit, constat sibi quod alius, 8i vult, 
intelligit illud idem. 
Cf. St. Augustine, De Trin. IX, c. 6, n. 9 (PL 42,965sq.); De Lib. Arb. 
II, c. 8 (PL 32,1252). 
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On the authority of Augustine alone, Marston refutes the position 
which states that the agent intellect is a part of the soul. On this same 
authority he proves the existenoe of the First Truth in whioh all other 
, . 
.... 
truths are seen by using an analogy between the objects ot the senses ot 
sight and hearing and truth common to all. From the Augustinian proposition 
whioh maintains that what is above our minds i, God, He deduoes that the 
light above our minds and in whioh we c<mlprehend is God. Again from. 
St. Augustine's words he shows that there is a two fold aotivity of the 
mind' activity concerned with cognition in a superior light (which has to 
do with truth common to all); and an activity concerned with cognition of 
things temporal (and which has to do with truth not cammon to all but 
partioular to the subjeot knowing). Now the truth cammon to all is superior 
to the knowing ones; hence it is God. Finally. Marston shows that the 
eternal rules are those according to which we judge, but of which no one 
judges. These rules came from. God, and since they are that according to 
which we judge. they are that according to which we know. They, as 
immutable truth, do not pertain to the nature of the soul knowing. It is I 
by means of these arguments that Marston has been able to conclude a 
doctrine of the agent intellect, whioh for him, is consonant with that Qf 
. 
St. Augustine. Indeed, he cannot see how any other doctrine could be in 
harmony with that of the Saint· s24 and without fear that the opposite might 
be true, he fir.mly holds that there is but one light, an uncreated light. 
24Marston, Quaest. III, pp. 257-8: Quoniam igitur non video quo modo 
praedicta opinio possit salvare intentionem Sancti Augustini, quam 
videntur raetendere verba et deductiones eius. 
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in whioh we behold all truth certudinaliter. 25 
After determining the first and last source of certitude to be God, 
Marston considers the ter.ms whioh he has borrowed from Aristotle for 
. 
. ~ 
incorporation into an Augustinian metaphysics. The agent intellect, so 
called because it illuminates the possible, sufficiently and completely,26 
he believes is the uncreated light. 27 The c~plete and sufficient 
illumination conferred by the agent intellect requires that the agent 
intellect be separated by its essence fram the possible.28 This is the 
interpretation which Alpharabi, Avicenna, and many others have put on the 
words of Aristotle. 29 Besides, the philosopher's words seem to indioate 
that, for he has said that the agent intellect is separated from the possibi 
seoundum esse et substantiam and that the agent differs from the possible 
as regards inoorruptibility. The possible is inoorruptible in substance, 
25Ibidam, p. 258: firmiter teneo unam esse lucam inoreatam, in qua omnia 
vera certitudinaliter visa oonspioimus. 
26Ibidam, p. 258: Sumendo namque intellectum agentem prout dioitur ab 
actu illuminandi possibilem, non qualicumque illustratione, ut volunt 
omnes, sed pro eo quod sufficienter et complete illuminat possibilem. 
27Ibidem, p. 258: Et hano lumen oredo quod Philosophus vocavit intellectum 
agentam. 
Cf. Aristotle, De Anima III, 0.5. 
28Marston, Quaest:-III, p. 258: sed pro eo quod suffioienter et complete 
illuminat possibilam, neoesse est dicere quod sit substantia separata 
per essentiam ab intelleotu possibili. • • • 
29Ibidam: Prout hoc sentiunt Alfarabius, in libro De intellectu et 
intellecto, et Avicenna, in multis locis, et alii expositores Philosophi 
quam plurimi. 
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but not in ~J whereas, the agent is inoorruptible as regards both.30 
Moreover, Aristotle says31 that the agent intelleot is to the possible as 
the artisan to the materials whioh he fashi9ns, or as the light of the 
sun to oolors. Moreover,32 the effioient oause and the matter on whioh it 
works are not found in the same subjeot. The effioient oause, i.e., the 
artifix, must be separated from the matter o~which he works aooording to 
his essenoe. The Philosopher had also said33 that the light of the sun 
banishing darkness from colored things is separated from these things by 
its essence. The separation and the aotivity analogous to the examples 
given and belonging to the agent intellect, is proper to neither the 
angelio intelligenoe nor the rational soul, but to God alone.34 
Marston has strongly enough concluded that the agent intellect is God. 
His interpretations of Aristotle, Augustine and medieval Augustinians have 
emphasized his position. However, Marston does not resign the problem 
at this point. He considers, as does St. Bonaventure, whether the agent 
30Ibidem: Neonon et ipse Philosophus videtur vel quod "intelleotus agens 
est separatus a possibili secundum esse et substantiam, quoniam dicit 
ipsum differre a possibili penes inoorruptione.m; possibilis autem 
incorruptibilis est seoundum substantiam, quamvis oorrumpatur seoundum 
esse", in quantum oorrumpitur quodam interius corrupto. 
The editor notes that Aristotle's words as quoted by Marston are taken 
from Bacon's Opus Majus, 2, 5 (edited by Bridges, III, 45 sq.). Vide, 
then, Appendix A, p. 
Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, III, 0.5; St. Thomas, Summa Theologica, I, q.89, 
a.l; St. Bonaventure, II Sent., d.l9, a. 1, q. 1, ad. 3. 
31Cf. Aristotle, De Anima, III, c. 5; Vide nota 30. 
32Cf. Aristotle, Physios II, c.8. 
33Ut supra: notae 30, 31. 
34Marston, Quaest. III, pp. 258-9: "agens autem incorruptibilis est et 
secundum substantiam et esse". Dioit etiam quod intellectus agens "se 
I 
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intellect could be an influence of the unoreated light.35 From what has 
been said regarding the uncreated truth or the light in which all see 
truth, it is olear that it is oommon to all. The immutable nature which 
. 
.. 4, 
belongs to truth requires that in some way inoommutable truths must be 
attained. Something more and above the phantasms or the abstraoted 
speoies must constitute the human mind in its.act of knowledge. That 
that 'somethingl is any influence of the eternal light differing from it, 
or something on the part of the mind itself distinct fram the eternal 
light, Marston oannot believe. He reasons that the eternal light makes a 
oertain active impression in the human soul, from which there is bequeathed 
to the soul a oertain passive impression, the formal principle of inoom-
mutable truth; just as the image, when imprinted on the wax, leaves behind 
a oertain likeness in the wax, by whioh, if the wax had cognitive power, it 
oould know the image itself. This is just what the Psalmist wished to 
say, when speaking of the way in which our mind is fashioned after that 
light, he says: "Signatum est lumen vultus tui super nos." Now lumen 
vultus is none other than the light of the eternal truth, acoording to 
habet ad possibilem sicut artifex ad materiam et sicut hux solis ad 
colores. Artifex autem est extra materiam in quam agit, et separatur 
per essentiam per eadem', cum efficiens et materia non coincidant,. 
seoundum Philosophum II Physioorum, 'Similiter lux solis, expellens 
tenebras a coloribus et aliis rebus, separata est ab eis per essentiam. 
Dicit etiam quod intellectus agens scit omnia semper et in actu, quod 
nee animae rationali nec angelo convenit, sed soli Deo. 
35Ibidem, p. 263: Unde necesse est aliquid ultra phantasmata vel species 
abstractas ponere in mente nostra, quo attingamus aliqualiter inco.mmu-
tabiles veritates: quod non credo esse aliquam influentiam lucis aeternae 
differentem ab ea nec ali quid a parte mentis nostrae distinctum reali-
ter ab eadem. Nam lux aeterna, irradians mentem humanam, quamdam 
I 
which light is bestowed on our intellect through the image impression.36 
Thus with st. Bonaventure, Ro~er 1furston ooncludes that the agent intellect 
is not an influence of the eternal light, but is the eternal light itself, 
, . 
. ~ 
God. 
St. Augustine has said that the angel could be the oause of knowledge 
in the rational soul. 37 He thereby grants to.the angel an illuminative 
power, but it is power proportionate to the nature manifesting it, and 
hence, it is a limited power and is not the srune as the illuminative power 
of God. Augustine maintains that the light conferred on the created 
being by God is as the sun shining through a window; whereas the light 
conferred by the angel is as the opening of that window. Again he has 
said that the God-given light is to the soul as the light of the sun is to 
the eye, and that the angelic light is as the light of the stars. This 
shows that the angelic light is not precisely what l~rston has said is the. 
impressionem activrun facit in ea. - -
36Ibidem: Unde sicut quando videmus unum sensibile visibile, alia specie 
et alia informatur oculus tuus et meus, sic et per aliud, quod est in 
mente mea, video veri tat em incammutabilem, et tu per aliud vides eadem_ I 
Unde necesse est aliquid ultra phantasmata vel species abstraetas ponere 
in mente nostra, quo attingamus aliqualiter incommutabiles veritates; 
quod non credo esse aliqurun influentiam aeternae differentem ab ea nec 
aliquid a parte mentis nostrae distinctum realiter ab eadem- Nwm lux 
aeterna, irradians mentem munanam, quwmdwm impressionem activam fac~t 
in ea, ex qua derelinquitur in ipsa passiva quaedam impressio, quae 
for.male prineipium est eognoscendi veritates incammutabiles, sicut 
sigillum, quando imprimitur in cera, derelinquit quoddam vestigium in 
cera, quo, si cera haberet virtutem cognitivam, posset ipsum sigillum 
cognoscere. - Et hoc est quod voluit Psalmista, loquens de ilIa luce, 
quo modo mens nostra ab ipsa quodam modo sigillatur: Signatum est, 
inquit, lumen vultu6 ~ super ~; quia enim vultu res cognoscitur, 
lumen vultus non est aliud quam lumen Veritatis aeternae secundum quod 
offertur intellectui nostri per sigillativwm impressionem. 
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agent intellect. Now, knowing beforehand that our Franciscan will adhere 
to a strict interpretation of the words of Augustine, we may not preclude 
that he will grant, without specification and careful examination of terms 
. 
. ~ 
and possibilities, that angelically conferred illumination is the work 
proper to the agent intellect. Indeed the wording of the question itself 
is not so much that of a positive possibilit~as is that of a mere 
probability. To answer the question 'Whether the human soul is illumin-
ated by God alone t ,38 he gives three ways in which the angel could perform 
this operation. 
In the first way the angel could effect cognition in us by operating 
on our bodies, which the soul perfects and informs.39 Every movement of 
the soul produces something in the body, and thus movement made in the 
body is caused by the soul. If the movement remains in the body, it is 
in its turn the cause of similar knowledge in the soul, just as anger is .~ 
the cause of burning animosity and burning animosity is the reason why 
we are easily angered. Now, the angel could rouse these movements in us 
by a natural parler, from which movements it could somehow provoke thought I 
Cf. Psalm 4, 7; St. Augustine, De Trin. c. 15 (PL42,1052); Contra Faustem 
XXVI, c. 5 (PL 42,482); St. Thomas~umma Theol. I, q. 84, a. 5, 
Respondeo. 
37Vide c. 2, nota 8. 
38Cf. Marston, Quaest. IV, p. 274 sq.; St. Bonaventure, II Sent. d. 10, a. 
2, q. 2; Roger Bacon, Op.Ter. c. 23, pp. 76-7. 
39Cf. St. Augustine, Ad Nebridium, Epist. 9 (PL 33,72); st. Thomas, Summa 
Theologica, I, q. 111, a. 3-4. 
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in us. If the angel could cause such motions in the body. which are the 
occasion of the soul t s knowing according to the aforementioned mode. the 
angel could e~en in some way induce illumi~tion and cognition by doing 
something about the body which the soul would perfect.40 
In a second way. the angel could illuminate the soul by moving the 
spirit itself or the sensible soul, which se~es and ministers to the 
intellect.4l The knowledge thus bestowed by the angel is the type which, 
4DMarston, Quaest. IV, pp. 280-1: Dico igitur quod angelus potest in 
nobis cognitionem aliquo modo efficere operando circa corpus nostrum 
quod anima Perficit et infor.mat ••• omnis animi motus aliquid facit in 
corpore. sicut patet ad sensum in motibus irae et tristriae et gaudi et 
ceteris huiusmodi, qui apparent in vultu talium motuum passionibus 
agitati. Et sicut iste motus in factus in corpore causatur ab anima. 
sio potest. si maneat in corpore. esse animae causa iterato consimilis 
oogitationis. siout ira eat causa crementi fellis et fel iterum est 
causa cur faciliter irascimur. Istos autem motus. in corpore causatos 
ab anima. potest angelus tam bonus quam malus ex naturali 'pot estate 
diversimode contractare et agitare, ex quibus motibus sic agitatis 
ingeruntur nobis aliquando cogitationes. •• Cum igitur angelus possit,. 
motiones tales oausare et efficere in oorpore quae sint animae ocoasio 
oognitationum secundum modum praetactum. potest etiwn in anima aliquo 
modo illuminationem et oognitione.m. inducere aliquid agenda circa corpus 
ipsum quod anima perficit. 
4lIbidem. pp. 282-3: utrum vero ista argumenta verum oonoludant. nescio. 
Hoc oredo qUod sustinere volens qUod angelus possit aliquod phantamnata 
in imaginatione producere, faoiliter illis responderet. Nam quod dicit 
in principio quod, 'si in angeli potestate esset tale phantasmata 
producere, t~nc posset caecum nati~tate facere cognoscentem colores et 
de eisdem iUdicare'. istud non sequitur. Qurumvis enim tale phantamnata 
in imaginatione esset. oporteret qUod soiret illud esse phantamnata 
caloris, ad hoc quod per illud colorem oognosoeret. siout hamini ingerere 
passet speci~ mulieris, qui tamen nunqurum aliquam vidisset; habens 
igitur tale phantasmata bene illud adverteret. messiens trumen quod 
mulieris esset. Tali autem coloris phantasmate in imaginatione existente. 
passet angelus vel per exterioram locutionem vel interioram docere 
habentem tale phantasma quod illud esset phantasma coloris. Ex quo 
patet quod non sequitur, si angelus tale phantasma in imaginatione 
formaret vel per eius adminiculum in ea fieret. quod propter hoc caecu m 
posset de coloribus facere disputantem, nisi aliqua doctrina angeli 
I 
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for example, one blind fram birth would have of color, or one not having 
seen the city of Alexandria would have from a description of that city 
given him by another. If one says that such an implanting of species in 
. 
... .. , 
the phantasm or such an inducement of knowledge could not be, Marston 
agrees. But, he adds, if an image, such as the image of color in one blind 
fram birth, is present, then, without a doubt .the angel could show man, 
either by telling him of it or by teaching him, the likeness of this 
color not perceived by sense.42 
In a third way the angel could cause illumination in the soul by 
bringing light into it. This light is a dispositive principle and in a 
certain way the reason for knowing things other than the light, but not 
the reason for knowing the light itself.; just as light in the medium is 
not objectively known by the sense unless it is known to what extent it is 
spread over with color.43 Some do not hold this cpinion, but they do hold,.... 
superveniret menti vel spiritui, docens cuius esset illud phantasmate. -
Et haec omnia confirmantur per Augustinum !De! Trinitate VIII, c. 10, 
dicentem sententialiter: nCum audissem a multis de Alexandria qualis 
esset, finxi in animo meo tal em civitatem. Quem imaginem si ex animo I 
meo proferre possem ad oculos hominum qui Alexandriam viderunt, profecto 
aut omnes dicerent, 'non est ipsa', aut si dicerent: 'ipsa est', multa 
mirarer, atque ipsam intuens animo meo, id est imaginem quasi picturam 
eius, ipsam tamen esse nescirem, sed eis crederem qui visam tenerent. 
42Ibidem, p. 284: Quod si dicas mihi talem imaginem nullam posse cognitio-
nem inducere, dico quod verum est per se; sed si talis imago esset ibi, 
posset absque dubio angelus hamini ostendere, vel loquendo vel alia 
docendi, quod ipsa esset huius coloris imago. 
43Ibidem, p. 291: A simili posset dici in propositio quod angelus lumen 
in animam influit, quod est dispositivum principium et quodam modo ratio 
cognoscendi alia et non se ipsum; sicut etiam lumen in medio a sensu 
objective non cognoscitur nisi quatenus est coloribus superfusum. 
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the opinion that nothing is moved or effected unless by that which informs 
it.44 To this objection Marston offers another of their opinions,45 that 
something could be the form of another in its being or in its operation; 
, . 
.,. .; 
just as, according to them, God is the form of the beatified intelleot, 
because the divine essence is that whioh the beatified soul knows. Perhaps 
one could say that the soul is moved intelli~bly by the presenoe of the 
angelic light, although the light is not present to the soul as to a sub-
jeot, informing it in its being, as an aocident is in its subjeot; but 
as something informing another to movement. Hence, in this way an angelio 
light could inform the intellective power of the soul, so that it oould 
help it or so that it oould render illumination to the intelleot; although 
it does not inform it as an aocident informs its subjeot.46 
These arguments lead to the conolusion that the angel oould 
illuminate the human soul (assuming illumination to mean any showing fortb. 
or disposition thereto) either by moving the body or the interior sensitive 
44Cf. st. Thomas, Summa Theologica I, q. 111, a. 1, in corp., et ad 2. 
45Cf• St. Thomas ~ III, 51; de Verite q. 12, a. 6; Summa Theologioa I, I 
q. 12, a. 2. 
46Marston, Quaest. IV, pp. 291-2: Tertium similiter non videtur multum 
efficaoiter oonoludere, maxime contra il10s qui sunt opinionis contrariae. 
N~ quando dicit quod 'nihil operatur neo effioitur clarius nisi per 
illud quod ipsum informat,' responderi posset secundum illos quod aliquid 
potest esse forma alterius in essendo vel in operando, siout, secundum 
ips os, Deus est forma intellectus beati in patria in operando, quia 
essentia divina est illud quo intellectus beatus cognoscit Deum, ut 
dicunt. Et Eodem modo forsitan posset diei quod anima clarior efficitur 
ex praesentia luminis angelici, quwmvis ipsum lumen non sit in anima ut 
in subjecto informans ips~ in essendo, ut aooidens subjectum, sed siout 
aliquid aliud infor.mat in operando. Unde potest tale lumen potentiwm 
animae intel1eotiv~ informare ut adiuvans ipsmn vel praebens et 
illuminandi intelleotum, quwmvis non informet ipsum ut aocidens subjectum. 
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powers, or even by moving the soul itself by operating about it and 
pressing into it.47 However, all that Marston says concerning the angelic 
light, he says by way of opinion, and not by way of assertion. (This is 
. 
• .i, 
evident, throughout the whole of the text treating of the conferring of 
angelic light, in the stressed use of the verb Iposse l .) The final 
determination of the problem, Roger leaves to.those wiser than himself, 
to whose sage judgment he humbly sUbmits.48 
In the Marstonian system it is not definite that the agent intellect 
is an angel; that it oould be an angel, is possible; that it is God is 
absolute. Now, we ask, what is the operation proper to the agent intellect? 
In Quaestio III, Marston says that the agent intellect is agent because 
it sufficiently and completely illuminates the possible.49 Again it is 
said to be agent (and God also) because it principally and completely 
illuminates the possible.50 Again the function of the agent intellect is~ 
41Ibide.m, pp. 299-300: Concedendum est ergo quod angelus illuminare potest 
animam, sumpta illuminatione, ut praetactum est, pro manifestatione 
quacumque et dispositione ad illuminatione.m, twm agendo circa corpus 
quam circa vires interiores sensitivas quam etiam circa ipsammente.m 
operando et influendo in ewm. 
48Ibidem, p. 300: Hoc twmen, quod dixi de lumina naturali angeli, quod 
per ipsum posset animam illuminare, opinendo solum, non asserando, 
simplioibus proposui, ut praeberam materiam cogitandi, sapientioribus 
determinandum reliqui, quorum iudicio in hac materia humiliter me IJubmitt 
49 Ibidam, Quaest. III, p. 258: Et hanc lucam credo Philosop~s vocavit 
intellectum agent em. Sumendo namque intellectum agent em dicitur ab actu 
illuminandi possibilam, non qualicumque illustratione • • • sed pro eo 
quod suffioienter et oomplete illuminat possibilam. 
50Ibidam, p. 259: Sed secundum quod intellectus agens dicitur ab actu 
illuminandi complete et principlaiter, est substantia separata, Deus ipseo 
I 
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to make all things known. The soul which knows all things knows them in 
the eternal light, not that it knows the light itself by looking upon it, 
but that the light is the reason and the pr~nciple for the knowing of 
other things.51 
In this s~e general vein Marston maintains that God illuminates our 
souls,52 and that the agent intellect illumi~tes the material intellect. 
But in a more specific manner he adds that it illuminates the material 
intelleot so that it receives intelligible species.53 Quoting the 
Commentator he says that the agent intelleot is to the material intellect 
as light to the eyes; and as light is the perfection of the eyes, so the 
agent is the perfeotion of the material intelleot. And, as in same general 
way light makes potential colors aotual, so the agent intelleot makes 
intelligibles in potenoy to be aotual, so that the material intellect is 
able to reoeive them. 54 
5lIbidem, Quaest. IV, p. 290: N~, sicut patet ex praeoedente questione 
li.e. Quaetio III/ anima omnia quae oognoscit, in lumine aeterno 
cognosoit, non t~en ipsum lumen cognoscit intuendo, sed ut ipsum est 
ratio et principiumad alia oognoscendum. 
52Ibidem, Quaest. III, p. 260: N~ quod Deus solus anim~ nostr~ 
illuminet ••• 
53Ibidem, Quaest. III, p. 259: Ciroa cognitionem incamplexorum intellectus 
agens illuminat materialem, ut possit recipere speoies intelligibiles ••• 
54Ibidam, pp. 259-60: Et de istis duabus operationibus intellectus ' 
agentis dicit Commentator, super III De Anima, in illo # Et sio non 
habebit natur~, in fine oommenti, sic loquens: "Debes scire quod 
respeotus intelleotus agentis ad istum intellectum est respectus lucis 
ad diaphanum, et respectus for.marum materialium ad ipsum est respeotus 
oolorum ad diaphanum. Quamadmodum enim lux est perfectio diaphani, sio 
intellectus agens perfectio materialis; et quemadmodum diapbanum non 
movetur a colore nisi quando lucet, ita iste intellectus non recipit 
intellecta nisi secundum quod perficitur per ilIum intellectum. 
I 
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Here there is noted an interohangeable use of the terms 'possibilis' 
and 'materialist. seemingly indioating that the meaning of the terms is 
the srune. There is noted. too. the use 9f.the Arisotelian terms 'aotual' 
.~ 
and 'potential'. but these are used as regards potenoy and aot on the part 
of the things known. That whioh is potentially intelligible beoomes 
actually so by the illuminative power of th~agent intellect. What about 
the subjeot whioh was potentially in the state of knowing. and then after 
being illuminated aotually is in that state? Marston maintains that in 
the knowing of an immutable proposition something is as the matter. and 
this is what is in the phantasm and in the species. both of whioh are in 
the intelleotual memory. Another. the formal element is the evidenoe of 
the infallible truth whioh it attains to the eternal reasons. Therefore. 
it is proper to oonsider such incommutable truths either aocording as they 
are represented in the species or in the eternal reasons.55 
From the point of view of the objeot known. there is aot and potenoy. 
inasmuoh as what was potentially intelligible becomes actually so under 
the influence of the eternal light. The potential factor resides in the 
objeot known. or in the speoies and in the phantamn. The aotual faotor 
55Ibidem. p. 262; Sciendum est quod in oognitione propositionum 
tmmutabilium aliquid est quasi materiale. apprehensio soilioet extremorum. 
puta totius et partis. et hoo est phantasmatibus vel speoiebus. quae 
sunt in memoria intellectuali; aliud est for.male. videlioet veritatis 
infallibilis evidentia. quae ex hoo habetur completive quod rationes 
aeternae aliqualiter attinguntur. Igitur talia inoammutabilia oonvenit 
considerare vel seoundum quod repraesentantur in speciebus vel seoundum 
quod repraesentantur in rationibus aeternis. 
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resides in the possible or material'intelleot and in the objeot only after 
the potential has been realized by the agent operating on it. This 
eduoation from potenoy to aot seams to g~v~ the objeot known a sort of 
.~ 
derived aotuality. From the point of view of the knowing subjeot, the 
material faotor is what is in the phantasms or the speoies. The for.mal 
faotor is not the knower, as one might expeo4, but it is the evidenoe of 
the infallible truth whioh the knowing spirit has within itself in virtue 
of its having somehow attained to the eternal reasons. The knowing subjeot, 
it seams, is the oooasion of the aotualization of potential knowledge by 
the Eternal Light. 
Strong as has been Marston's insistenoe on God's being the agent 
intelleot, he has admitted that the soul may be illuminated inoompletely 
by an agent intelleot whioh is part of the soul. 56 The aotivity exeroised 
by this oreated agent intelleot, (if that is what it is to be oalled), is~ 
inoomplete and insuffioient. It oan not aooount fully for the attainment 
of immutable truth by the image of God. The eternal rules are needed 
neoessarily for the genesis of truth in the oreature. God is the light in 
whioh it knows. He is the souroe of truth whioh it finds. God is the 
artifioer fashioning the possible intelleot, the human soul, after Himself, 
, 
the exemplar of Truth. God is the agent, the soul is the matter; He draws 
forth fran its darkness the soul He has produoed in oreation by making its 
56Vide nota 4. 
I 
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knowing in potency to be knowing in act. Creatively, conservatively, 
providentially, God is the efficient cause of the image's knowledge; 
naturally and co-operatively the image is ~he material oause. Thus 
perfect knowledge is achieved only in God. 
In detail Marston has given an account of four operations specific 
to the agent intellect. By the light of th:i.l intellect the soul is made 
luminous, phantas.ms are discerned, propositions are made generally 
understood, and conclusions are drawn. Should the reader be tempted to 
assign these operations to a oreated intelligenoe, he is stopped by the 
conolusion which holds that these operations are in the highest degree 
and rightly proper to God Himself. 57 
The proof of the first aotivity of the agent intellect is oontained 
in the words of St. Augustine.58 In his 83 Various Questions, question 
53, he has said that it is God only who illuminates our minds. Similarl,. 
in many other texts he has said that God only is above our minds, and that 
no oreature is interposed between God and the rational soul. 59 Hence, we 
57Marston, Quaest. III, p.260: Ex iam dictis apparet manifeste quod quator 
sunt operationes intellectus agentis; nam suo lumine illustratur anima, 
discernuntur phantasmata, cammunicantur theoramata, declarantur ex 
principiis elicita. Haec autem summe et proprie conveniunt ipsi Deo. 
58Cf• St. Augustine, 83 Quaestionum, q. 51, nne 2 et 4, (PL 40,32 sq.); 
q. 53, n. 2 (PL 40, 36); De Vera Relig. c. 55, n. 113; ibidem, c. 44, n. 
92 (PL 34, 172, 159); et De Trin. XI, c. 5, n. 8 (PL 42, 990) 
59Marston, Quaest. III, pp. 260-1: Nam quod Deus solus nostram illuminet, 
dicit Augustinus, 83 Quaestionium, quaest. 53: "Quaedam," inquiens, Deus 
facit "per se ipsum, quae ipso solo digna sunt, sicut illuminare animas." 
Et, De Vera Religione, dicit: "Inter mentam nostram, qua illum 
intelligimus Patram, et veritatem, id est lucem interioram, per quam 
illum intelligimus, nulla interposita creatura est.n Et huiusmodi 
sententiis pleni sunt libri Augustini. 
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must conclude that God enlightens our minds. That phantasms are enlight-
ened and made known by the eternal light. the light of the agent intelleot, 
has its proof also in the words of Augustine. 60 The words of this same 
. 
. ~ 
saint show too that the darkness of the phantasy is imbued with 
imperturbable eternity.6l Likewise, Augustine's words show that the 
propositions are beheld in the eternal light,62 Now. the making known of 
propositions concerns self-evident principles. and one cannot deny that 
it is in the tmmutable truth. which is neither yours nor mine, but the 
cammon possession of all, that all things are understood. 63 Finally, the 
60Cf. St. Augustine, de Trin. IX, c. 6, n. 11 (PL 42, 967); Ibidem, IX. c. 
3, n. 3 (PL 42, 962); De Civ. Dei I, V, o. 9, n. 4 (PL 7. 151-2) 
6lMarston, Quaest. III, p. 261: Itam, quod a Deo phantasmata Illustrentur, 
patet per eumdem Augustinum. De Trinitate IX. c. 7, ubi dicit: "Ipsa 
forma inconcussae ac stabilis veritatis. et in qua fruerer /homine!, 
bonum cum credens. et in qua consulo ut bonus sit, eadam luce inoorrupt-
ibilis sincerissimaeque rationis, et meae mentis aspeotum et illam 
phantasiae nubem, quam desuper cerno, cum eumdem hominem quem videram .~ 
cogito. imperturbabili aeternitate perfundit." Nota quod dicit formam 
inconcussam eadem luoe et mentis aspectum et phantasiam perfundere. 
62Cf • st. Augustine, De Lib. Arb. II, c. 10, n. 28 (PL 32, 1256); 
Ibidem, c. 12, n. 53 (PL 32, 1259) 
63Marston, Quaest. III, p. 261: Itam, quod in lumine aeterno videantur 
theoramata, hoo est propositiones per se notae. probat Augustinus 
diffuse, De Libero Arbitrio, libroII, c. 9, et in fine conoludit: 
Quapropter nullo modo negaveris incammutabilem veritate.m, quam non possis 
dioere tuam vel meam. sed omnibus incammutahilia vera cernentibus, tam-
quam miris modis secretum et publicum lumen. praesto esse ao se 
praebere cammuniter. 
110 • 
. ' 
oonolusions from self-evident prinoiples are drawn in the unoreated light 
or the eternal reasons. The youth interrogated on prinoiples and 
oonolusions in geometry. draws the proper ?onolusions, not beoause he is 
removing the veil of forgetfulness. but beoause his mind is subjeoted to 
the eternal reasons, and he thereby sees in what way oonolusions are to 
be drawn from first or evident prinoiples.6\ 
The agent intelleot is not striotly speaking the oreated agent 
intelleot, nor yet an influence of the uncreated light; but it is the 
unoreated light itself. This oonolusion is, it seems, an aocommodation 
of the dootrines of the Arabian philosophers and of Aristotle to the 
dootrine of st. Augustine. The unoreated intelligenoe is separated 
seoundum esse et substantiam from the possible intelleot of the rational 
soul, as Avioenna had said the created intelligence of Arabian philosophy 
is separated from the human soul; and as Aristotle had said the agent .. 
intelleot was separated from the possible in a manner similar to the 
separation of the artist from the materials whioh he fashions. Being 
unable to allow that any oreated intelleot oould be separated in this 
fashion f rom the soul knowing, and that any oreated intelleot oould so 
64Ibidem, pp. 261-21 Tandem quod in lumine inoreato elioiantur ex • 
prinoipiis conolusiones, patet ex eodem Augustino, De Trinitate II, o. 
14, ubi dioit: "Cum pervenitur. quantum fieri potest, ad rationes 
aeternas, non in eis manet ipse perventor, sed veluti aoies ipsa 
reverberata repellitur et fit rei non transitoriae transitoria oogitatio, 
/quae/ transiens per disciplinas, quibus eriditur animus, memoriae 
oammendatur, ut sit quo redire possit, quae oogitur inde transire." Hoo 
idem patet in oapitulo sequenti, ubi diffuse dooet quod puer, oonse-
quenter interrogatus de prinoipiis et oonclusionibus geometric is, vera 
respondet, quia mens eius, aeternis subjeota rationibus, in ipse luoe 
videt uo odo 
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operate on the mind of man that the four operations desoribed above 
are attributable to it, and being unwilling to admit any intermediary 
between the rational soul and its model, Marston oould but say that the 
. . 
.. ; 
enlightened mind makes its way to the hidden reoesses of truth only in 
the light of the eternal rules. In the light of these rules the human 
soul knows, not in virtue of infallibility of.truth in itself, but in 
virtue of the oharacteristics which mark the agent intelleot as being the 
unoreated Truth itself. 
The problem of the agent intelleot presented itself to Roger Marston 
in muoh the s~e manner that it had presented itself to his predeoessors. 
Marston's solution to the problem, however, differs from those of 
Alexander and Bonaventure, and more olosely resembles the solution given 
by John Peckh~. Bonaventure was willing to admit that there is an agent 
intelleot whioh is part of the soul, just as long as natural knowledge is .• 
safeguarded and is not confused with 'special knowledge divinely given', 
and just as long as tradition can thereby oope with the growing popularity 
of Aristotelianiam. Peokh~, on the other h~d, was less emphatio in I 
maintaining the double agent intellect. He did grant that as the agent 
intellect moves the soul by transforming the possible intellect into the 
, 
similitudes of things intelligible and by moving it so that it is applied 
to the eternal light, it is part of the soul.65 But such activity is 
merely preparatory for the completive activity of the unoreated agent 
intellect. This, too, is the position maintained by Marston, who des not 
65vide c. 4, nota 27. 
·' 
stop to consider the Aristotelian terms of potency and act as they regard 
the knowing subject himself, but only as they regard this subject in his 
knowing of immutable truth, the formal principle of whioh is the eternal 
. 
..... 
light and the passive principle the reoeiving created intelligenoe. 
God, then, is a light proportionate not to a created light but to the 
immutable light which the created light reo09rizes in all its acts of 
certain knowledge. God is the light of the mind, above the mind; on the 
mind, but not in it; superior to it and not equal to it. God prepares in 
His creative act an image, worthy to reflect truth and light; a oreature 
ever seeking truth and needing it in all its acts; a oreature, who when 
it knows, knows through Truth, and by Truth, and in Truth. The impotence 
of the creature and the omnipotence of the Creato~ indioate the oonditions, 
both neoessary and sufficient for human knowledge. And just as God is 
the initial term in the soul's search for truth, so He is the final ter.m* 
in the finding of it. Truth or knowledge comes from God and returns to 
Him, coming forth again from. Him as the immutable source of the oreature's 
knowledge. It is identioal with God as regards its essence. It olothes 
'Wi. th a new and superior mode of being the mind whioh it eluoidates 'Wi th 
actuality of knowing, the mind whioh It fashions after Light and Whioh It 
draws ever to Itself. 
I 
.' 
CRAPl'ER VI 
THE AGENT INTELLECT IN FRANCISCAN PHILOSOPHY 
, . 
.. .. , 
The Francisoians we have studied take their place as adherents to, and 
upholders and interpreters of, Augustinian tradition. As followers of 
st. Augustine, they are immediately establi~ed in a philosophio tradition 
other than that fram which St. Thomas received his inspiration. 
These followers of St. Franois of Assisi were oonditioned by time 
and oiroumstanoes in suoh wise that they found it impossible to advooate 
tradition without in same way oaming into oontaot with the novel doctrines 
of Aristotle. Contaot with this tnew philosophy' meant that the Fran-
oiscans must defend their own position which the new philosophy threatened 
to replace. Need it be said that contact with Aristotle resulted in an 
infiltration of, at least, and Aristotelian terminology, and in some caset 
an infiltration and oommingling of Aristotelian terminology and metaphysics 
with Augustinian? 
The answers given by the Friars to the problem of the agent intelleot I 
testify to the depth of the penetration and to the strength of the grafting 
of the old on the new. These answers, given by way of interpretation of 
Augustine in terms of Aristotle and of Aristotle in terms of Augustine, are 
all the possible answers which oould be proffered, and all of them bear 
resemblanoes to the philosophies of both St. Augustine and Aristotle. 
This should be evident in the brief aooount rendered of the 
113 
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Franciscans' views of the intelleotual aotivity of the agent intelleot. 
We have desoribed the oognitive operation proper to this intellect in terms 
of the Franciscans themselves- We now ask if we can set forth one doctrine 
which in itself is genuinely Franciscan and whioh oan be understood as 
being representative of the sohool itself. Our answer is negativeo All 
possible answers have been proposed, and yet.not anyone of tham may be 
oonsidered the olimax and the final solution representative of Franoisoan 
thought_ It seams that no matter Vlhat the approaoh to the problem. no 
matter what the solution, the resouroefulness of Augustine is never 
exhausted_ No one answer is suffioient to embody the fulness of Augustinia~ 
philosophy. 
Now. a positive answer we might offer to the question asked ourselves 
could be for.mulated thus: Our Franoiscans, guided by the s~e Christian 
theology and philosophy. but strongly influenoed by the meanings whioh ~ 
they themselves assigned to philosophic terms, seem to follow two general 
trends. Some of them. desirous of establishing a nd maintaining the 
sovereignty and supremacy of God. teach that the agent intelleot is God. 
Others. seeking to establish that man. created to the image and likeness 
of God. must be endowed with faeulties proper to a rational nature; and at 
the s~e time desiring to explain how a finite being may attain to 
immutable truth. say that there are oreated agent intellects and an 
unoreated agent intellect. 
Alexander of Hales solved the problem by saying that God. the First 
Agent Intellect. created agent intelleots. the aotivity of whioh was such 
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that intelleotion in the human soul oould take plaoe. This appears as a 
leaning on the words and the metaphysios of Aristotle, but it should not 
for that reason lead us to believe that Alexander is as Aristotelian as 
. 
9 .. , 
is, for example, St. Thomas of Aquin. Alexanderts interpretation served 
to maintain that the human intelleot always remains an intelleot, that 
is a oreature imaged after and imaging the Ejernal Truth; and that God, 
the First oause in the order of Being, is the First oause in the order 
of Truth. Thus, although there are oreated agent intelleots and even 
though these intelleots operate effioiently in their own natural order to 
illuminate possible intelleots, they oan do so only in virtue of having 
reoeived enlightenment fram the First Agent Intelleot. And, as Hales has 
said, these oreated agents are able to bring light to possible intelleots 
only as regards some forms, and not as regards all forms, and this ability 
is conferred upon them in oreation. l 
Now, following Aristotle, Alexander has taught that as regards the 
rational soul, the agent intelleot and the possible intelleot are its 
oonstitutive prinoiples, but following Augustine he has said that the 
agent intellect is an illuminative power reoeiving light from on High and 
relying upon Eternal Truth Itself for the knowledge whioh it oomprehends, 
just as the oreature depends upon the oreator for its oreation. 
Roger Baconts approach is as markedly Aristotelian as Alexander's. 
He, however, found it hard to say that the agent intelleot was part of the 
ICf. Chapter I, pp. 15-20. 
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soul. He holds, as does Hales, that the soul is a certain capacity for 
intelligibles, but he cannot say with Alexander that the rational soul 
has any ~~ efficiency for realizing and perfecting this capacity • 
. 
... 
Indeed, all that Bacon will grant is that the human soul is the possible 
intellect, which needs an agent intellect, none other than God, to bring 
it forth fram its potency to act.2 
The very fact that necessary truth exists and that necessary truth 
cannot have as its source the mutable and contingent natures of creatures, 
and the obvious fact that finite minds know this necessary truth, requires 
and demands that creative truth which brought the rational soul fram the 
state of nothingness to the state of real being, in same way continuously 
intervene to bring the creature across the measureless gulf fram time to 
eternity, from the contingent to the neoessary, fram the mutable to the 
immutable. This explains why the rational soul, or possible intelleot, 
needs an agent intellect which is God, to aotualize its oapacity for truth. 
Any notion entertained 'by Bacon regarding oreated agent intelleots 
was not seriously retained. This impetuous philosopher tells us that if I 
we want to consider the rational soul as being actualized after enlightenm 
by God we may, but worthy of note is this: The human soul, educed fram 
potency to act as regards intelligibles is still but an actualized possible 
intellect, and its thus being eduoed is not sufficient reason or warrant 
2Cf. Chapter II, pp. 33-34; note 38, p. 46. 
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for our supposing that it is an agent intellect. Thus, there are not 
agent intellects, but there is an Agent Intellect, and the human soul is 
the intelleotus possibilis as it functions ~ctively and passively. 
In Bacon's teaching the well-worn and oft-quoted texts of Aristotle 
are literally interpreted. The Philosopher has said in his De Anima that 
the agent intellect is related to the possib~e as the sun to the eye, or 
as the artisan to the materials he fashions. 3 Now Bacon feels that he 
must interpret Aristotle in just the way Aristotle reads. Then, who can 
doubt that the sun is separated in its very being from the eyes receiving 
its light, and who is there to deny that God, the light of the mind, is 
separated from the mind irradiated with the brillanoe of His Truth? 
Alexander, wham Bacon refers to as one of the neglected masters, had not 
found it necessary to abide by the words of Aristotle in just that way. 
He says that this analogy of the sun to the eye and of God to the mind .~ 
is riot needed; for surely, he argues, the sould would not have been oreated 
to the image of God but what God would have conferred upon it some per-
fection for the perfor.ming of its own proper operations. For Hales the 
human intellect supplies by its own aotivity something in the nature of 
effioient causality for perfecting itself, while for Bacon, God must be not 
only the Creator, but also the Ruler of the intelleot and the oause of 
knowledge, and hence of truth, attained to and possessed by the human 
3Vide Appendix A, p. 126. 
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spirit. 
The other Franciscans treated in this paper follow closely the 
tradition established by St. Bonaventure. In their works we find not 
... ; 
just the teacher-student and master-disciple trend. but likewise a doctrinal 
development growing out of the conclusions of one into the premisses of 
another_ These mendicants of the Bonaventur~an tradition. and Bonaventure 
himself. know and use the Aristotelian division of the intelleotual powers. 
St. Bonaventure teaches. as Halensis had too, that there are both active 
and passive factors in every human soul, and consequently an acting 
intellect and a passive intellect. These prinoiples constituting the 
rational soul are used by this Franoiscan inamnuoh as they serve to explain 
how the human spirit achieves knowledge by way of abstraction, or how 
knowledge of bodies is had. But. they are disoussed when theSeraphio 
dootor desoribes how indubitable truth is possessed by a human intelleotoj 
By having recourse to St. Augustine's theory of divine illumination 
St. Bonaventure found the solution to the perplexity of how a finite mind 
oould grasp the immutable nature of stable truth fram the fleeting things 
of time- His applioation of this theory was not the ready one which Bacon 
had used, but a oareful and detailed interpretation of the implioations 
entailed in all the possible uses of this theory. Always having before 
him the dignity of the image created to reflect and to know divine truth, 
and knowing that immutable truth needs as its source an immutable nature, 
4Cf Chapter III, pp. 57-60. 
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and realizing too that the created image does know for certain, Bonaventure 
refused to concede that the Eternal Rules are the whole and sole 'ratio' 
of the creature's knowledge. 5 
Further, natural knowledge must be distinguished from infused 
knowledge; nature must be always credited with operations exercisable by 
it in relation to, but without being oomplet.ly dependent upon, super-
nature. At the same time God must be regarded as the first source of 
being, of Truth and Knowledge, of Light. So without saying that God was 
the sole reason for intellectual activity of the human reason, as Baoon 
had said in his synthesis of Christian and Greek philosophies, Bonaventure 
conoludes that in all aots of oertain knowledge two orders are needed: 
there must be on the part of the oreature knowing, a created, contingent, 
temporal, finite order; and on the part of the intelligib~ there must be 
an uncreated, necesary, eternal, infinite order of Truth. And this .~ 
expanation is in line with the teaohing which came to Bonaventure fram 
Alexander of Hales. 
According to Bonaventure, the human soul must in 'someway' attain to 
the Eternal Verities or to the Divine Ideas in the Eternal Art. For this 
reason, just as Bonaventure says that in every oognitive act of the human 
intellect the interdependent and interoperative activity of the two 
prinoiples oonstituting the human intelleot is needed, so in every 
5Ibidem, and also note 28, p. 50-51. 
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intelleotion of true and oertain knowledge the interaotion of the temporal 
and eternal orders of Truth are neoessary. 
Bonaventure# in following his own considerations of the Christian 
•• 
and the Pagan# allows for oreated agent intelleots# but finds neoessary 
an unoreated Light. Baoon# bent upon reotifying faulty and poor trans-
lations of the Philosopher# deoides and insi,ts that the agent intelleot 
oan be none other than God. Henoe# although Alexander# Bacon and 
Bonaventure were faced with the same perplexity# namely that of aooounting 
for the knowledge of the unalterable by the changable. and although all had 
at their disposals the philosophies of Augustine and Aristotle. Alexander 
and Bonaventure give to the problem an answer differing greatly fram 
Bacon's. Where they would safeguard the natural causality of the rational 
oreature and bestow upon it from the beginning a dignity specifically 
befitting its nature. Bacon would give to God the natural created efficie~ 
causality. And where they would have an illumination protective of the 
autonomy of reason# Bacon would give us one reduoing it. 
Betvveen Bonaventure and Baoon. there is another differenoe to be I 
noted. Both consider the agent intelleot and the possible intelleot as the 
for.mal and material prinoiples of cognition. Now. St. Bonaventure remarks 
that if the agent intellect is not part of the soul. and if the possible 
intelleot is as the matter. then the 'anima rationalist is reduced to the 
possible intelleot# and therefore. to the material principle. If Bacon had 
read this he would probably have nodded in approval. because. for Baoon. 
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the rational soul and the possible intellect are the same. But Bonaventure 
still anxious to preserve something besides passivity to the human soul 
and anxious to safeguard the Augustinian principle of the spontaneity of 
•• the soul, says, that if this is our conclusion, then we might as well 
believe that anything having a material principle must have this swne 
possible intellect, and then indeed, why do ~e call one a possible 
intellect and the other matter?6 
Acting and passive factors are necessary to explain the actions of 
creatures who know-not and then kn~l. This premise Peckham had inherited 
fram Aristot~ by way of Bonaventure, but his treatment of the active 
factor draws from Bonaventure's consideration of the nature of the Eternal 
Reasons a little more of the nature of a uncreated agent intellect than 
is understood in Bonaventure. In the soul itslef, certainly, there must 
be an active and a passive principle, because it is the soul which knows •• 
And, Peckhwn says that· the agent intellect, as it is part of the soul, 
transforms the possible intellect into the similitudes of intel1igib~s 
and moves the possible intellect so that the intellect is brought to the 
light conferring illumination from above. So, the created intellect, 
agent and possible, is ordered to Creative Light, as to the origin and the 
end of the incommutable truths which it grasps. 
Now, this created agent intellect is more efficacious in its 
operations than is the intellectus possibilis which Bacon had defined as 
6Ibidam, pp. 50-51 and note 17, pp. 42-43. 
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the human soul; still it is not so efficacious as the created agent 
intelleot desoribed by Alexander and Bonaventure. Peckham. interpreting 
Aristotle's words in much the same way that Bacon had. holds that properly 
•• 
speaking the agent intellect must be God. This does not mean that Peckham 
holds that the sale cause of knowledge in the creature is God or that the 
creature is merely the material cause. but r~her that God so cooperates 
in the intellectual operation by which the creature attains truth. that 
the creature is enabled to reach and grasp immutable truth. Since every 
operation is fram God. the created intellect depends upon and is suspended 
fram God as the Light whioh enlightens. i~erefore. rather than exclude 
the created agent intellect. Peckham'S potition includes it and the 
intelligible object as well, However, the created agent intelleot oannot 
exercise its proper functions without the more-than-providential, the 
more-than-conserving oooperation of God, the enlightening light which is .~ 
truly and reily the agent intellect.7 
Not so clearly defined is the created agent intellect desoribed by 
Marston. Peokhamts student. For him the created agent intellect is a I 
created light, a light derived fram the uncreated light. That this created 
agent intelleot is not readily oonoluded fram the text. However, his 
treatment of the 'lumen derivatum' is suoh that one is reminded of the 
7Chapter IV, notes 16. 31. and 34. 
123 • 
. ,' 
created agent intellect in Peckham's treatise. Marston does not here 
assign a specific function to the created light, but he does maintain' that 
this derived light is not self-sufficient in the attainment of truth • 
. 
.. .. , 
Marston considers the human intellect as a created light derived fram 
the uncreated light, and he thereby treats of two lights. The function of 
this created light is known in virtue of the.distinction between what 
the soul sees in itself and what it sees in an eternal light. What is 
sees in itself it sees in a natural light. but it cannot be that immutable 
truth is seen in this srume light. Rather we must say with Peokhmn that 
the soul regards immutable truth in the eternal light, which is the 
equivalent of saying that the soul knows in the Eternal Reasons, or that 
the soul in 'someway' attains to the Eternal Rules. So. from the 
Marstonianconclusions. it is understood that the agent intellect inasmuch 
as it sufficiently explains the attainment of eternal truth and simply 
natural. created truth. is God. 8 
Now. not only do Marston's conclusions lead to this. but his 
interpretations of Aristotle do also: The Philosopher has said that the 
agent intellect is separated 'seoundum esse et sub stanti am , fram the 
possible; that the agent intellect is incorruptible as regards both~ 
, 
and substance; that the agent intellect is to the possible as the artist 
to the materials upon whioh he works; or as the light of the sun to colors. 
All these are oomparable. neither to the rational soul nor to the angel. 
but to God Himself. Therefore the agent intelleot is God.9 
~~~i8~er V, notes 4, p. 86; 5, p. 86; 28, p. 96; 22, p. 94. 
124. 
It is possible from all this to say that Marston resembles Peokham 
both in his generous tributes to the uncreated and in his limitations to 
created natures_ In his considerations that the created intellect is effi-
. 
• 4"7 
cacious he resembles the other Bonaventurians. His limiting and reducing 
of the creature's oausality in the order of knowledge and his aoknowledge-
ment of the creature' sneed of Divine interv\ntion in its intellectual 
activity, define the development which progresses from one philosopher's 
doctrine to another. Alexander's need of an Eternal Light becomes more 
pronounced. in Bonaventure's 'someway' attainment of the Eternal Rules. 
This taken over by Peckham stressed the need of the Eternal Light by the 
created Agent intellect. Marston so worded the arguments for it that one 
could not help but feel that much more is granted to the nature of the 
First Efficient in t he order of the creature's activity than is granted 
to the nature supposedly endowed with its own proper activities and the 
... 
means of exercising them_ Marston, taking this attitude from his master, 
gave still more to the oausal action of divine light and less to God-imaged 
beings. 
All these Christian philosophers were seeking a place for Augustine's 
divine illumination, which would in harmony with the current theory of 
Aristotle's abstraction. Thus they tried to declare at one and the same 
t:ime that knowledge came from God, (and thus had its source in what is 
above the soul), and that knowledge had a natural order. In a doctrine 
of this kind, of course, the problem is the part left to the created 
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intellect, and more specifically to the created agent intellect. All 
that can be said regarding the foundation natural to human knowledge in 
tenns of an Augustinian metaphysics has been said by these men, all of 
. .., 
whom are constantly recalling that eternal truth is the source of 
irrefragible rational truth, that the eternal light is the source of 
all created intellectual light. Truth above iPe mind, truth on the mind, 
truth irradiating the mind, is the principle and the fount of human 
wisdom. Without the interposition of any object, divine truth penneates 
and completes created truth, thereby perfecting the human intellect. 
Divine truth, being the First Truth in the order of Truth, is the first 
cause of knowledge itself. 
Let it be said that these Franciscans, guided by Augustine in their 
interpretations of philosophic doctrines, are all agreed, despite the 
broad surface differences in their solutions, that God is supra intelli- .~ 
gentiam. sive humanam. ~ a.ngelioam., that God is separated as the infinite 
from the finite, as the eternal from the temporal, as the changeless from 
the ohanging; He is separated, in the Latinized words of Aristotle, 
seoundum esse et substantiam.. All the Friars seem to maintain that 
complete truth requires more than that the creature know. The created 
intellect must in some way know in the completeness, in the f'ulness, and 
in the richness of the Eternal Verities. And so, although in the main 
their cammon doctrines were taken from Augustine and Aristotle, it must be 
held that in this description of Franciscan views of intelleotual aotivity 
there is not given a closed theory of knowledge. 
I 
.' 
We have not been able to find a text of Aristotle's De Anima. III. 5. 
which fits precisely the quotations of Rd~ei7Bacon. In lieu of that we 
have thought it best to give the translation given by Pirotta in his 
edition of the Commentary of St. Thomas on the De Anima. which text 
Pirotta attributes to ~~. of Moerbecke. In this we have at least a 
contemporary text. 
ARISTOTLE: De Anima. III. 00 5. Bkkr. 430a 10-26 
(Pirotta: Cam. S. Thomae Aquinatis in Aris-
totelis Librum De Anima. III. lect. Xl 
Taurini. 1925) 
Quoni~ autem sieut in amni natura est aliquid. hoc quidem materis 
unicuique generi. hoc autem est potentia amnis ilIa. alterum autam oausa 
et faotivum. quod in faoiendo amnia. ut ars ad materi~ sustinuit. neoesse 
et in anima has esse differentias. Et est intelleetus hio quidam talis 
in amnis fieri. ille vero in amnia faoere. sieut habitus quid~. et sicut 
lumen. Quodwn enim modo. et lumen facit potentia existentes colores. aotu 
oolores. 
Et hie intelleotus separabilis. et impassibilis et immixtus. 
substantia aotu ens. Semper enim honorabilius est agens patiente. et 
prinoipium materia. 
Idem autem est seoundum actum sci entia rei; quae vero 
secundum potenti~. tempore prior in uno est. Omnino autem neque tampore. 
Sed non aliquando quidem intelligit. aliquando non intelligit. 
Separatus autam est solum hoc. quod vere est. Et hoc solum 
immortale et perpetuum est. 
Non reminisoitur aut em. quia hoc quidam impassibile est; 
passivus vero intellectus. est corruptibilis. et sine hoc nihil intelligit 
anima. 
126 
BIBLIOGRAPHY 
Alexander of Hales: Summa Theologioa. Quarraohi, new edition, 1928, tomes 
1 and 2. .. ... 
Anselm, St.: Patrologia Latina, vol. 158. 
Aristotle: De Anima: Versio AntiquaJ in Pirotta: S. Thomae 
Aquinatis, In Aristoteli, Librum de Anima Commentarium; 
Taurini, 1925. 
Augustine, st.: Migne, Patro1ogia Latina, vols. 32-46. 
Baoon. Roger: J.H. Bridges: Opus Majus: 2 vols., Oxford. 1897. 
J.S. Brewer: Opera Quaedam Haotenus Inedita: 
London. 1859. 
R. Steele: Opera Haotenus Inedita: 7 faso. Oxford, 
1926. (fase. 1 et 2 used.) 
Bonaventure, St.: ~ Humanae Cognitionis Ratione: Aneodota Quaedam~. 
~onaventurae et nonullorum ipsius Disoipulorum; 
Quarrachi, 1883. 
DeWulf, Maurice: 
Gilson, E.: 
A.C. Peltier; Opera Omnia S. Bonaventurae, 1864-71; 
vols. 2,3,9. 
A-
Histoire ~~ Philosophie medievale, J. Vrin, Paris 
1936, sixth edition. 
Introduction a 1 etude de Saint Augustin, Librairie 
Philosophique J. Vrin, Paris, 1929. 
~ Philosophy ~~. Bonaventure. Sheed and Ward, 
New York, 1940. 
Marston, Roger: Quaestiones Disputatae ~ Anima, Quarrachi. in Bibliotheca 
Franciscana Scho1astica Medii Aevi. tame VII, 1932. 
.' Peckham, John: Quaestiones traotantes de Anima, in Beitrage zur Gesohiohte 
der Philosophie des M1tte1alters, Baeumker and V. Hert1ing. 
Munster, 1916-1918, vol. 19, bund xix, Heft, 5-6; edited 
by Dr. P. Hieronymus Spettmann, O.F.M. 
Roehmer, J.: La theorie de l'abstra±ion dans l'eoole franciscaine d' 
Alexandre de Hales a Jean Peokham; in Arohives d'histoire 
doctrinale et litteraire du moyen age; 1928, vol. 3. 
127 
I 
